

TEMPERAMENT AND THE INTERPRETATION OF FREEDOM

A Study of Some of the Psychological
Determinants of Philosophical Thought

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INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of this dissertation to demonstrate that the major divergences of some interpretations of the philosophical problem of freedom are psychologically determined, with special attention to the doctrines of freedom of William Temple and Nicolas Berdyaev. More specifically, the study will explore the hypothesis that the contrasting doctrines of freedom held by William Temple and Nicolas Berdyaev can be shown to be necessarily relative when examined in correlation with the contrasting psychological types of the two thinkers as their types are definable in terms of C. G. Jung's concept of "extraversion" and "introversion."

Preliminary Definitions and Characterizations

1. William Temple held a doctrine of freedom that was well integrated with his apperception of the authority of the central institutions of his social milieu. It afforded him full scope for creative effort and self-fulfillment within the limits of Anglicanism's doctrinal orthodoxy and its "Church type" (Troeltsch) of ecclesiology on the religious level, and, on the secular level, within the limits of on-going corporate British life. It supported a responsible career of 'loving' reform from within.

2. Nicolas Berdyaev held a doctrine of "original"

or primordial freedom which essentially set him over against tradition and authority, denying him full integration into the social structure and supporting a revolutionary posture in which he took a stance outside the corporate life, a stance which was associated with a strong eschatological emphasis in his thought.

3. "Necessary relativity" means, in the words of Jung, that "every judgment made by an individual is conditioned by his personality type and . . . every point of view is necessarily relative."¹ This means, further, that diversity in philosophical systems is, psychologically speaking, a foregone conclusion.

4. The demonstration of the necessary relativity of the two views of human freedom to be discussed is dependent upon Jung's analysis of the human psyche into "attitudes," consisting of typical combinations of psychic factors which dominate the structure and dynamics of the psychology of individuals. These attitudes are "pre-conditions" of active apperception, determining where the individual's accent of value and reality will fall, whether upon the objective situation itself ("Extraversion") or upon the individual's own relation to the objective situation ("Introversion"). These attitudinal "types"

¹C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 207.

correspond to what is often referred to as "temperament." Jung's analysis gives greater specificity of content to this latter concept, which is usually vaguely defined.

5. The application of this concept of psychological types to the study of the temperaments of Temple and Berdyaev does not constitute a "psychoanalysis" in the Freudian sense. Reductionism is not involved, whereby their creative products are seen as 'nothing but' this or that psychological process. The full integrity of the conscious life of each man is respected, is, indeed the chief datum of this study.

6. Whereas in other 'depth' psychologies the major division of the psyche is indicated by a horizontal line marking off the conscious from the unconscious, in Jung's psychology there is also a set of vertical boundary lines marking off areas of distinct typical attitudes, any one of which may be the constituent factor of some individual consciousness. In Jungian psychology there is no universal, undifferentiated form of consciousness. Jung speaks of heterogeneity when speaking of the conscious mind. He finds homogeneity only at the deepest level of the unconscious, a level which corresponds to the most primitive stage of human development, before the emergence of highly differentiated 'civilized' man and the specialization of modern societies. Jung is a psychologist of

differentiation who seeks to explain the psychological differences among men. It is upon this differentiation that the concept of necessary relativity is based.

Procedure

The demonstration of the hypothesis will correspond with the following procedural steps: (1) Exhibiting the meaning of the concept of psychological types by placing it in the context of Jung's analysis of the structure and dynamics of the whole psyche; the concept has little meaning except in this context. From this procedure will emerge the significance of "necessary relativity." (2) Carefully examining the biographical literature on Temple and Berdyaev for evidence that they are or are not to be correlated with Jung's psychological types. (3) Interpreting the doctrines of freedom of Temple and Berdyaev as revealed in some of their major philosophical writings, and correlating the results with the results of the first two steps above. (4) Interpreting the contrast between the two thinkers in the light of the concept of necessary relativity. (5) Drawing some conclusions and implications from the results of the four preceding steps.

Summary of Some of the Results of the Research

These divergent views of freedom are equally authentic in that they reflect real, though different,

psychologically determined angles of vision which are equally integral to their life orientation. It is not intended in this study to equate authenticity with objective validity. However, the equal authenticity of these diametrically opposed philosophical positions would void the claim to exclusive validity by either. This is to say that each view is necessarily partial. Each of the thinkers, regardless of what he imagines he may have accomplished, has provided only a piece of the jigsaw puzzle, and not the solution to the whole puzzle.

Jung's researches provide psychological justification for this conclusion. Jung views the psyche as a total process, a self-governing system, analogically described as an energetic system. Structurally it consists in a relationship of interacting levels, ranging from the conscious on the surface, through the personal unconscious, to the collective unconscious at the deepest level. The conscious is an emergent from the unconscious and is sustained by the interacting relationship between the two. The individual's conscious assumes a form that is determined by which one of several "function-possibilities" is actualized. By this differentiated mode of functioning the individual carries out his adaptation activities; he is orientated toward reality in a definite direction; his orientation is selective and therefore simultaneously

exclusive. The individual can apprehend reality only in accordance with his limited, selective purview. All apprehensions are limited, but not in the same way, depending upon which, or which combination, of the function-possibilities become differentiated, and how the differentiated function is modified by the individual's habitual deployment of his psychic energy or libido.

Jung distinguishes four ways by which the individual's conscious mind can 'take hold' of reality. These function-possibilities are Thinking, Feeling, Sensation, and Intuition. "Sensation establishes what is actually given, thinking enables us to recognize its meaning, feeling tells us its value, and finally intuition points to the possibilities of the whence and whither that lie within the immediate facts."² Every individual psyche contains all four as possibilities, but one of them becomes more highly differentiated, thus determining the individual's easiest and habitual mode of orientation and hence determining his "Functional type." But the individual's use of his superior function is modified by his introverted or extraverted attitude, or habitually inward-directed or outward-directed flow of psychic energy. This

²C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1933), p. 93.

determines the individual's general attitude type. The individual's typical attitude is his "standpoint," his peculiar "readiness to act or react in a definite direction," the pre-condition of his slant of vision. "Active apperception is impossible without an attitude." When a person speaks from the depths of his type-determined apprehension of reality, his speaking has a deeply personal therefore authentic, quality. By the same token it is also limited.

The evidence shows Temple to be a classical Extravert, with an understanding of freedom that corresponds to his extraversion in that it permits his assimilation to the objective situation. Berdyaev is revealed as a deeply introverted individual, with a view of freedom which found authentic expression in his rebelliousness toward the objective situation in the interests of guarding the "image of God" that was in him and in the interests of an aristocratic view of creativity.

With regard to the problem of freedom, the conclusion of this study is that the types of views represented by Temple and Berdyaev are both authentic, and that it is not wisdom to identify with one to the total exclusion of the other. Since every individual contains within him the possibility of both extraversion and introversion he can, through the awareness of the reality

of, and the acceptance of, his unconscious "attitude" which stands in a bi-polar relation to his conscious "attitude," hold both an extraverted and an introverted view of freedom. This may be done either alternately, or, for some men, simultaneously. But enlargement of consciousness is the pre-requisite to either alternative.

Basic Assumptions

There are two basic assumptions underlying the study: (1) That it is important to find some intelligent and responsible way of relating to the plethora of conflicting philosophies in today's world. (2) That Jung has provided a description of the human psyche which can serve adequately as a basis for so relating to the plurality of philosophies.

CHAPTER I

THE PSYCHE ACCORDING TO JUNG

It may well serve a useful purpose . . . to
speak of the heterogeneity of men.

C. G. Jung

For Carl Gustav Jung, the world of psychic consciousness is a pluralistic world. To be conscious and to differ from other men are one and the same. Individuality is "characterized by its peculiar, and in certain respects, unique psychology."¹ This is the theme of his Psychological Types,² a book which, in his own words, "discussed the various attitudes the conscious mind might take toward the world."³

In giving such prominence to "the heterogeneity of men," Jung deliberately departed from the contemporary prevalent tendency in psychology. He wrote:

I have no doubt that my opponents will be at some pains to eliminate the question of types from the scientific agenda, since, for every theory of complex psychic processes that makes any pretence to general validity, the type problem must, to say the least, be a very unwelcome obstacle. Following the analogy of every natural science theory, which also

¹C. G. Jung, Psychological Types (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1946), p. 560. (Hereafter cited as Psychological.)

²Ibid., the major source for this chapter.

³C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 207.

presupposes one and the same fundamental nature, every theory of complex psychic processes presupposes a uniform human nature.⁴

With an eye upon Freudianism, he wrote in another place:

The reduction of a complex structure to sexuality is only a valid causal explanation if it is agreed beforehand that we are interested only in explaining the function of the sexual component in complex structures. But if we accept the reduction to sexuality as valid, this can be only with the tacit presupposition that we are dealing with an exclusively sexual structure. To assume this, however, is to assert a priori that a complex psychic structure can only be a sexual structure, a manifest petitio principii! It cannot be asserted . . . therefore every explanation on a sexual basis can be only a partial explanation, never an all-sufficing psychological theory.⁵

Reductionism, of whatever sort, is the causal approach, and "Cause alone makes no development possible."⁶ Causality looks to the past and to "the antecedent facts." It "holds the libido fast in the elementary facts."⁷ By "elementary facts" Jung means the collective factors out of which the conscious is differentiated, a process to be noticed presently. The conscious can receive no adequate explanation from the causal viewpoint, Jung believes. From this viewpoint in its Freudian form, "the whole edifice of culture becomes a mere surrogate due

⁴Jung, Psychological, p. 622.

⁵C. G. Jung, Contributions to Analytical Psychology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1928), p. 28. (Cited hereafter as Contributions.)

⁶Ibid., p. 25.

⁷Ibid.

to the impossibility of incest."⁸ Every apparent development is really a "nothing but," reducible with monotonous regularity to sexuality. "From the standpoint of rationalism this is all that can be desired, but from the standpoint of the mind it is a lifeless and comfortless boredom."⁹ The exclusively causal approach depends upon a mechanistic world view according to which an event is the effect of "immutable substances chang(ing) their relationships to one another according to fixed laws."¹⁰ This immutable substance remains the same throughout all changes, even sublimation being "an inept expression for the same old thing."¹¹

From this critique it should not be inferred that Jung categorically rejects the idea of 'one-psychology-for-all.' On the contrary, he writes: "I am myself so profoundly convinced of this homogeneity of the human psyche that I have actually embraced it in the concept of the collective unconscious, as a universal and homogeneous substratum . . ."¹² Yet he insists that a psychology of the homogeneity of the psyche must remain a psychology of the unconscious. But this is never to leave the

⁸Ibid., p. 24.

⁹Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 1.

¹¹Ibid., p. 23.

¹²Jung, Psychological, p. 624. This "substratum" to be related to consciousness presently.

foundation and origins of the psyche, and it

entirely omits that factor which consists in its [the psyche's] historical or individual differentiation. With such a theory, I ignore the psychology of the conscious psyche . . . I practically reduce man to his phylogenetic prototype, or I disintegrate him into his elementary processes . . .¹³

Against this similarity of the psyche at the unconscious level "an equally great dissimilarity of the conscious psyche stands out in all the bolder relief."¹⁴ ". . . the notion of a uniformity of the conscious psyche is an academic chimera, . . . shrinking to nothing in the face of reality."¹⁵ Thus while Jung is a profound psychologist of the unconscious, and while his theory of the conscious mind can be appreciated only when taken in connection with the unconscious, still it is not inaccurate to call him a Psychologist of the Conscious Mind, which is to say that he is a psychologist of the differentiated personality. This is not to say that Jung is the only or most adequate psychologist of consciousness.

I. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PSYCHE

If consciousness is marked chiefly by its differentiation, what then is its relation to general psychological principles? Can the conscious be fitted into a

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

comprehensive and unifying view of the psyche? Jung takes the view that it can be.

The starting point for Jung's psychological system is his belief in the "full reality of the psyche," as one prominent Jungian phrases it.¹⁶ Psychology is for him "a field of study based on the assumption of an autonomous psyche."¹⁷ This is in contrast to "the modern preference for physical grounds of explanation [which] leads to a 'psychology without the psyche'."¹⁸ "Today the psyche does not build itself a body, but on the contrary, matter, by chemical action, produces the psyche." Yet Jung does not deny a close connection between the psyche and "the physiological structure of the brain, with the glands, and the body in general." On the contrary, he affirms it, then asks whether, in the face of all these admissions "we must ask ourselves if the psyche is not after all a secondary manifestation--an epiphenomenon--and completely dependent upon the body."¹⁹ Still the view of an objective and independent psyche is empirically

¹⁶Jolan Jacobi, The Psychology of Jung (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 1.

¹⁷C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of A Soul (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1933), p. 180.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 179.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 178.

justified:

All that I experience is psychic. Even physical pain is a psychic event that belongs to my experience. My sense-impressions--for all that they force upon me a world of impenetrable objects occupying space--are psychic images, and these alone are my immediate experience, for they alone are the immediate objects of my consciousness. My own psyche even transforms and falsifies reality, and it does this to such a degree that I must resort to artificial means to determine what things are like apart from myself. Then I discover that a tone is a vibration of the air of such and such a frequency . . . We are in all truth so enclosed by psychic images that we cannot penetrate to the essence of things external to ourselves. All our knowledge is conditioned by the psyche which, because it alone is immediate, is superlatively real. Here is a reality to which the psychologist can appeal--namely psychic reality.²⁰

What is the psyche? It is "the totality of all the psychic processes, both conscious as well as unconscious."²¹ This means that the psyche is bi-polar and can be viewed either from the conscious or from the unconscious standpoint. Here again Jung stands in contrast to Freud. For Freud, the entire psyche is viewed from the standpoint of consciousness, strange as this may seem in view of the fact that his well-deserved fame rests largely upon his revelations of the unconscious. Jung is accurate when he says that Freud assumes an external approach, from the side of consciousness, to be the only possible approach to the unconscious.²² Jung

²⁰ Ibid., p. 190.

²¹ Jung, Psychological, p. 588.

²² Jung, Modern Man, p. 187.

writes:

In Freud's view, as most people know, the contents of the unconscious are limited to infantile tendencies which are repressed because of their incompatible character . . . Through analysis the repressions are removed and the repressed wishes made conscious . . . According to this theory, the unconscious contains only those parts of the personality which could just as well be conscious and are in fact suppressed only through upbringing.²³

By contrast, Jung affirms that "The unconscious . . . includes not only repressed contents, but also all psychic material that lies below the threshold of consciousness. It is impossible to explain the subliminal nature of all this material on the principle of repression; otherwise, through the removal of repressions, a man would acquire a phenomenal memory which would thenceforth forget nothing."²⁴ In the following two passages Jung reveals a view of the nature of the unconscious that differs both structurally and dynamically from that of Freud:

We . . . emphatically say that in addition to the repressed material the unconscious contains all those psychic components that have fallen below the threshold, including subliminal sense-perceptions. Moreover, we know, from abundant experience as well as for theoretical reasons, that the unconscious also contains components that have not yet reached the threshold of consciousness. These are the seeds

²³C. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), p. 136. (Cited hereafter as Two Essays.)

²⁴Ibid., p. 136.

of future conscious contents. Equally we have reason to suppose that the unconscious is never at rest in the sense of being inactive, but is continually engaged in grouping and regrouping its contents. Only in pathological cases can this activity be regarded as completely autonomous; normally it is coordinated with the conscious mind in a compensatory relationship.²⁵

Again, after discussing some archaic images produced by the dreams of a patient, which could not be accounted for as having their origin in the patient's personal life, Jung says:

In view of these facts we must assume that the unconscious contains not only personal, but also impersonal, collective components in the form of inherited categories or arche-types. I have therefore advanced the hypothesis that at its deeper levels the unconscious possesses collective contents in a relatively active state. That is why I speak of the collective unconscious.²⁶

To specify further the concepts involved in Jung's view of the unconscious, the concept of the unconscious itself is "an exclusively psychological concept."²⁷ It carries no metaphysical connotations. It is a "psychological boundary-concept," covering all the psychic contents or processes which are "not related to the ego in a perceptible way."²⁸ One is justified in speaking of it at all solely on the basis of experience.²⁹ Experience

²⁵Ibid., pp. 136-37.

²⁶Ibid., p. 147.

²⁷Jung, Psychological, p. 613.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

alone must decide all questions concerning the nature and contents of the unconscious. And on this basis of experience Jung feels himself forced to view the "fundamental distinction" in the unconscious not as that between "pre-conscious" or "subconscious" on the one hand and "unconscious" on the other, but as that between the "personal unconscious" and the "collective unconscious."³⁰

The criterion for assigning a manifest psychic content to one division or the other is whether or not the content corresponds to experiences acquired during the individual's life. Jungians generally assign the "preconscious" ("a region of subliminal contents waiting . . . for a summons before they enter into consciousness") and the "subconscious" (" . . . unrecalled, unintended, and unnoticed matters") to the personal unconscious.³¹ But there are also manifest contents which "break immediately out of the deepest, most obscure centre of our unconscious, never wholly to be made conscious," having a "wholly autonomous character" and often associated with the neuroses and psychoses as well as with the "visions and hallucinations of creative spirits."³² In addition,

³⁰Jung, Two Essays, p. 145.

³¹Jacobi, op. cit., p. 31.

³²Ibid.

there are archaic images "of world-wide distribution," "inherited thought-patterns."³³ These no longer correspond to the individual's experiences and are, therefore, assigned to the collective unconscious.

It is clear, then, that all that is normally included in the Freudian conception of the unconscious belongs, on the Jungian view, solely to the personal unconscious. Thus the farthest downward limit of the Freudian unconscious is merely a boundary marking the beginning of a limitless region of which the contents possess an objective character in the sense that they have no perceptible correspondence to the individual's lifetime experiences, and in the sense that they have a universal distribution.

Before describing the structure of the conscious, it is convenient at this point to clarify the relation of the conscious and the unconscious. The relatively autonomous psychic reality which Jung studies is essentially a system of functional relationships, designable as the totality of conscious and unconscious functions. Consciousness is defined by Jung as "the function or activity which maintains the relation of the psychic contents to the ego."³⁴ The ego, in turn, is "a complex of

³³Jung, Two Essays, p. 147.

³⁴Jung, Psychological, p. 536.

representations which constitutes the centrum of my field of consciousness and appears to possess a very high degree of continuity and identity."³⁵ The function of the ego, Jacobi says, is "concerned, especially in our Western culture, with adjustment to external reality."³⁶ But it is only one of a number of function complexes, including those of the unconscious, which make up the total psyche: it is "only the centrum" of the field of consciousness. The conscious, then, intervenes, so to speak, between the ego and the unconscious reaches of the total psyche. It is the transition area in which the contents of the unconscious enter into a sensed relation to the ego, thus conditioning the individual's adjustment to external reality.

Jacobi describes the consciousness as floating "as a little island on the boundless sea of the unconscious."³⁷ The contents of the collective part of the unconscious are derived from "the inherited possibility of psychical functioning in general, namely from the inherited brain structure."³⁸ The unconscious, older than the conscious, is "the 'primal datum' out of which consciousness ever afresh arises."³⁹ Having in mind the

³⁵Ibid., p. 540.

³⁶Jacobi, op. cit., p. 6.

³⁷Ibid., p. 5.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹C. G. Jung, Seminar on Children's Dreams (privately printed and circulated), cited by Jacobi, op. cit., p. 7.

totality of the unconscious, Jung writes, ". . . it contains . . . an indeterminable number of subliminal perceptions, an immense fund of accumulated inheritance-factors left by one generation of men after another, whose mere existence marks a step in the differentiation of the species."⁴⁰ The unconscious did not come into being "with the existence and consciousness of the individual. But the truth is that the unconscious is always there beforehand as a potential system of psychic functioning handed down by generations of men. Consciousness is a late-born descendant of the unconscious psyche."⁴¹ Again, "The collective unconscious is the mighty spiritual inheritance of human development, reborn in every individual constitution."⁴²

Two diagrams, reproduced hereafter from Jacobi's book The Psychology of Jung (pages 33 and 34), serve to represent the relation of the conscious and the unconscious. Jacobi's explanation of Diagram XI, a phylogenetic scheme, is as follows:

At the very bottom lies the unfathomable, the central force out of which at one time the individual psyche has been differentiated. This central force goes through all further differentiations and isolations, lives in them all, cuts

⁴⁰Jung, Modern Man, p. 186.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 187.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 33-34.




DIAGRAM XI

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------|
| I. Single Nations. | |
| II and III. Groups of Nations (e.g., Europe). | |
| A. Individual. | E. Groups of People. |
| B. Family. | F. Primitive Human Ancestors. |
| C. Tribe. | G. Animal Ancestors. |
| D. Nation. | H. Central Force. |

FIGURE 1

A PHYLOGENETIC SCHEME




DIAGRAM X

1. The Ego.
2. Consciousness.
3. The Personal Unconscious.
4. The Collective Unconscious.

FIGURE 2

AN ONTOGENETIC SCHEME

through them to the individual psyche, as the only one that goes absolutely unchanged and undivided through all the layers. Above the "unfathomable ground" is the sediment from the experience of all our animal, above that of our oldest human, ancestors. Every section stands for a further differentiation of the collective psyche, until, proceeding from human to national groups, from the tribe to the family, the height of the individual, unique psyche is reached.⁴³

In Diagram X, an ontogenetic scheme, the lowest and largest section of the cone represents the collective unconscious. "On it rests the others, lying one upon the other and becoming ever narrower; finally comes the ego at the top." In Jung's own words, ". . . the conscious and personal psyche [rests] upon a broad basis of an inherited and universal psychic disposition which is as such unconscious, and . . . our personal psyche bears the same relation to the collective psyche as the individual to society."⁴⁴

II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSCIOUS

What, then, is the psychology and structure of the conscious? What determines the psychological character of the individual? Crucial to this question is Jung's concept of the psychological "function." He defines function as "a certain form of psychic activity that remains

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Jung, Two Essays, p. 156.

theoretically the same under varying circumstances."⁴⁵
 The emphasis falls upon the mode of "receiving and working up contents presented from without or within."⁴⁶ The momentary contents are irrelevant. For example, one individual will "habitually bring given presentations into conceptual connection," which is Jung's definition of what he terms the "Thinking" function.⁴⁷ Jacobi says, in describing this function, "The decisive fact is . . . not what one thinks, but that one employs one's intellectual function and not, for instance, one's intuition . . ."⁴⁸
 The thinking of one who habitually employs the Thinking function is not mere rumination, but is a consciously directed process whose aim is to reach a logical conclusion, which, having been reached, possesses "an absolute validity . . . whether as motive or as guarantee of practical action, without the backing of any further evidence."⁴⁹

In our rationalized, technicized Western culture the Thinking function is most highly favored. One sees little placards in offices and workshops, exhorting one to "THINK." From the psychological point of view they could

⁴⁵Jung, Psychological, p. 547.

⁴⁶Jacobi, op. cit., p. 10.

⁴⁷Psychological, p. 611.

⁴⁸Jacobi, loc. cit.

⁴⁹Psychological, p. 514.

just as legitimately exhort us to "OBSERVE," to "INTUIT," or to "FEEL." These, too, are basic functions integral to the psychic constitution of everyone. Jung calls these others "Intuition," "Feeling," and "Sensation." He defines Intuition as "that function which transmits perceptions in an unconscious way."⁵⁰ Though distinct from the other functions, Intuition may appear in any of them. Presenting its contents as something having the character of "being given," not derived, and as "a complete whole, without our being able to explain or discover in what way this content has been arrived at," intuitive cognition "possesses an intrinsic character of certainty and conviction."⁵¹ The certainty of intuition "depends upon a definite psychic matter of fact, of whose origin and state of readiness, however, the subject was quite unconscious."⁵² The subject can, of course, become conscious of the fact that he is apprehending a given content as a whole and with certitude, but he is unaware of the mechanism by which this occurs. Intuition gives information concerning future possibilities and of the "atmosphere" surrounding a given situation.⁵³

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 568.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Frieda Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), p. 35.

Feeling, Jung defines as "primarily a process that takes place between the ego and a given content, a process moreover, that imparts to the content a definite value in the sense of acceptance or rejection ('like' or 'dislike')." ⁵⁴ It is an entirely "subjective" process which constitutes a kind of "judging," differing, however, from an intellectual judgment "in that it does not aim at establishing an intellectual connection but is solely concerned with the setting up of a subjective criterion of acceptance or rejection." ⁵⁵ Where thinking judges in terms of true or false, feeling judges in terms of good or bad.

Sensation is identical with sense-perception. Jung defines it as "that psychological function which transmits a physical stimulus to perception." ⁵⁶ It is "perception transmitted via the sense organs and 'bodily senses' (kinaesthetic, vaso-motor, sensation, etc.)".

By means of these four basic functions the consciousness carries on its special task of adaptation to outer or inner reality. All four functions are present in every individual psyche. "That there are exactly four is a matter of empirical fact. But . . . a certain

⁵⁴Jung, Psychological, p. 543.

⁵⁵Ibid.

⁵⁶Psychological, p. 585.

completeness is attained by these four. Sensation establishes what is actually given, thinking enables us to recognize its meaning, feeling tells us its value, and finally intuition points to the possibilities of the whence and whither that lie within the immediate facts."⁵⁷ The four can be divided into pairs on the basis of their "rational" or "irrational" nature. Thinking and feeling are termed by Jung the rational functions, on the grounds that each of them in its own way makes judgments. Sensation and intuition are irrational, because both are forms of perception of what is 'there.'

The four functions are basic to Jung's typology, for one or the other of the four is more highly differentiated in each of us than are the others. In some cases the mind works most effortlessly and naturally in terms of one of the rational functions, while in others one of the irrational functions is the natural way. Some minds, therefore, are essentially perceptive, while others are essentially judgmental. Yet even within the same category individuals are polar opposites in the character of their conscious orientation. Thinking and feeling are antagonistic, and so are intuition and sensation. "When we think it is in order to judge or reach a conclusion, and

⁵⁷Jung, Modern Man, p. 93.

when we feel it is in order to attach a proper value to something . . ."⁵⁸ The thinking type does not wish to becloud logic with feeling, while the feeling type is apt to disdain the 'cold,' 'hairsplitting' tendencies of the former. As to the antagonism of intuition and sensation, Jung says, "When I try to assure myself with my eyes and ears of what actually occurs, I cannot at the same time give way to dreams and fantasies as to what lies around the corner."⁵⁹ The most highly differentiated function of the individual is called by Jung the "superior" function. It is recognized by its "strength, stability, constancy, trustworthiness and service in adaptedness."⁶⁰

But since all four functions belong constitutionally to every individual psyche, one of them becomes differentiated at the expense of the others. The undifferentiated functions remain in a "more or less primitive and infantile state, often only half-conscious, or even quite unconscious." These are "inferior" functions, inferior meaning simply undifferentiated and implying no value judgment. This inferiority "is characteristic of each type and is an integral part of the total character."⁶¹ One is at a disadvantage in using one's inferior

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 91.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 92.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 93.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 92.

function because it cannot be directed and may even make one its victim. When the inferior function rises to consciousness it comes as an invader, so that the feeling function of the thinking type, for example, manifests itself in a childish and archaic form.

Jolan Jacobi has, again, provided diagrammatic illustration of these and other features of the structure of the conscious. In her Diagram V, reproduced on the following page, the circle represents the totality of the individual psyche and shows that all four functions are present in every individual. Imagining this Chinese Taigitu-sign, for a moment, to be a compass, either of the pairs of functions may be represented by the North--South axis, and either pair by the East--West axis. In this diagram it is assumed that Thought is in the differentiated position, and stands at the North. Its opposite is Feeling, which stands at the South pole. The East--West axis thus represents Intuition and Sensation respectively. It should be remembered that any one of the functions could be 'North.' The lower, or 'Southern,' half of the circle represents the unconscious portion of the psyche. Thus that function which is opposite to the most highly differentiated function lies wholly in the unconscious, where for most people it remains unless it irrupts into consciousness with primitive force. In the




FIGURE 3
STRUCTURES OF THE CONSCIOUS

most highly "individuated" persons it is at the disposal of the will, but can be used only alternately, not simultaneously, with the differentiated function. The functions corresponding to the East--West axis lie partly in the unconscious and partly in the conscious. Following the course of the arrow, we see that the individual has one principal function by which he habitually orients himself to the world. In addition, he has one "Auxiliary" function, Intuition in this case, which, because it lies partly in the conscious, can be partially utilized. The third function, in this case Sensation, is seldom available as an auxiliary, and the fourth never, for the ordinary person. The use of all four functions would be the ideal state of integration, of full consciousness, and is a vital aspect of the ideal goal of Jungian analysis.

In actual fact, the pure type is seldom found. Most individuals will utilize adjacent functions in some sort of mixture. Thus we can imagine our 'compass' to have two more axes: the 'Northeast--Southwest' ("Intuitively Speculative Thought--Sensory Feeling") and the 'Southeast--Northwest' ("Intuitive Feeling--Empiric Thought").⁶² Only the preponderance of one function over

⁶²Jacobi, op. cit., p. 17.

the other determines the individual's type. The point is important as a guard against the impression that Jung likes to place people in hard-and-fast categories. The essential point is that the conscious performs its adaptive task in terms of the four functions described, or some combination of them. Hence there is a real psychology of consciousness, a genuine phenomenological approach. There are real differentiations in conscious adaptation which provide the basis for a valid type-theory. "I value the type-theory," writes Jung, "for the objective reason that it offers a system of comparison and orientation which makes possible something that has long been lacking, a critical psychology."⁶³

III. INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION

There is another dimension of conscious differentiation to be considered. Individuals sharing the same principal function can also be polar opposites in terms of Jung's famous Introversion and Extraversion, which he terms "attitudes" toward the objective realm.

Let us assume that an individual's superior function is Thought. As a function of adaptation, his thought is "directed." That is, being differentiated, his thought

⁶³Jung, Modern Man, p. 94.

can serve the adaptation process by being capable of direction. As Jung says, "Without differentiation direction is impossible, since the direction of a function is dependent upon the isolation and exclusion of the irrelevant."⁶⁴ A differentiated thinking function then, thinks to some purpose, chooses between the relevant and the irrelevant. Clearly, therefore, the differentiated function becomes laden with a selected content. In the most general terms this selectivity is determined by Introversion or Extraversion, by the individual's negative or positive orientation toward the object. In the first instance the individual turns from the object and toward the subject. Accordingly, his superior function has a subjective character of content. In the second, he turns toward the object, and his superior function is redolent of the external world. Combining each of the four basic functions with Introversion and Extraversion, we get eight possibilities of typical differentiations of the conscious.

There is a widespread impression that Extraversion is more reality-orientated than Introversion. Many people recognize as genuine thought only what Jung terms Extraverted Thought. Jung points out, however, that there is another kind of genuine thinking, namely, Introverted

⁶⁴Jung, Psychological, p. 140.

Thinking. His contention justifies a long quotation:

I reach this other kind of thinking in the following way. When my thoughts are engaged with a concrete object or general idea in such a way that the course of my thinking eventually leads me back again to my object, this intellectual process is not the only psychic proceeding taking place in me at the moment. I will disregard all those possible sensations and feelings which become noticeable as a more or less disturbing accompaniment to my train of thought, merely emphasizing the fact that this very thinking process which proceeds from objective data and strives again toward the object stands also in a constant relation to the subject. This relation is a condition sine qua non without which no thinking process whatsoever could take place. Even though my thinking process is directed, as far as possible, towards objective data, nevertheless it is my subjective process, and it can neither escape the subjective admixture nor yet dispense with it. Although I try my utmost to give a completely objective direction to my train of thought, even then I cannot exclude the parallel subjective process with its all-embracing participation, without extinguishing the very spark of life from my thought. This parallel subjective process has a natural tendency, only relatively avoidable, to subjectify facts, i.e., to assimilate them to the subject.

Whenever the chief value is given to the subjective process, that other kind of thinking arises which stands opposed to extraverted thinking, namely, that purely subjective orientation of thought which I have termed introverted. A thinking arises from this other orientation that is neither determined by objective facts nor directed toward objective data--a thinking, therefore, that proceeds from subjective data and is directed towards subjective ideas or facts of a subjective character.⁶⁵

These subjective facts are just as objective as

⁶⁵Jung, Psychological, pp. 430-31.

'objective' facts are, just because they are facts. The introverted thinker is no more subjective than is the extraverted thinker, since all thinking is a subjective process. The introvert is simply one for whom the psychic facts have a greater degree of significance than the external facts. The failure to understand this lies at the root of much understanding. For example, Gadison Forstman complains that:

It is characteristic of theologians who have been reared in the subject-object way of getting at things to be incensed at the suggestion that it is invalid to speak of the events in the history of salvation as "objective facts" or of statements in the Bible as "objective truths" and to hurl immediately the charge "subjectivism" supposing that the Christian faith is somehow evaporated into a kind of amorphous, incommunicable feeling.⁶⁶

Forstman continues, "It is unfair . . . to charge them with subjectivism simply because they are not always speaking of 'objective' facts and truths and perhaps even criticizing that kind of terminology." But extraverts and introverts always misunderstand one another, because they see the world from different "angles of vision." "One cannot be introverted or extraverted," writes Jung, "without being so in every respect . . . when a person is

⁶⁶Gadison Forstman, "The Subject-Object Relation and its Relevance to the Problem of Authority," in Papers Read at the 1960 Meeting of the Association of Disciples for Theological Discussion (privately printed and circulated).

extraverted (or introverted), his consciousness as well as his unconscious have definite qualities; . . . his general behaviour, his relation to people, and even the course of his life, show certain typical characteristics."⁶⁷ Either can see the world only in accordance with his type, and the slant of vision of the other seems unreal to him.

"One man's meat is another man's poison."

Introversion and Extraversion are termed "attitudes" by Jung. He defines attitude as "a readiness of the psyche to act or to react in a certain direction." It manifests itself as a selectivity of response. Jung writes:

The state of readiness which I conceive attitude to be, always consists in the presence of a certain subjective constellation, a definite combination of psychic factors or contents, which will either determine action in this or that definite direction, or will comprehend and external stimulus in this or that definite way. Active apperception is impossible without an attitude. An attitude always has an objective; this can be either conscious or unconscious, since in the act of apperceiving a new content a prepared combination of contents unfailingly emphasizes those qualities or motives which appear to belong to the subjective content. Hence a selection or judgment takes place which excludes the irrelevant. As to what is, and what is not, relevant is decided by the already orientated combination or constellation of contents. Whether the attitude's objective be conscious or unconscious is immaterial to its

⁶⁷ Jung, Modern Man, p. 85.

selective effort, since the choice is already given a priori through the attitude, and therefore follows immediately.⁶⁸

Attitude, then, is of absolutely fundamental importance to the existence of psychic individuality. It is the individual's own nerve-end rendition of the general psychological laws, a typical bias which determines the whole psychic process. In fact, "the general attitude effects such immense displacements of energy, and so modifies the relations between individual functions, that resultants are produced which frequently bring the validity of general psychological laws into question."⁶⁹

We have to do here with a priori conditions of thought, which, unlike the Kantian categories, may be of one sort with one individual and of another sort with another.

An individual's differentiation of attitude is not consciously chosen. Frieda Fordham, well known Jungian disciple, thinks it may be innate.⁷⁰ In fact, Jung himself says, "The differentiation of type begins often very early, so early that in certain cases one must speak of

⁶⁸Jung, Psychological, pp. 526-27.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 529.

⁷⁰Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p. 31.

it as being innate."⁷¹ Furthermore, the types have a random distribution, being found "not only among the educated classes, but in every rank of society; with equal distinctness, therefore, our types can be demonstrated among labourers and peasants as among the most differentiated members of a nation . . . one finds the same contrasts amongst women of all classes." Even children of the same family will differ in type. In view of these facts Jung concludes that "The contrast of types, therefore, as a universal psychological phenomenon, must in some way or other have its biological precursor."⁷²

IV. THE DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE

Jung's concept of the libido is profoundly affected by his theory of psychological types, for he found it impossible to reduce all psychological functioning to sexuality or to any other single dynamism. What is required of a psychodynamic theory is that it be capable of accounting for the unmistakable fact of differentiation.

Jung takes libido in its original meaning: "The Latin word libido has by no means an exclusively sexual

⁷¹Jung, Contributions, p. 303.

⁷²Jung, Psychological, p. 414.

meaning, but the general sense of desire, longing, urge."⁷³ He takes the "graphic or perceptual character," but not the definition, from Schopenhauer's "Will" and Bergson's "élan vital."⁷⁴ Thus Jung liberated the libido concept from its fixed attachment to immutable substance, disengaged it from its involvement in the concretism of Freudianism thought, generalized it, and rendered it qualitatively neutral. In his hands it became transmissible, applicable to whatever instincts, drives, urges, interests, attitudes or modes of functioning an individual might possess.

Jung accomplished this by conceiving of the psyche as a system of energy analogously to the concept of energy in physics. His autobiography, published in 1961, throws much light on his motive in developing this theory and on the role which he considered it to have played in his psychological system.

A subject with which I had been deeply concerned ever since my book Symbols of Transformation was the theory of the libido. I conceived the libido as a psychic analogue of physical energy, hence as a more or less quantitative concept, which therefore should not be defined in qualitative terms. My idea was to escape from the then prevailing concretism of the libido theory--in other words, I wished no longer to speak of the instincts of hunger, aggression, and sex, but to regard all these phenomena as expressions of psychic energy.

⁷³Jung, Contributions, p. 32, footnote.

⁷⁴Ibid.

In physics, too, we speak of energy and its various manifestations, such as electricity, light, heat, etc. Here, too, we are dealing primarily with energy, that is to say, with measures of intensity, with greater or less quantities. It can appear in various guises. If we conceive of libido as energy, we can take a comprehensive and unified view. Qualitative questions as to the nature of the libido--whether it be sexuality, power, hunger, or something else--recede into the background. What I wished to do for psychology was to arrive at some logical and thorough view such as is provided in the physical sciences by the theory of energetics. This is what I was after in my paper "On Psychic Energy" (1928). I see man's drives, for example, as various manifestations of energetic processes and thus as forces analogous to heat, light, etc. Just as it would not occur to the modern physicist to derive all forces from, let us say, heat alone, so the psychologist should beware of lumping all instincts under the concept of sexuality.⁷⁵

The libido with which Jung works, therefore, is not recognizable per se. It is "a complete X, a pure hypothesis, a picture or counter . . . an abbreviated expression for the energetic standpoint."⁷⁶

Any of the "specific, dynamic phenomena of the mind" may become so charged with energy that it possesses the power of constellating the individual psyche. The quality of an individual psyche depends entirely upon the form into which the energy passes. "Form gives energy its quality."⁷⁷ Furthermore, when psychic energy passes from

⁷⁵Jung, Memories, pp. 208-9.

⁷⁶Jung, Contributions, p. 33.

⁷⁷Jung, Two Essays, p. 58.

one form into another, or, in Jungian terms, when it is "transformed," the resulting new constellation is relatively, but only relatively, uncontaminated with the quality of the old constellation, so that it is invalid to reduce the former to the latter. This accords with Gordon Allport's concept of "functional autonomy," according to which a controlling "sentiment" becomes independent of possible instinctual origins and becomes itself an initiating source of motivation.⁷⁸

A qualitatively neutral, freely transposable libido is clearly favorable to a psychology of "Becoming," to use Allport's term, for it makes possible the finalistic point of view. Allport regards "becoming" or development, what Jung terms differentiation, as a fact calling for explication, and he thinks this can be provided only by a psychology "that transcends the prevalent tendency to explain mental states exclusively in terms of past occurrences."⁷⁹ Jung, holding that "the reductio ad causam is the very opposite of development," and insisting that "the visible facts of differentiation and development . . . require also the final standpoint," advances

⁷⁸Gordon W. Allport, Personality, A Psychological Approach (New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc., 1937).

⁷⁹Gordon W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 51.

his energetic approach as a solution.⁸⁰ This approach, he said, "is in essence final."⁸¹ In Jung's energetic-final approach, each new development is the intensity equivalent, not the qualitative result, of the preceding conditions. He contrasts the causal and the energetic explanations of psychic development as follows:

According to the causal-mechanistic view, the fact series a-b-c-d appears as follows: a brings about b, b causes c, etc. Here the concept of effect appears as a qualitative characteristic, a virtue of the cause, or, in other words, a dynamis. On the other hand, the final-energetic viewpoint presents the series thus: a-b-c are means toward the transformation of energy, which flows causelessly from a, the "improbable" condition, over into b-c, the "probable" condition. A causal effect is thus quite set aside, inasmuch as only the intensities of the effect are taken into account. In so far as the intensities are the same, we could just as well put w-x-y-z instead of a-b-c-d.

The material of experience is in both cases the series a-b-c-d; the difference is that according to the mechanistic view a dynamism is deduced from the causal effect observed, while the energetic view is concerned with the equivalence of the transformed effect rather than with the causal effect. That is to say, both standpoints have to do with the series a-b-c-d, the one qualitatively, the other quantitatively. The causal mode of thought abstracts the dynamic concept from the material of experience, while the final view applies its pure concept of energy to the field of observation and allows it, as it were, to become a dynamis.⁸²

⁸⁰Jung, Contributions, p. 25.

⁸¹Ibid., p. 1.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 33, 34.

As an example of Jung's manner of explaining psychic phenomena by the means-to-an-end approach, let us consider "regression." By the causal approach regression is regarded as deterioration, as a neurosis. The causalist might say that the regression is a case of mother-fixation. "But," says Jung, "from the final standpoint the libido returns to the mother-imago in order to find there the memory associations by means of which further development can take place, as, for instance, from an emotional system into an intellectual system."⁸³

A very important aspect of Jung's psychology is his conception of the dynamic relations between the conscious and the unconscious. He saw the major role of the unconscious in a positive light, viz., as being compensatory for the one-sidedness of the conscious orientation. In a paper read at Aberdeen in 1914, on the theme of the inseparability of the conscious and the unconscious, he wrote: ". . . unconscious virtues compensate for conscious defects . . . In normal people the principal function of the unconscious is to effect a compensation and to produce a balance. All extreme conscious tendencies are softened and toned down through a counter-impulse in the unconscious."⁸⁴ Consciousness, with its character

⁸³Jung, Contributions, p. 24.

⁸⁴E. A. Bennet, C. G. Jung (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1962), p. 64.

of selectivity and its rigid exclusion of the irrelevant, forces the other functions and attitudes into the unconscious, as we have seen. The inhibited elements lead an "effective existence" in the unconscious, in virtue of which the "form a definite counterweight against the conscious orientation."⁸⁵ The more pronounced the conscious one-sidedness the heavier becomes the counterweight of the unconscious. In a case of extreme conscious one-sidedness the unconscious sets itself up in definite opposition to consciousness, "in which case the compensation appears in the form of a contrasting function."⁸⁶ In less cases compensation "is . . . not so much a contrast as a levelling up or supplementing of the conscious orientation."⁸⁷ The inhibited contents in the unconscious have the potentiality of consciousness: We call the unconscious 'nothing,' says Jung, "and yet it is a reality in potentia."⁸⁸

We see, then, that the psyche is a system of opposites in tensional relation. Polarity is the very crux of Jungian psycho-dynamics. Psychic energy is born

⁸⁵Jung, Psychological, p. 532.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid.

⁸⁸C. G. Jung, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (New York: Bollingen Foundation Inc., 1959), p. 279.

of this polar tension, and what some people take to be a solid and static structure is in reality a bi-polar system in a state of equilibrium, analogously to an electric circuit. "Everything human," writes Jung, ". . . is a phenomenon of energy. Energy necessarily depends on a pre-existing polarity, without which there could be no energy. There must always be high and low, hot and cold, etc., so that the equilibrating process--which is energy--can take place."⁸⁹ Among the polarities discussed by Jung are the conscious and the unconscious, the male and female components of the personality (animus and anima), the public and the secret attitudes (persona and shadow), the extraverted and introverted attitudes, the thinking and feeling and the sensational and intuitive functions.

This matter of the opposites is sufficiently important to merit additional comment. Heraclitus, "who was indeed a very great sage, discovered the most marvelous of psychological laws: the regulative function of the opposites. He called it enantiodromia, a running contrariwise, by which he meant that sooner or later everything runs into its opposite." "War is the father of all and the king of all," said Heraclitus. "Homer was

⁸⁹Jung, Two Essays, p. 85.

wrong in saying: 'Would that strife might perish from among gods and men!' He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away."⁹⁰ It is the balance between opposites that enables the libido to move forward freely in a "continuous satisfaction of the demands of environmental conditions."⁹¹ It is heightened tension between opposites that initiates that process of regression which is the beginning of a new orientation. "The conscious mind . . . perhaps without being aware of it, seeks its unconscious opposite, lacking which it is doomed to stagnation, congestion, and ossification. Life is born only of the spark of opposites."⁹² The porter_ who divides his load, suspending it across both shoulders, moves forward easily. Carrying it on one side only, he stumbles and tires quickly.

V. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE CONSCIOUS

The conscious, then, may be thought of as the visible pole of the bi-polar, relatively closed energy

⁹⁰B.A.G. Fuller, History of Greek Philosophy: Thales to Democritus (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1923), p. 128.

⁹¹Jung, Contributions, p. 35.

⁹²Jung, Two Essays, p. 64.

system which Jung calls the psyche. To speak of the conscious and the unconscious is to speak of a relation, or complex of relations, of energy movements. The conscious owes its existence to the fact that it displaces an enormous amount of energy from that undifferentiated state in which all psychic functions and attitudes exist as potentials, and in which they flow into and out of each other and are mingled with the "slime of the deep," and are for that reason inefficacious in coping with environmental demands. In becoming differentiated, the conscious takes on a very high degree of identity and continuity and forms a definite field having a boundary and a centrum which is the ego. Upon emerging from the unconscious it maintains a relation of tension with its source, and the energy thus generated accrues largely to the conscious for the support of its critical task of meeting environmental demands. For example: Consciousness is the culture-builder, and this includes philosophizing. This power rests upon its power of discrimination, which in turn derives from its high concentration of energy.

The strong energetic value of the conscious contents has an effect like intensive illumination, whereby distinctions become clearly perceptible and mistakes eliminated. In the unconscious, on the contrary, the most heterogeneous elements, in so far as they possess only a vague analogy, may become mutually substituted for each other, just

by virtue of their relative obscurity and frail energetic value.⁹³

This passage occurs in a context in which Jung is discussing the unconscious as "the womb of creative phantasy," so there is no question of denying to unconsciousness an important role in the creation of culture. In fact, the more the unconscious is neglected the more important it becomes in the predicament of civilization. This is the burden of Jung's message when he turns prophet, as he does in The Undiscovered Self.⁹⁴ "Creative phantasy," however, does not depend upon differentiation, but precisely upon the "unconscious instinctive process."⁹⁵ It is obvious that philosophy must be the product of consciousness, for ". . . the whole nature of consciousness is discrimination, distinguishing ego from non-ego, subject from object, yes from no, and so forth . . . Only consciousness can recognize the suitable and distinguish it from the unsuitable and worthless."⁹⁶

But the discriminating conscious is a differentiated conscious, for differentiation is the condition which makes thinking-to-some-purpose possible. Thus we come again to the selectedness of the contents of

⁹³Jung, Psychological, p. 143.

⁹⁴C. G. Jung, The Undiscovered Self (New York: Mentor Books, 1957).

⁹⁵Psychological, p. 142.

⁹⁶Ibid.

consciousness. An individual can philosophize only in terms of conscious contents which have already been screened by the dominant attitude, all that is "irrelevant" having been excluded. Jung has likened the conscious to the pencil-like beam of a searchlight which plays across a darkened landscape. Whatever falls under the illumination of the beam is lifted into consciousness, while the rest remains in the darkness of the individual's unconscious.⁹⁷ But these neglected elements may be lighted up by the consciousness of another individual who has a different orientation. The 'reality' about which a thinker philosophizes, therefore, is reality-as-seen-by-himself. It is that aspect of reality which he is prepared to apprehend by the nature of his differentiation. This does not mean that he misapprehends reality; what he apprehends is real, and therein lies its 'objectivity.' But what he apprehends is only one aspect of the whole, and he apprehends it because as an apprehending instrument he is differentiated for the apprehension of just that aspect. His differentiation constitutes an ineluctable subjective factor in his philosophizing. He is biased, but this bias is not the same as prejudice, for it has to do not with pre-judgment, but with the conditions of any judgment. Nevertheless, it is a

⁹⁷Jung, Contributions, p. 100.

limitation (even though a limitation without which there could be no thinking at all), and it imparts an unavoidable one-sidedness to his creative product.

The energetic concept that applies to this phenomenon is that of the conservation of energy. The energetic-value of the conscious which gives to it its power of discrimination is intercepted from the general flow of the total energetic system, which is a relatively closed system.⁹⁸ Other parts of the psyche must give up some of their energy to supply the conscious mind. For example, it is fundamental to Jung's theory of the neuroses that the unconscious is activated by the loss of energy from the conscious.⁹⁹ As Jacobi expresses it, "In this total system the quantity of energy is constant and only its distribution is variable."¹⁰⁰ Suppose, for instance, that the extraverted attitude and the thinking function receive such an access of energy in the case of an individual that he is the Extraverted Thinking type. The introverted attitude and the other three functions are thus deprived of energy and fall partly or wholly into the unconscious. In this state they lack decisive dynamic

⁹⁸ Jung, Psychological, p. 564.

⁹⁹ This point is made repeatedly in Jung's works, but see Contributions, pp. 18 ff.

¹⁰⁰ Jacobi, op. cit., p. 51.

effectiveness and play little or no part in the creative individual's work, so his creative products bear the stamp of his Extraverted Thinking orientation. But the inhibited factors are merely weakened, not obliterated. If for some reason the individual's habitual orientation can no longer cope with the demands of his environment, that orientation will lose energy and regress to the unconscious where it will accrue to the inhibited factors and lift them into consciousness, thus resulting in a new orientation. Jung says that "No psychic value can vanish without being replaced by an equivalent."¹⁰¹ If, now, the individual produces creative work, such as a philosophy, it will bear the marks of the new orientation and will stand in marked contrast, perhaps even antagonism, to his former work.

There are reasons for philosophical antagonisms, therefore, which are not logical but psychological, and which have to do not with faulty observation, but with necessarily limited observation. Philosophers may also be limited by their conditioned perspectives, e.g., the philosophical tradition in which they were reared or the historical situation of their time, but independently of these each interpreter has his typically structured psychodynamic orientation which imposes a necessary

¹⁰¹Jung, Modern Man, p. 242.

relativity on his work. Every philosophy is the necessary corollary of the typical psychic context in which the philosopher carries on his thinking process.

Proceeding with the analysis, we perceive that it would be ridiculous to base a theory of typical psychic context upon mechanisms which are here today and gone tomorrow. It is the high degree of identity and continuity of an individual's attitude and function which enable us to speak of his psychological "type." Out of the welter of psychic possibilities, how is it that a particular attitude becomes the dominant orientating factor of an individual's conscious existence? How does he come to function in a particular manner?

Of the general attitudes and basic functions revealed by Jung, one of them apparently has an initial advantage toward differentiation. We have seen already that Jung considers this advantage to be innate. In addition to this, the individual's life experience is important. "The general attitude is always a resultant of all the factors that can have an essential influence upon the psyche, such as in-born disposition, education, milieu-influence, experience of life, insight and convictions gained through differentiation, collective ideas, etc."¹⁰² In regard to the differentiated function Jung

¹⁰²Jung, Psychological, p. 528.

writes, "The very conditions of society enforce a man to apply himself first and foremost to the differentiation of that function with which he is either most gifted by Nature, or which provides his most effective means for social success."¹⁰³ With Schiller, Jung believes that in the modern period the individual has declined while culture has advanced. He blames this decline upon the demands of collective culture. Evaluating and rewarding the individual on the basis of his social function, collective culture forced him into one-sided differentiation.

Thus the modern individual sinks to the level of a mere function, because this it is that represents a collective value and alone affords a possibility of livelihood . . . Man no longer appears as man in collective civilization; he is merely represented by a function--nay, further, he is even exclusively identified with this function and denies any responsible membership to the other inferior functions.¹⁰⁴

This situation creates a conflict within the individual, for he holds within himself the possibility of other attitudes and functions. A single function can become differentiated only at the expense of the others, and this means that the superior and inferior functions become antagonists. The conflict is the price paid for collective cultural advance, and for the individual's social success. Jung quotes Schiller approvingly, "There

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 564.

¹⁰⁴Ibid.

was no other means to develop man's manifold capacities than to set them against one another. This antagonism of human qualities is the greatest instrument of culture"¹⁰⁵ The psyche seeks to reduce the conflict by delivering itself over to the domination of the attitude which is in accordance with the superior function. Viewed from the outside, this means that the individual himself accepts his identification with the superior function. He comes to see himself as society sees him. He develops a settled point of view which offers resistance to the invasion of other points of view. He adopts a consciously directed orientation which subjects other psychic functions and attitudes to itself. In short, his life takes on the appearance of being organized around a single principle; he becomes identifiable, a "type." The law of entropy offers a clue to the relative permanence of the psychological types.

By the law of entropy, in the performance of work energy is turned into a diffused form with diminished intensity, not to be re-utilized in the performance of work. "In this way," says Jung, "a closed energetic system gradually reduces its differences in intensity to an even temperature, whereby any further change is prohibited."¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 94.

¹⁰⁶ Jung, Contributions, p. 27.

He applies this to the formation of a typical attitude:

We see this process, for example, in the development of a lasting and relatively unchanging attitude. After violent oscillations at the beginning the contradictions balance each other, and gradually a new attitude develops, the final stability of which is the greater in proportion to the magnitude of the initial differences.¹⁰⁷

The high intensity of energy accompanying the conflict exerts a wide-ranging power of attraction upon the material in the psyche, "constellating it in such a way as to reduce greatly the chances of disturbances that might arise from differences with the material not previously constellated."¹⁰⁸ This far-reaching process of equalization forms an enduring attitude. We have seen already that the dominant attitude or function tends to exclude all material that is alien to the attitude or function.

The elements that "belong" are left to the action of mutual equilibration, and meanwhile are protected from outside disturbing influences. Thus after some time they reach their "probable" condition, which manifests its firmness, for example, in a "lasting" conviction, or in a "deeply-ingrained" view-point, etc.¹⁰⁹

It is, of course, the very stability of attitudes so formed that constitutes the "problem" of the types. How difficult, for instance, for an introverted wife and an

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

extraverted husband to resolve their difficulties! It is not, usually, that they lack the wish to do so, but each by virtue of his type fails continually to 'see' the point of view of the other. And there are divergent philosophers who accuse each other of incompetence, indeed of not being philosophers at all.

It is the task of the following chapter to give a brief descriptive account of the psychological types revealed by Jung.

CHAPTER II

THE TYPES: DESCRIPTION AND EXAMPLES

Jung's researches on the problem of human psychological differences developed out of his response to a painful existential situation, his break with Freud. He knew that the separation did not rest entirely upon intellectual differences. In seeking an explanation, he came across the problem of types: "For it is one's psychological type which from the outset determines and limits a person's judgment."¹ "The book on types yielded the insight that every judgment made by an individual is conditioned by his personality type and that every point of view is necessarily relative."² In chapters I through IV of his Two Essays on Analytical Psychology, published originally soon after his break with Freud, Jung makes a comparative study of the approaches of Freud and Adler to a specific clinical problem. He contrasts the two approaches: ". . . with Freud everything follows from antecedent circumstances according to a rigorous causality, with Adler everything is a teleological 'arrangement' . . . Freud sees his patient in perpetual dependence on,

¹C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 207. (Cited as Memories.)

²Ibid.

and in relation to, significant objects . . . with Adler the emphasis is placed on a subject who, no matter what the object, seeks his own security and supremacy . . ."

Then Jung asks:

Which of the two views is right? . . . One simply cannot lay the two explanations side by side, for they contradict each other absolutely. In the one, the chief and decisive fact is Eros and its destiny; in the other, it is the power of the ego. In the first case, the ego is merely a sort of appendage to Eros; in the second, love is just a means to the end, which is ascendancy . . . both theories are in a large measure correct--that is to say, . . . they both appear to explain their material--it follows that a neurosis must have two opposite aspects, one of which is grasped by the Freudian, the other by the Adlerian theory. But how comes it that each investigator sees only one side, and why does each maintain that he has the only valid view? It must come from the fact that, owing to his psychological peculiarity, each investigator most readily sees that factor in the neurosis which corresponds to his peculiarity . . . The difference can hardly be anything else but a difference of temperaments, a contrast between types of human mentality, one of which finds the determining agency pre-eminently in the subject, the other in the object . . . The spectacle of this dilemma made me ponder the question: are there at least two different human types, one of them more interested in the object, the other more interested in himself?³

The researches thus prompted are expounded in his book Psychological Types. The theory developed therein is an apparatus which Jung has found useful for a discriminating approach to the psychology of the individual. It

³C. G. Jung, Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (New York: Meridian Books, 1956), pp. 45-53. (Cited as Two Essays.)

facilitates the detection, understanding, and treatment of psychological divergences.

I. THE CULTURAL EFFECTS OF THE TYPES

The first two thirds of Psychological Types, is devoted to a study of the "problem of types" in some of the major cultural areas: religion, medicine, philosophy, art, biography, etc. A passage from Heine's Deutschland, stands as the motto of the book:

Plato and Aristotle! These are not merely two systems; they are also types of two distinct human natures, which from immemorial time, under every sort of cloak, stand more or less inimically opposed . . . Enthusiastic, mystical, Platonic natures reveal Christian ideas and their corresponding symbols from the depths of their souls. Practical, ordering, Aristotelian natures build up from these ideals and symbols a solid system, a dogma and a cult. The Church eventually embraces both natures--one of them sheltering among the clergy, while the other finds refuge in monasticism; yet both of them incessantly at feud.⁴

It is Extraversion and Introversion that stand revealed here. Plato turns from the world of objects to construct a world of ideas. Aristotle reveals the clarity of the object in his definitions. In the absence of adequate biographical data Jung does not attempt to say whether the personal psychologies of Plato and Aristotle

⁴C. G. Jung, Psychological Types (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1946), p. 9. (Cited as Psychological.)

correspond to Extraversion and Introversion respectively, though he leaves the strong impression that such was his opinion.⁵

The contrast with Plato is even more strongly marked in the Megarians. Jung interprets the latter as denying the substantiality of the generic concept, and comments:

Naturally the whole position of the Platonic ideas is undermined by this characteristic sort of judgment, for with Plato it is precisely ideas that receive an eternal and immutable validity, while the "actual" and the "multiple" are merely a fugitive reflection. The Cynic-Megarian criticism, on the contrary, from the standpoint of the actual, resolves these generic concepts into purely casuistic and descriptive nomina, without any substantiality. The accent is laid upon the individual thing.⁶

The disagreement here is to be grasped at the psychological level: "Plato's thinking, abstracted and created from the plurality of things synthetic constructive concepts, which designate and express the universal conformities of things as the essentially existent. Their invisible and supra-human quality is directly opposed to the concretism . . . which would reduce the material of thought to the category of the unique, individual, and objective."⁷ This divergence between the abstracting and

⁵Ibid., pp. 50, 51.

⁶Ibid., p. 40.

⁷Ibid., p. 47.

the concretizing habits of thought point to those distinct "attitudes" which are of the essence of Jung's divergent psychological types. Each school can hurl charges of obtuseness and logical inconsistency at the other, but there is no question of an exclusive claim to validity by either. "Both forms of judgment are justifiable, as both are also naturally present in every man."⁸ Neither side can refute the other, for they address each other from incommensurate standpoints. To admit oneself refuted would be to surrender one's supreme value, the reality-principle of one's very orientation to the world. Such a change would not only require, but would itself be, a change of one's psychological type, or the admission to consciousness, on a par with its controlling attitude, of a different attitude which heretofore has been forcibly excluded precisely because of its incompatibility with the ruling attitude.

The Medieval dispute between Nominalism and Realism owed much of its energy to the fact that each side assumed that it was concerned with 'reality' while the opponent was playing with words. The pot called the kettle black. "When, therefore, the nominalist calls to the realist: 'You are dreaming--you think you are dealing with things, but in reality you are only fighting

⁸Ibid.

chimeras,' the realist can answer the nominalist in precisely the same words; for neither is the nominalist concerned with things in themselves, but with words, which he sets in the place of things. Even when for every separate thing he sets a separate word, yet they are always words and not things themselves."⁹ We realize this today to a far greater extent than men of an earlier age, many of whom naively assumed the coincidence of word and thing, so the Nominalists thought they were being the hard-headed, no-nonsense realists in our sense of the term 'realism.' Nominalist and Realist were both partly wrong, therefore, and for the same reason; but they were both partly right, again for the same reason:

In so far as the thing is real, and a word conventionally designates the thing, the word also receives "reality-significance." In so far as the conformity of things is real, the generic concept designating the conformity also receives "reality-significance"; furthermore, it is a significance that is neither greater nor less than that of the word which designates the individual thing.

Jung continues, "The shifting of the accent of value from one side to the other is a matter of individual attitude and contemporary psychology." Jung does not mean here that the shift is a matter of taste; he uses the term "attitude" in his technical sense, to mean a general psychic orientation which "screens out" the "irrelevant,"

⁹Ibid., p. 46.

so that one attitude simply cannot see the point of view of a different attitude. The shifting of the accent is a function of the predominance of one or the other of ". . . the abstract standpoint--in which the decisive value lies in the thought process itself--and the specific thinking and feeling upon which . . . the objective orientation is based."¹⁰

The influence of typical psychic orientations is further revealed by Jung in his discussion of the differences between two towering Christian figures, Tertullian and Origen.¹¹ Origen, in whom ". . . the two spheres of Grecian philosophy and the Gnosis on the one hand, and the world of Christian ideas on the other, peacefully and harmoniously mingle," was the "absolute opposite of Tertullian." In Tertullian,

That psychological process which we call the Christian led him to the sacrifice, the amputation, of the most valuable function . . . His most valuable organ was the intellect, including that clear discernment of which it was the instrument. Through the sacrificium intellectus, the way of purely intellectual development was forbidden him; it forced him to recognize the irrational dynamis of the soul as the foundation of his being.

This orientation toward the inner reality led to his "incomparable formula 'anima naturaliter Christiana'."

¹⁰Ibid., p. 50.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 19-30.

(The soul is naturally Christian.") This marks Tertullian as a "classical representative of the introverted thinking type." "The intellectuality of the Gnosis . . . must necessarily have been odious to him, for that was just the way he had to forsake, in order to recognize the principle of feeling."

Origen, on the other hand, ". . . is a classical example of the extraverted type. His basic orientation is toward the object; this shows itself in his conscientious consideration of objective facts and their conditions; it is also revealed in the formulation of that supreme principle: 'Amor et Visio Dei!'" This type of radical relation to the object has ever symbolically "expressed itself in sexuality," consequently, "Castration . . . is the adequate symbol of the sacrifice of the most valuable function." By this drastic act Origen "freed himself from the sensuality that was coupled with Gnosticism; he could then yield himself unafraid to the riches of Gnostic thought, while Tertullian, through his sacrifice of intellect, turned away from the Gnosis, but thereby reached a depth of religious feeling that we miss in Origen."

Tertullian's temper of mind was legalistic, as revealed in his writings, yet McGiffert considered him

"one of the most original of thinkers."¹² With his keen intellect he probably could have made a most capable philosopher, but he put this beyond reach by his violent rejection of the Hellenizing tendencies of the East.

The contrast of attitudes between Origen and Tertullian is clear. Origen declared that it is impossible for a Christian to be truly pious if he does not philosophize.¹³ For Tertullian, piety consisted in heeding the "naturally Christian" witness of the soul:

I summon a new witness, or rather a witness more known than any written monument, more debated than any system of life, more published abroad than any promulgation, greater than the whole of man, yea that which constitutes the whole man. Approach then, O my soul . . . But I call thee not, O soul, as proclaiming wisdom, trained in the schools, conversant with libraries, fed and nourished in the academies and pillared halls of Attica. No, I would speak with thee, O soul, as wondrous simple and uneducated, awkward and inexperienced, such as thou art for those who have nothing else but thee, even as thou comest from the alleys, from the street-corners, and from the work-shops. It is just thy ignorance I need.¹⁴

Jung thinks that Tertullian "sensed in himself" the "necessity of the religious process" and that this was "the real ground of his faith."¹⁵ His soul guaranteed what authority enjoined, for in his polemics Tertullian

¹²Arthur Cushman McGiffert, History of Christian Thought (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), II, 7.

¹³Ibid., p. 209.

¹⁴Jung, Psychological, p. 22.

¹⁵Ibid.

was a great authoritarian. The witness of his soul must have come to him with intense feeling, the strength of which is evident in the violence of his way with heretics. That his feelings held sway over external authority is suggested by his defection to the Montanists, and his subsequent violent attack on the pope. Original thinker but no rationalist, Tertullian's keen intellect was primarily in the service of his inner processes. He was an Introvert.

For Tertullian, sin lay in the will and consisted in disobedience to the will of God. To such a view the daring speculations of Hellenistic theology lay perilously close to sin. There is one pure and definite thing which God requires all men to believe. They must seek until they find it; it lies in what Christ taught. Having found it, they are to seek no farther. "To know nothing contrary to the rule (i.e., the rule of faith) is to know everything."¹⁶ Such highly differentiated attitudes maintain themselves only by relentless exclusion of the irrelevant, hence the odiousness of philosophy for Tertullian. For Origen, on the contrary, sin is concupiscence. That is, concupiscence is the result of man's involvement in the material world, which in turn is the result of his pre-existent fall. As Reinhold Niebuhr says of Origen,

¹⁶McGiffert, op. cit., p. 16.

"For him therefore sex, as the consequence of this mutability, was the particular symbol of sin."¹⁷ Since sex is also the supreme symbol to the Extravert of his attachment to the object, it may have been in order to live like a Christian while thinking as a Greek, as Porphyry said of him, that Origen had himself castrated, for he was probably strongly tempted by sex, since it was for him the essence of sin. Jung says, "If anyone wants to know what are the ethical results of a bold intellectualism carried out on a large scale, let him study the history of Gnostic morals."¹⁸ With Tertullian the close relation between intellectual libertinism and moral libertinism seems to have had a reverse effect, causing him to sacrifice the intellectual approach in order to avoid sensualism. He was something of a libertine before his conversion. Tertullian and Origen, then, were two distinct and antithetically opposed psychological types.

Turning to the field of biography, we have another vivid contrast of the two types. The first is Wilhelm Ostwald's characterization of Helmholtz.

"In spite of his prodigious learning, comprehensive experience, and richly creative mind, he

¹⁷ Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947), I, 171.

¹⁸ Jung, Psychological, p. 26.

was never a good teacher: his reactions never came instantaneously, but only after a certain lapse of time. Confronted by a pupil's question in the laboratory, he would promise to think it over, and only after several days would he bring the answer; this turned out to be so remote from the situation of the pupil that only in the rarest cases was it possible for the latter to discover any connection between the difficulty he had felt and the well-rounded theory of a general problem expounded by the teacher. Thus, not only was the immediate help lacking upon which every beginner very largely relies, but also that guidance commensurate with the pupil's personality by which he may gradually develop from the natural dependence of the beginner to the complete mastery of his chosen branch of science."¹⁹

Rejecting Ostwald's slow-reaction theory, Jung affirms that Helmholtz "merely reacted inwardly rather than outwardly." This is an important point, for the Introvert is often accused of slow reaction, whereas he is merely guilty of invisible reaction. Thus Jung continues:

His attitude is wholly bent upon his thoughts; hence instead of the personal wish of the pupil, he reacts to the thoughts the pupil's question has excited in himself, and this he does so rapidly and fundamentally that he at once devines a further connection which, at the moment, he is incapable of appraising and rendering back in an abstract and finely elaborated form . . . Naturally, not observing that the pupil has no inkling of such a problem to deal with, and not merely an extremely simple and, to him, trivial piece of advice which could be given in a moment, if only he could allow himself to see what the pupil was waiting for to enable him to get on with his work. But as an introvert he has not felt-into the other's psychology; he has

¹⁹Quoted by Jung, in his Psychological, p. 408.

only felt into his own theoretical problems, his inner world, where he goes on spinning the threads of the theoretical problem taken from the student.²⁰

The second example is taken from John W. Caughey's portrait of Herbert E. Bolton, the noted history teacher. Caughey saw Bolton as ". . . a very open personality," a ". . . straightforward and uncomplicated person." The Extravert usually has this reputation. Caughey writes:

He took to the trails. He was not content merely to pore over the manuscripts and old maps. He preferred to revisit the scene, to confirm or correct the locations, and let the geography contribute directly to the history he was studying . . . In respects other than geographical he tried to put himself in the position of the people he was studying, whether they were Spaniards, Frenchmen, Englishmen, or Indians . . . His performance as a teacher I have never seen paralleled. He was a teaching machine . . . The paradox was that he did not seem to be a good lecturer. He was neither dramatic nor spectacular . . . nor was he truly eloquent. Instead he offered down-to-earth exposition, a straightforward narrative, together with his observations on the meaning . . . he showed his keenness for the grand development that was his subject and his zest for the study. He achieved a contagion of interest in the pursuit and recapture of a fleeting past . . . Bolton used his seminar as a forum where his theses and dissertation writers read chapters . . . Some of the offerings were inadequately researched, or poorly organized, or badly written. Bolton nevertheless almost always steered the comment to some element in the performance that was eligible for praise.²¹

Bolton's extraversion shows clearly in his

²⁰Ibid.

²¹John W. Caughey, "Herbert Eugene Bolton," The American West, I (Winter, 1964), 36ff.

outstanding hospitality toward the object: his anticipation of the psychological needs of his students, his own need to be as close to the object of his investigation as possible, his great ability to communicate--especially in a face-to-face situation, his absorption in shepherding his graduate students through their theses and dissertations, the "down-to-earth" quality of his teaching--all argue an outward flowing of the libido. The contrast with Helmholtz is striking. Helmholtz was blind to the needs of his students, though very much alive to ideas.

II. THEORETICAL DESCRIPTIONS

It has now been affirmed and illustrated that the continental divide between extraversion and introversion lies in their respective attitudes toward the object. Behaviorally, the Extravert is object-seeking and the Introvert is object-avoiding. In harmony with Jung's energetic approach, it can be said that libido flows away from the subject and toward the object in the case of the Extravert, and away from the object and toward the subject in the Introvert's case. In appearance it is as though both types were yielding to a powerful attraction, but an attraction which is wielded by the object in the one case and by the subject in the other. As Jung says, "In the first case the object acts like a magnet upon the

tendencies of the subject; it is therefore an attraction that to a large extent determines the subject . . . It might almost seem as though it were an absolute determination, a special purpose of life or fate that he should abandon himself wholly to the object."²² In the second case, " . . . the subject is and remains the centre of every interest. It looks, one might say, as though all the life-energy were ultimately seeking the subject, thus offering a constant hindrance to any overpowering influence on the part of the object. It is as though . . . the subject were a magnet which would draw the object to itself."²³ As we have seen, in the case of any given individual, one or the other of these two attitudes has an advantage, thus becoming a sort of line of least resistance, which the psychic energy will always follow.

Jung associates the extraversion--introversion polarity with the introjection--projection continuum which is in use in some psychoanalytic circles. Adopting Ferenczi's antithetical use of the two terms, according to which introjection is "an 'indrawing' of the object within the subjective circle of interest, while 'projection' means a translation of subjective contents into the object,"²⁴ Jung identifies introjection with

²²Jung, Psychological, p. 11.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 566.

extraversion and projection with introversion. This is based upon the fact that for the process of introjection, an adjustment of the subject to the object is necessary, a 'feeling-into' or "possession" of the object.²⁵ Projection, on the other hand, detaches a "subjective judgment" from the subject as a "valid statement of the case" and "transveys" it into the object, and "by so doing the subject distinguishes himself from the object."²⁶ Projection is therefore identified with introversion. Hence extraversion is "assimilating" while introversion is "dissimilating."

Although it is inevitable in a behavioral description to speak of the Introvert as drawing away from the object, since this is all that can be observed from the outside, still, it is wrong in that it gives the impression that introversion is negatively defined. On the contrary, the introverted attitude is just as positive as the extraverted, only it is a positive orientation toward the subject. For the Introvert, the subject has "psychological value," just as does the object for the Extravert. In view of the overwhelming preference for the Extravert in our Western culture, with an accompanying devaluation of the Introvert, it is as well to emphasize this point.

²⁵Ibid., p. 567.

²⁶Ibid., p. 583.

The psychic reality toward which the Introverts turn is just as real as the external reality of the Extravert. As Jung says, "The subjective factor is just as much a fact as the extent of the sea and the radius of the earth."²⁷ Furthermore, the subjective factor "claims the whole value of a world-determining power which can never under any circumstances be excluded from our calculations. It is the other world-law, and the man who is based upon it has a foundation just as secure, permanent, and valid, as the man who relies upon the object."²⁸

It is equally a fact, however, that the Introvert assumes an attitude toward the object that perplexes and antagonizes the Extravert. He is "governed by subjective factors"; he relies "principally upon that which the outer impression constellates in the subject."²⁹ "Introverted consciousness doubtless views the external conditions, but it selects the subjective determinants as the decisive ones . . . [and] is guided . . . by that factor of perception and cognition which represents the receiving subjective disposition to the sense stimulus."³⁰ The Introvert is "always facing the problem of how libido can be withdrawn from the object, as though an attempted ascendancy

²⁷Ibid., p. 474.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 171, 172.

³⁰Ibid., p. 472.

on the part of the object had to be continually frustrated"; he is Blake's "devouring" type, as opposed to the "prolific" type.³¹ He "interposes a subjective view between the perception of the object and his own action, which prevents the action from assuming a character that corresponds with the objective situation."³² Recall Helmholtz' response to the student's question, for example. It is little wonder, then, that the Introvert has the reputation for taciturnity, impenetrability, shyness, etc. By contrast, the Extravert is regarded as "open," "accessible," "en rapport," "outgoing," "friendly," etc.

Now "object-seeking" and "object-avoiding" are terms which describe alternative constellations of the total conscious existence of an individual; when a man is an Extravert or an Introvert, he is so from the center to the circumference of his conscious field. Therefore his thinking exhibits the characteristics of his personality type, just as any of the other basic functions which he happens to favor. For example, for the Extravert as a thinker,

. . . the valid and determining criterion is the standard taken from objective conditions, no matter whether this be directly represented by an objectively perceptible fact, or expressed in an

³¹Ibid., p. 471.

³²Ibid.

objective idea; for an objective idea, even when subjectively sanctioned, is equally external and objective in origin.³³

By "objective idea," Jung means an idea that is "transmitted by tradition and education."³⁴ An important test for extraverted thinking, therefore, is whether a judgment is drawn from the individual's social and cultural environment or whether it has a subjective origin. A second test lies in "preferential direction outwards" of the thinker's conclusions.³⁵ If his thinking "leads back again to objective data, external facts, and generally accepted ideas," it is extraverted. For instance, the thinking of a merchant or an engineer clearly has an objective direction. The case of the philosopher engaged with ideas may be ambiguous. But if these ideas are "mere abstractions from objective experience," or if they are "derived from tradition or borrowed from the intellectual atmosphere of the times," then they are extraverted, for they are to be numbered with objective data.³⁶

Now, as we have seen, there are some men who are "mainly ruled by reflective thinking so that every important action proceeds from intellectually considered

³³Ibid., p. 428.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid., p. 429.

³⁶Ibid.

motives." Among the psychological functions they give the supreme place to thinking, seeking constantly to bring their "total life-activities into relation with intellectual conclusions." When this thinking activity is habitually orientated by "objective data," such individuals are of the "extraverted thinking" type.

Introverted thinking, on the other hand, is "primarily orientated by the subjective factor." This thinking, Jung writes,

. . . does not lead from concrete experience back again into objective things, but always to the subjective content. External facts are not the aim and origin of this thinking, although the introvert would often like to make it so appear. It begins in the subject and returns to the subject, although it may undertake the widest flights into the territory of the real and the actual . . . new views rather than the perception of new facts are its main concern. It formulates questions and creates theories; it opens up prospects and yields insights, but in the presence of facts it exhibits a reserved demeanour . . . What is of absolutely paramount importance is the development and presentation of the subjective idea, that primordial symbolical image standing more or less darkly before the inner vision. Its aim, therefore, is never concerned with an intellectual reconstruction of concrete actuality, but with the shaping of the dim image into a resplendent idea. Its desire is to reach reality; its goal is to see how external facts fit into, and fulfill the framework of the idea; its actual creative power is proved by the fact that this thinking can also create that idea which, though not present in the external facts, is yet the most suitable, abstract expression of them.³⁷

³⁷Ibid., pp. 480-81.

The Introvert's preoccupation with "that primordial symbolical image standing more or less darkly before the inner vision," means that he is in an intimate relation to the famous "archetypes." The archetype belongs primarily to the collective unconscious. It is a "mnemic deposit," an "imprint," a precipitate of a "certain ever-recurring psychic experience."³⁸ The mythological motif is the direct manifestation of the archetype, and Jung has demonstrated the universality of mythological themes, for example, in his Psychology of the Unconscious. It is due to the primordial image that the individual is born into the world with a brain that is already prepared for thought. Just as the crystal splits along pre-determined lines of cleavage, so the psyche possesses a store of a priori images with which to interpret its experiences. Jung writes:

The organism confronts light with a new formation, the eye, and the psyche meets the process of Nature with a symbolical image, which apprehends the Nature-process just as the eye catches the light. And in the same way as the eye bears witness to the peculiar and independent creative power of living matter, the primordial image expresses the unique and unconditional creative power of the mind.³⁹

The primordial image is not an idea, but is the "preliminary stage" of the idea, its "maternal soil."⁴⁰

³⁸Jung, Psychological, p. 556.

³⁹Ibid., p. 557.

⁴⁰Ibid.

"By detaching from it that concretism which is peculiar and necessary to the primordial image, the reason develops the concept--i.e., the idea--which . . . is distinguished from every other concept by the fact that it is not only given by experience but is actually inferred as underlying all experience. The idea possesses this quality from the primordial image, which as the expression of a specific cerebral structure also imparts a definite form to every experience."⁴¹ Confrontation of external stimuli would produce nothing but uncomprehended perception without the primordial symbolical image, which as a "recapitulatory expression of the living process"⁴² provides a "co-ordinating meaning both to the sensuous and to the inner mental perceptions, which at first appear without order or connection."

Underlying the formation of every concept, then, is a living, autonomous psychic process which follows its own laws. It is necessary to emphasize this in order to make clear just what it is that the introverted thinker is occupied with; he is occupied with that psychic process which parallels the engagement of the thought with outer objects, and which maintains a constant relation between the subject and that "very thinking process which proceeds

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

from objective data and strives again toward the object."⁴³ Thinking is always the thinking of someone, and this relation is the absolute condition of any thinking process. No epistemological method can completely neutralize the influence of this subjective relation.

The Introvert is occupied with this subjective relation, not as an object of thought, for in that case he would be always a psychologist, but as the experience of an inner claim which overshadows the claim of outer reality. "When the general attitude is introverted as a result of the withdrawal of libido from the outer object, a reinforcement of the inner object or idea naturally takes place. This produces a very intensive development of ideas along the line unconsciously traced out by the primordial image."⁴⁴ It will appear from this how superficial it is to accuse the Introvert of egoism simply because he is introverted. Egocentric he may, with a certain apparent justice, be considered, but not necessarily egoistic. He is no more prone to egoism than the Extravert, and in neither case does it have anything to do with the attitudinal type. When the Christian ethic exhorts us to self-forgetfulness, it is not a command that we all become Extraverts. Actually, on Jungian

⁴³Ibid., p. 430.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 558.

grounds, the Introvert is not even egocentric.

The ideational activity of the introverted thinker may be very great, but its characteristic is intensity rather than extensity. It is from this that the peculiar qualities of the Introvert's thinking and personality are derived. In contact with an Introvert a person may feel himself being pushed away, as though the Introvert exemplified Horney's "moving away from" type. Jung writes of the Introvert,

His judgment appears cold, obstinate, arbitrary, and inconsiderate, simply because he is related less to the object than to the subject . . . it always seems to go beyond the object, leaving behind it a flavour of a certain subjective superiority. Courtesy, amiability, and friendliness may be present, but often with a particular quality suggesting a certain uneasiness, which betrays an ulterior aim, namely, the disarming of an opponent, who must at all costs be pacified and set at ease lest he prove a disturbing element . . . Invariably the object has to submit to a certain neglect . . .⁴⁵

In the elaboration of his world of ideas he may exhibit the greatest daring, not even shrinking from heresy or revolutionary notions. Yet should his revolutionary world become an objective reality he would shrink from it as from any objective situation. He expects his creative product to make its own way in the world. He disdains to solicit anyone's appreciation for it, and

⁴⁵Ibid., pp. 485-86.

particularly so in the case of persons of influence, for the greater their influence the greater their threat as objects. Yet he can easily fall prey to the influence of inferior persons, for he considers them sufficiently innocuous that he can make himself accessible to them. This type often marries a partner of such marked inferiority that the world wonders. But in the pursuit of his ideas he is "generally stubborn, headstrong, and quite unamenable to influence."⁴⁶ Frequently, he is a naive bachelor whom designing women take advantage of. He doesn't mind, though, so long as it doesn't interfere with his pursuit of his ideas.

He complicates every problem, making mountains out of what appear to others to be molehills. He is scrupulous to a fault, and this leads to all sorts of qualifications, hedging, doubts, etc., whenever he offers an opinion. Of course he is frequently misunderstood, and this causes him to exaggerate the weaknesses of men. In fact, he has great difficulty in accurately appraising the world of objects. As a teacher he fails to discern the needs of his students and does not cultivate the art of communication. A famous clown said, somewhere, that in order to entertain, one must first love people. This is perhaps why so many entertainers are Extraverts. But,

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 486.

although the Introvert may be considered inconsiderate and domineering by his mere acquaintances, his inner circle very often values his companionship most highly. He prefers such a small, intimate group and can exhibit the profoundest loyalty to its members. Toward sex, however, the Introvert may show a negative attitude, for it is the supreme symbol of involvement with the object.

By contrast, the extraverted thinker subordinates himself to objective reality or to the intellectual formula which expresses it.⁴⁷ The facts of common experience are what best fulfill his sense of reality. That uneasiness in the presence of the object which is characteristic of the Introvert is notably absent in the Extravert. The Extravert strives toward the object, feels into and identifies with the object, has a willed dependence upon the object.⁴⁸ He does not hide his personality; indeed, he is unable not to exhibit it. He is actually engaged with his milieu, physically or mentally; he is 'at home' in his objective situation. His reactions to events and objects are immediately manifest, and in such reactions his personality is revealed; he is "an Israelite in whom is no guile." He creates an impression of warmth, outgoingness, and sympathy; he is attractive. Whereas the Introvert is more appreciated in

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 435.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 395.

his small, intimate circle and less appreciated in the wider circle, the Extravert is more appreciated at the "periphery" of his situation.⁴⁹ He makes a good teacher because he "feels into" the mentality of his students and has an instinct for communication.

The programmatic thinker is a good example of extraversion. His intellectual formula provides a basis for reforms. "If tolerance for the sick, the suffering, or the deranged should chance to be an ingredient in the formula, special provisions will be made for humane societies, hospitals, prisons, colonies, etc., or at least extensive plans for such projects."⁵⁰ He knows how to marshall the generally prevailing motives of justice, truth, and religious charity behind these schemes. The Extravert is often found as a "ventilator of public wrongs or a purifier of the public conscience, or as the propagator of important innovations."⁵¹ If he is a philosopher, he may be content to find his problems in the heritage of thought of his culture, proposing new solutions to old problems, or chiming in with solutions offered by others whose recognition as thinkers is broad. He does not shrink from controversy, but he criticizes

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 436.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 436.

⁵¹Ibid.

the views of others as a member of the fraternity. Unlike the Introvert, he is happy to seek acceptance of his own views, both because he sees his thought as a true representation of the objective reality which therefore should be accepted, and because he has strong rapport with his fellows and can freely enter into the give-and-take of dialogue.

III. SUMMARY

Jung's contribution to our understanding of human nature is one which maintains the integrity and originality of the psyche. To quote once again one of his outstanding pupils and interpreters, Jung recognizes "the full reality of the psychic"; it is "no less real than the physical" and is "unambiguously experienceable." "It is a world in itself--subject to law, structured, and possessed of its special means of expression."⁵² So conceived, it would be astonishing if the psyche did not play a decisive role in the determination of man's experiencing of reality and on his interpretation of that experience. In the formation of ideas, the psyche is active rather than merely reactive, self-propelled, governed from within.

⁵²Jolan Jacobi, The Psychology of Jung (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943), p. 1.

Gordon W. Allport sees virtually all psychological theories as being oriented toward one or the other of two polar points of view, which he terms the Lockean and the Leibnitzian.⁵³ The Lockean tradition, "still dominant in Anglo-American psychology," remains true to Locke's conception of the mind as a tabula rasa. The mind is essentially passive, "reactive when stimulated." On this view "it is not the organism itself but what happens to the organism from the outside that is important." The Lockean tradition in psychology regards human personality as "a concatenation of reflexes or habits," in keeping with its focus upon what is "small and molecular." It looks backward to childhood conditioning and is essentially causal in its approach rather than finalistic. And all of this is in harmony with modern positivism, revealing the ideal "to bring psychology into line with physics and mathematics so as to make for a unity of science."

The Leibnitzian tradition, on the other hand, "maintains that the person is not a collection of acts, nor simply the locus of acts; the person is the source of acts." And activity itself is purposive, so that these psychologies tend to be finalistic. In its typical cognitive theory this tradition opposes Kant's doctrine

⁵³Gordon W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 7-16.

of inherent categories to Locke's tabula rasa. In some of its forms it tries to "reach beyond the mechanisms of associationism for an explanation of mental organization." In all of its forms it preserves the active psyche. Some of its representatives emphasize the doctrines of "attitude, set, tendency." It tends to be sensitive to "the existential richness of human life."

Our survey of Jung's thought, with the following quotation thrown in for good measure, leaves little doubt that his approach falls squarely into the Leibnizian part of Allport's spectrum:

. . . we know that the mind cannot be a tabula rasa, since we have only to criticize our principles of thought to perceive that certain categories of our thinking are given a priori, i.e., antecedent to all experience, and make a simultaneous appearance with the first act of thought, being, in fact, its pre-formed conditions. For what Kant proved for logical thinking holds good for the psyche over a still wider range. At the beginning, the psyche is no more a tabula rasa than is the mind (the province of thought). To be sure the concrete contents are lacking, but the contents-possibilities are given a priori through the inherited and pre-formed functional disposition. The psyche is simply the product of brain-functioning throughout our whole ancestral line, a precipitate of the adaptation-efforts and experiences of the phylogenetic succession. Hence the newly-born brain or function-system is an ancient instrument, prepared for quite definite ends; it is not merely a passive, apperceptive instrument, but is also in active command of experience outside itself, forcing certain conclusions and judgments. These adjustments are not merely accidental or arbitrary happenings, but adhere

to strictly preformed conditions, which are not transmitted, as are perception contents, through experience, but are a priori conditions of apprehension. They are ideas ante rem, form-determinants, basic lines engraven a priori, assigning a definite formation to the stuff of experience; . . . images . . . schemata . . . inherited function-possibilities, which, moreover, exclude other possibilities, or, . . . restrict them to a great extent.⁵⁴

From Anthropology we are familiar with the concept of the cultural "configuration," and how it influences the social and private patterns of behavior of individuals. This concept is the dominant theme of Ruth Benedict's popular volume, Patterns of Culture.⁵⁵ In the study represented by this book, Benedict investigates "the individual as living in his culture; and the culture as lived by individuals." She shows that no item of behavior can be brushed aside as a mere personal idiosyncrasy. Franz Boas, in his Introduction to the volume, writes:

This requires a deep penetration into the genius of the culture, a knowledge of the attitudes controlling individual and group behavior. Dr. Benedict calls the genius of culture its configuration . . . This treatment is concerned . . . with the discovery of fundamental attitudes . . . It is not historical except in so far as the general configuration, as long as it lasts, limits the directions of change that remain subject to it. In comparison to changes of content

⁵⁴Jung, Psychological, p. 377.

⁵⁵Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York: Penguin Books, 1934).

of culture the configuration has often remarkable permanency . . .⁵⁶

Substitute "attitude" for "configuration" in the italicized part of the sentence, and "consciousness" for "culture," and Boas' description of Benedict's approach could be applied to Jung's study of psychological types. The patterns of culture revealed by Benedict are types in the same way that the psychic attitudes revealed by Jung are types. And there is no reason why Benedict's cultural approach and Jung's psychological approach to individual patterns of behavior should be in contradiction. Jung does not deny the influence of culture, nor in any way diminish the importance of the cultural approach. His work does much to illuminate the reasons for variations in individual behavioral patterns within the same cultural configuration, why certain aspects of the cultural configuration come sharply into focus in one individual, while other aspects are reflected in another individual. Moreover, Benedict has shown that cultural configurations are relative, for the range of her investigations brings to light some astonishingly divergent ways of effective living. As it is with these cultural configurations, so it is with the psychic orientations--

⁵⁶Ibid., Franz Boas, "Introduction," p. xv.
(Italics mine.)

in Benedict's words, they prevent the individual's looking at the world "with pristine eyes."⁵⁷ A man lives his life and does his thinking contextually, not alone in the context of culture and history, but also in the context of a definitely structured psychic reality.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 2.

CHAPTER III

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES OF TEMPLE AND BERDYAEV

I. INTRODUCTION

The lineaments of extraversion and introversion are etched deeply into the respective portraits of William Temple and Nicolas Berdyaev, as their portraits can be drawn from the records of their lives and thought.

When we compare the character of the biographical accounts of these men with the character of Jung's own autobiography, it is immediately and forcefully suggested that extraversion and introversion are highly adequate as typological descriptions of the two figures. Jung is a self-acknowledged Introvert, and his introversion is at once apparent in his statement concerning the sort of autobiography he proposed to write:

. . . I speak chiefly of inner experiences, in which I include my dreams and visions . . . All other memories of travels, people and my surroundings have paled beside these interior happenings . . . Recollection of the outward events of my life has largely faded or disappeared. But my encounters with the "other" reality, my bouts with the unconscious, are indelibly engraved upon my memory. In that realm there has always been wealth in abundance, and everything else has lost importance by comparison.

Similarly, other people are established in my memories only if their names were entered in the scrolls of my destiny from the beginning, so that

encountering them was at the same time a kind of recollection.

Inner experiences also set their seal on the outward events that came my way . . . I early arrived at the insight that when no answer comes from within to the problems and complexities of life, they ultimately mean very little. Outward circumstances are no substitute for inner experience. Therefore my life has been singularly poor in outward happenings. I cannot tell much about them, for it would strike me as hollow and insubstantial. I can understand myself only in the light of inner happenings. It is these that make up the singularity of my life, and with these my autobiography deals.¹

The self-conscious introversion revealed here is reflected in the relative insignificance which the objective world assumed on Jung's spectrum of reality-value. The "hollow and insubstantial" character of outer events afforded no competition to the vivacity of the events of that "other," inner reality. Memory, that infallible recorder of the impressiveness of our experiences, etched the inner happenings in letters of gold, but the outer events in fading characters. People were real enough provided he had known them interiorly before he encountered them exteriorly. Travel, that delight of the Extravert, which supplies him with material for conversation and writing for a long time afterward, was quickly forgotten by Jung, except for opportunities it opened to

¹C. G. Jung, Memories, Dreams, Reflections (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 4-5.

him for explorations into new and heretofore unknown regions of his inner life. "I can understand myself only in the light of inner happenings": this is the key to Jung's autobiography. Those who read biography and autobiography in order to understand history by seeing it through the eyes of those who lived it, will be well-advised to pass by the autobiography of C. G. Jung. All of this is, of course, in perfect harmony with Jung's own criterion for introversion, viz., the relegation of the object to a place of lower importance.

A single illustration will suffice to show how the outer world could become significant for Jung only if he could relate it in a vital way to his inner life. In 1920, he accepted the invitation of a friend to accompany him to North Africa on a business trip. His account of the visit affords abundant evidence that it was sufficiently eventful to cast doubt on his statement that his life had been "singularly poor in outward happenings." But his own statement of the real significance of the journey gives it, once again, the character of an inner happening: "In traveling to Africa to find a psychic observation post outside the sphere of the European, I unconsciously wanted to find that part of my personality which had become invisible under the influence and

pressure of being European."² His account of an even greater adventure into Kenya and Uganda, which occurred in the fall of 1925, is interspersed with such statements as: "My liberated psychic forces poured blissfully back to the primeval expanses."³ It would not be too inaccurate to say that Jung's life was not so "singularly poor in outward events," but that he recalled them as inner events.

Taking Jung's self-account as a point of reference, how can we characterize the autobiography of Berdyaev and the biography of Temple?

Non-conformity was a major theme of Berdyaev's life, and it is apparent even in his choice of a form for the presentation of his experiences. His book, he tells us, was not to conform to any of the major types of autobiographical books. It was to be neither a diary, nor a 'confession' of the Augustinian sort, nor a set of reminiscences à la Alexander Herzen, nor a chronological account of his life. It was to be something new, a "philosophical autobiography or a history of spirit and self-knowledge." "Between the facts of my life and their record in this book," he wrote, "there intervenes a creative cognitive activity, whereby these facts acquire

²Ibid., p. 245.

³Ibid., p. 264.

significance; and it is this that interests me above everything else."⁴ The focus of his attention, then, is not to be upon the facts, or events, of his life, but upon the subjective process whereby they acquire significance. Berdyaev continues,

This book is frankly and openly egocentric [and we, the readers, can take it or leave it] . . . I call myself and my life into question and make them the object of critical inquiry . . . I have experienced the world around me and all the historical processes and events of my time as part of myself [notice the reversal here of the extraverted Ulysses' declaration "I am a part of all that I have met."⁵], as my spiritual biography. At the deepest mystical level everything that has happened to the world happened to me. And here I come up against the fundamental conflict inherent in me. On the one hand, I experience the events of my age and the destiny of the world in which I live as events happening to me, as my own destiny; but on the other hand, I am conscious of, and tormented by, the fact that the world is utterly alien and divorced from me. If I had written a diary it would have borne the legend: nothing is my own and all things are mine.

This ambivalence is an essential element of the dominant pattern of Berdyaev's behavior, namely, his inability to remain aloof from objective situations, and a simultaneous inability to get along with others involved in the same situation. Berdyaev's story differs in another respect from Jung's (Jung was quite content to remain

⁴Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality (New York: Macmillan Co., 1951), pp. ix-xi. (Cited as Dream.)

⁵Alfred, Lord Tennyson, "Ulysses," The Pocket Book of Verse (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1940), p. 231.

aloof from events), viz., in the vividness of his memory of the happenings of his time. The probable explanation is that while Jung was so preoccupied with his "bouts with the unconscious" that he was at times scarcely aware of passing events, Berdyaev experienced those events sharply as part of his own "spiritual biography."

Berdyaev writes on the conscious level betraying little awareness of the unconscious, but what he is chiefly conscious of is that "creative cognitive activity" to which events were related as fuel to the fire. This must be remembered, for otherwise one might be tempted at times to think that Berdyaev does mean to be writing about external events per se. This is not the case, however; at all times he is writing about the way in which he was affected by events. When he looked at the world per se it seemed to him as something "alien and divorced" from himself. In the case of both Jung and Berdyaev the subjective, highly personal reference is clear. The note of introversion is as strong in Dream and Reality as in Memories, Dreams, Reflections.

Iremonger's William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, on the other hand, is crowded to overflowing with events, with Temple at the center of them, participating in them and making them happen.

The reduction of the sheer immensity of Temple's

participation in the life of his time to some kind of order was almost the despair of his official biographer.

Iremonger writes:

Up to the end of the Manchester episcopate Temple's life pursues a direct and clearly defined course. After that the story becomes . . . "quite immensely" complicated. In the effort to arrange the available materials from 1929 onwards, again and again I found myself many years back in imagination----standing on the terrace of the Crystal Palace on a "Brock's Benefit" night. A huge but harmless rocket is shot to what seems a vast height in the air; there is a moment of suspense, after which it bursts into a score of brilliantly coloured stars. Something like this happened, after the swift and straight flight of the early period, in the last fifteen years of Temple's life. Two of his friends wrote independently of the momentary "poise" that they detected at the outset of his northern primacy before the stars began to coruscate and he flung himself with unsparing, and at times reckless, vigour into the active pursuit of his (and his friends') ideals. There seemed to be no other method of recording his innumerable activities than to follow, so to say, each star in its separate course, even if in doing so one played fast and loose with the strict order of events.⁶

This does not mean, however, that Temple remained relatively inactive until 1929. The following is an excerpt from a letter written to his wife during his campaign for the much earlier Life and Liberty movement. It describes his activities for a single day, which Iremonger declares to be "not exceptional" during the years of the campaign:

⁶F. A. Iremonger, William Temple: Archbishop of Canterbury (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. viii. (Cited as William Temple.)

. . . I got to Rugby very comfortably. There I had 50 minutes to wait, so I had tea, and then a Challenge Leader in the waiting room. Then I got on a slow train to Birmingham. Then again on to Walsall. There I found the Bishop (Kempthorne), and after supper we went to the meeting--decidedly good . . . we motored straight out here, arriving at 10:30 . . . At 11:15 we adjourned, and I finished the Leader . . . It is now exactly midnight. I am going to try to do the headlines and margin-alia of No. IV Committee, and then go to bed.

P.S. 1:40 A.M. But I did not go to bed. I wrote the Sunday Chronicle article! Rather a good day's work altogether.⁷

This same pattern of crowded days characterized the performance of every task which Temple undertook, varying only in degree. At forty, Temple became Bishop of the important and demanding Manchester diocese, the youngest Bishop in the Anglican Church. A few months later he wrote to his brother, exultantly, not complainingly, "This life is a wild kind of turmoil."⁸

Iremonger had to consider Temple as university lecturer, Public School headmaster, parish parson, national missionary, church reformer, social reformer, philosopher, diocesan administrator, mediator in public crises, pastor and teacher, Primate of England, Primate of All England, and Ecumenical leader. Temple did not experience the world around him, its historical processes and events, as part of himself in Berdyaev's sense,

⁷Ibid., pp. 255-56.

⁸Ibid., p. 296.

but experienced himself as part of the objective world. He was immersed in the events of his time, was in fact, a vital factor in many of those events as they related to his field of endeavor, and he was liberal in interpreting the relations. Despite the difficulty of following his coruscations, Temple's life was preeminently amenable to treatment by the biographer. He was highly 'visible,' describable, 'get-atable.' Jung and Berdyaev do not lend themselves to such treatment. Their vital experiences were inward, therefore can best be told in autobiographical form. Temple belongs to Church History; Jung and Berdyaev belong to the history of thought. This is not to forget that Temple was a powerful thinker, but even his philosophy and theology belong to Church History in the sense that his most erudite compositions were written in the interstices of an extremely active Churchman's busy days. Jung and Berdyaev live on in their writings; Temple survives most vitally in the hearts and memories of men, in the traditions of a church, in the history of a nation and a movement. It is no measure of their relative merits, but of the kind of personalities they were, to say that as long as Berdyaev's writings survive his entourage cannot speak of having lost him; Temple's death, on the other hand, shocked his many admirers with a terrible sense of loss. We experienced

something like it in America when President Kennedy was assassinated. Lord Beveridge wrote, some time later, "His loss to the world in its untimeliness is second only to the loss of Franklin Roosevelt."⁹ So earlier, upon hearing of Temple's passing, Roosevelt himself cabled a message of condolences to the King, an event that, as Canon A. E. Baker wrote, had "never happened before at the death of an ecclesiastic."¹⁰

Temple was not simply one of a succession of Church officials; he was unique. And the uniqueness consisted in the almost total involvement of a profoundly Christian man of enormous ability in events which were vitally related to many men and movements. It seems sound to conclude that the boundary line between the subjective William Temple and the objective world of events cannot be satisfactorily located, on the available evidence. We wish, of course, that we had a set of memoirs or a diary from Temple, but if his private and official letters are any indication, he would have seen himself in this same positive relation to the objective situation.¹¹

⁹Ibid., p. 631.

¹⁰W. R. Matthews, et al, William Temple: An Estimate and An Appreciation (London: James Clarke and Company), p. 100. (Cited as Estimate.)

¹¹F. S. Temple (ed.), Some Lambeth Letters (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

Further inquiry into the personalities of Temple and Berdyaev taken separately confirms the distinction suggested by the foregoing comparison of their biographical literature.

II. WILLIAM TEMPLE: 'INSIDER' IN THE WORLD

One of Jung's favorite expressions for the ultimate in extraversion is Levy-Bruhl's concept of "participation mystique." The term cannot be applied literally to Temple, for it carries the suggestion of compulsion, derived from its use to describe the "primordial relationship of the primitive to his object."¹² But though compulsion probably cannot be attributed to Temple, the "participation mystique" can be used to describe in a figurative way the extraordinary attraction which his objective environment appeared to exercise upon Temple. The term denotes partial identity between subject and object, based upon "an a priori one-ness."¹³ It carries out Jung's idea of object-seeking as being the essential characteristic of extraversion. The phenomenon in Temple which is thus described is best illustrated by his absorption in the corporate life of the English nation.

¹²C. G. Jung, Psychological Types (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1946), p. 365. (Cited hereafter as Psychological.)

¹³Ibid., p. 572.

Temple was radically at home in the on-going stream of institutionalized, authentic British experience. Here he found scope for the exercise of his energies and the realization of his capabilities. His career was an uninterrupted display of responsible and constructive effort within it. William Temple the man, the thinker, the Churchman, the reformer, and the apostle of ecumenicity were one with William Temple the Englishman.

He was a representative Englishman, one in whom many of his countrymen saw reflected the best of English ways; and who was proudly conscious of his nationality. After his impressive enthronement sermon at Canterbury, Canon Tapper said, ". . . here was a man in a class and on a level by himself, by far the greatest Englishman of his day."¹⁴ Canon A. E. Baker said of him:

So much was he a national figure, typically and greatly English in his education and churchmanship and ways of thinking and speaking, that it needs an effort to realize fully that he was a world figure.¹⁵

Temple treasured his English background and heritage. Baker says that Temple "held that any culture or refinement, any moral character that an Englishman possess has been given him by England." Civilization and morality are rooted in the nation and cosmopolitanism, while a

¹⁴Matthews, Estimate, p. 100.

¹⁵Ibid.

moral duty, must proceed from a strong national foundation.¹⁶ This is significant when taken in connection with Temple's conviction that the integration of personality, which he defines as freedom, owes much to the discipline provided by the institutions of one's society, as we shall see in the chapter which deals with his doctrine of freedom. Temple was far from being one of the "angry young men," one of the "outsiders," of whom his fellow countryman, Colin Wilson, writes. Nor could he have understood their mentality, in all probability. He was very much on the inside of the English society and spirit. His consciousness and pride of being English is revealed in some facetious remarks prefacing an important address. He had been preceded on the platform by a very eloquent non-Englishman. Upon arising Temple said, "I should like to begin . . . with a word . . . almost of apology . . . for being a mere Englishman with the relatively tame manner of speech that befits such."¹⁷

Temple's life as a schoolboy fits well into the type depicted in Tom Brown's Schooldays. He did all the things that are typical of English Public School lads, his performance ranging from average to excellent. The spirit of his participation ranged from mild to intense

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷William Temple, The Church Looks Forward (New York: Macmillan Co., 1944), p. 146.

enthusiasm, but it was always positive. At Rugby his stout figure loomed large on the inevitable English Public School playing field. He played at cricket, rackets, and rugby. In the latter sport he was a member of the "House XV," winning his "cap" but not his "colours."¹⁸ His enthusiasm for sports seems to have sprung more from the fact that they constituted a distinctive feature of school life than from any outstanding skill at the games. In forensics and literary activities he was much more at home. In the school debating society he was a "frequent and fluent speaker."¹⁹ Possessed of a keen and critical musical taste, young Temple was not particularly good at any instrument, although he played the oboe in the school orchestra. It was fashionable to do "social work among the poor" at the turn of the century, and many Public Schools maintained missions and clubs in the slums. Young Temple was active in the Rugby Club and was a great favorite with the club's underprivileged young charges. His days both at Rugby and at Balliol College, Oxford, were marked by contentment and very active participation in all phases of school life.

William Temple shared with the class of English society to which he belonged its traditional sense of

¹⁸Iremonger, William Temple, p. 25.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 26.

loyalty to home, school, nation, and national institutions. To the end of his life he remained an "Old Rugbeian," just as he remained an Old Oxonian. In 1916, he proposed to write to his wife a "treatise on the greatness of Rugby." Then follows a comparison with Winchester and Eton, from which Rugby emerges as superior in putting "character before brains" as the aim of education, in the training of provincial administrators, and in providing guidance to other schools. The "treatise" concludes with a revelation of the Old Rugbeians' eagerness to claim every possible point of superiority for the school: "Well; that's all . . . Oh yes: It was the first school to have a rifle corps . . ., or to teach science. Also, of course, it is the only one whose game has become a national sport."²⁰ The rivalry between schools which is revealed here is, of course, as British as fish and chips.

In 1915, in an address made in the capacity of President of the Workman's Education Association, Temple reveals how vital to "English traditional education" this sort of "corporate life" was, he himself being a notable product of that system:

When . . . I praise the English traditional education, I am praising education by means of

²⁰Ibid., p. 15.

a corporate life . . . Our intellectual training has often been very amateurish in method, and very feeble in results . . . But you will observe at once that it is just here, and here alone, that German education has been strong; it has not aimed at the subconscious mind, as ours has done---moulding the whole personality by the silent appeal to the imagination and sympathy which a common tradition embodied in a social life is alone able to make. That is the only way to train those elements in our nature which determine how we shall act in an emergency . . . The product of our system . . . is a body of men who, not always learned, and seldom able to formulate their principles of action, are undoubtedly the best colonial and imperial administrators of whom history holds record.²¹

One thinks immediately of the famous British "stiff upper lip," and of the colonial administrator dressing for dinner in the heart of the jungle; a very good example, incidentally, of Temple's idea of the free man--one who doesn't permit circumstances to present any temptation strong enough to deter him in the pursuit of his chosen purpose. Whether the English colonial administrator is the best in history must be open to question, but that Temple thought so is evidence of the English-ness of the man.

All in all, Iremonger leaves the impression that he sees Temple not so much as an Archbishop, but as a sort of epic hero whose life exhibited the qualities most admirable to Englishmen who were Christian or to Christians

²¹Ibid., p. 60.

who were also English. He is obviously proud of Temple and expects that other Englishmen will share his pride, and he provides abundant evidence that other Englishmen did so. It is important that they did so, for one of the major tests of the Extravert is the reputation he enjoys with his entourage of being en rapport. And Temple evidently enjoyed this reputation even with those who strongly disagreed with some of his views. For example, during both World Wars Temple was warmly regarded by England's many and very articulate pacifists. One of these was the Archdeacon of Stoke, who said of him at the time of his death:

I can say with certainty that although he was in my judgement the strongest theological opponent of pacifism he was tremendously loved and respected in pacifist circles; and no one welcomed his appointment at Lambeth with more enthusiasm than we did. For one thing we always felt that his criticisms were fair because he was careful to find out what we did believe before he began to criticize--which was by no means true of all critics.²²

Temple's war-time activities reveal still further that his was a personality which found deep fulfillment in its living contact with the throbbing heart of England. He dealt tenderly and insightfully with the doubts and scruples of Englishmen who were perplexed and dismayed by the war, whether they were the bereaved, the pacifists,

²²Ibid., pp. 543-44.

or the vindictive. This caused Iremonger to say that for the five years of World War II, Temple "spoke for the conscience of Britain."²³ For his biographer, Temple was not merely a successful Anglican Primate, but "the greatest spiritual leader and the outstanding moral force in the Britain of his day."²⁴ So was he for many Englishmen.

The Archbishop of Canterbury is duty-bound to be busy in time of war, but here as in the performance of other offices Temple overflowed his office and spilled over into the mid-stream of English life. "Much nearer to his heart than . . . problems of administration was his personal touch with men in the Services. Whenever it was possible he delighted to go among them."²⁵ On one visit he evaded his official escort, escaped from the officer's quarters provided him, confounded all expectations of the behavior of an elderly Archbishop on board a tossing ship, and after some anxious moments on the part of the ship's officers was found on the mess deck having a good time with the sailors, who were "hugely delighted."²⁶

It is against this background of rapport with his milieu that Temple is to be understood as a reformer. In

²³Ibid., p. 540.

²⁴Ibid., pp. viii-ix.

²⁵Ibid., p. 551.

²⁶Ibid., p. 553.

all his efforts to promote change, never was Temple other than an English Christian or a Christian Englishman, in spirit, principles, or program. He was never more English than when criticizing England's economic system. It can even be said that his whole aim in his efforts toward reform, including the most liberal phase of those efforts during his earlier years, was to make England be truer to herself. As reformer or advocate of reform in the Church, in education, in the economic life, or in international relations, he wanted to speak for the conscience of his countrymen. His basic assumption was that Englishmen could be appealed to in this way. He did not speak softly and cautiously about the violations of personality which he observed in British society. As early as 1908 he said, "It is the system which is foul and rotten."²⁷ But this and all other criticisms of British failures to keep Christian principles paramount must be taken in connection with an estimate of English civilization which he expressed during World War II:

There is much in British history and in contemporary British life which is open to criticism from a standpoint of high idealism . . . But these defects, even when they are defects in liberty itself, do not alter the fact that broadly speaking the British flag has stood for steadily increasing liberty, and an appeal to the principle of liberty never goes unheeded in Great Britain,

²⁷Ibid., p. 329.

even when the action called for is delayed . . . The British Empire shares with other human institutions an inability to be at all times true to its own best principles. But the principles are accepted; the steady purpose is there; and progress in liberty and training for the use of it is constant even though somewhat patchy.²⁸

In the eyes of William Temple, the Christian Englishman, the faults of English society lay in its sins of omission. "We have neglected God and His laws," he said in summarizing the faults of the "old world" which stood in need of reconstruction.²⁹ In pleading with Englishmen for the Christianization of English society, therefore, Temple did not have to introduce novel or alien or repudiated ultimate principles and loyalties. He could appeal to principles and loyalties that were common to them and to him. His was an English voice addressed to English ears, uttering principles which Englishmen were bound to acknowledge. The very sources of his inspiration were English: a father who was himself a great Englishman and an Archbishop of Canterbury, Arnold of Rugby, Oxford University, Bishops Westcott and Gore, the English Bible, the Church of England, the English tradition of freedom and the sacredness of personality, and above all the Christ whose name was sacred to Englishmen even when they

²⁸Ibid., p. 88.

²⁹William Temple, The Hope of a New World (New York: Macmillan Co., 1942), p. 9.

were shocked at the suggestion that His principles ought to govern the incidence of unemployment.

Unlike the Englishman who "needs an effort" to realize fully that Temple was a world figure, we in America need the same effort to realize fully how very English Temple was. And it is important to our understanding of him that we do so. It seemed to this writer that many of the Episcopalian clergymen with whom he discussed William Temple spoke of him as though he were an Ideal or etherealized Ecumenicist and Philosopher-Theologian, not connected with any milieu. The probable explanation of this is that while they knew he was not an American, they had not "realized fully" that he was an Englishman. The very qualities and achievements for which they admired Temple were deeply rooted in his English setting. That he was an Englishman was to William Temple no mere chance circumstance, exercising its influence unconsciously. He regarded it as his happy destiny. He knew his heritage and consciously claimed it. The national life was his stage of action, and to his participation in that life he gave his robust energies in full measure.

We turn now to consider the unusual wholeness of Temple's personality. This is important because it demonstrates the deep psychic harmony between Temple and

his milieu. The joy with which he appeared to live and work in his world was bona fide.

The Introvert often leads an unpleasant existence in our highly extraverted Western societies. Constantly misunderstood, he reciprocates with his own misjudgments of his fellowmen. Frequently his way out of the resulting tension is to falsify his introversion by pretending to an extraversion which he does not feel, the inauthenticity of which his entourage often senses. For example, Jung, speaking of the subject-oriented nature of introverted thinking, says, "External facts are not the aim and origin of this thinking, although the introvert would often like to make it so appear."³⁰ And again,

His judgment appears cold, obstinate, arbitrary, and inconsiderate, simply because he is related less to the object than to the subject . . . Courtesy, amiability, and friendliness may be present, but often with a particular quality suggesting a certain uneasiness, which betrays an ulterior aim, namely, the disarming of an opponent, who must at all costs be pacified and set at ease lest he prove a disturbing element.³¹

The maintenance of his authenticity is difficult for the Introvert, as many an introverted American college graduate has discovered when, upon applying for a position, he finds that in addition to his excellent scholastic record he is also expected to furnish evidence of the extra-

³⁰Jung, Psychological, p. 556.

³¹Ibid., p. 20.

curricular involvement to which he was not attracted. In trying to simulate the extraversion which his society demands, the Introvert invites serious inner conflict.

Was William Temple authentically extraverted? Again we are dependent on external evidence. Of this there is an abundance, and it is invariably positive. There is never a hint of inner strain, or of a discrepancy between the public and the private man. In Jungian terms, his ego and his persona were one.

The testimony of many can be summed up in that of Iremonger, which is quoted here in full:

"It is not easy to draw on a little canvas the man whose nature is large and central and human, without cranks or oddities. The very simplicity and wholesomeness of such souls defy an easy summary, for they are as spacious in their effect as daylight or summer." Not a syllable of this need be altered in the effort to describe Temple's genius. He was so comprehensive and representative a person, his character and attainments were all so much of a piece, that no particular gift or virtue seems to stand out obviously from the rest. But his disciples and critics have at least this judgement in common---that there was only one William Temple. The psychoanalyst would have found him an irritatingly unsatisfying subject. Here was one who had been in the limelight through most of his life, who had met on equal terms the most brilliant and the most influential of his contemporaries, whose hold on the hearts and minds of his countrymen grew steadily with his growth till it was unique in his generation. This was the public figure, the Primate of all England who could fill the Albert Hall at a few days notice and was, beyond dispute, the greatest moral force in Britain. There was also the William Temple of private life---a genial, friendly, and apparently uncomplicated person, with no vestige of pomposity,

vanity, or conceit, with no intolerances to shed or inhibitions to conceal, and without a single one of the fears and frustrations that have marred the personalities even of the greatest. But surely . . . this was a pose . . .? Yet the more intimately his friends came to know Temple, the more absurd the suggestion seemed. They could find no trace in him of a dual personality; no mask was put on and off; the public and the private man were one and the same person. Nor was he a perpetual battle-ground of repressions and frustrated desires. He had an inner unity and harmony of soul which no discords of the world, the flesh, or the devil could break. He grew into a wholly integrated personality, at home and happy in a friendly universe . . .³²

". . . a wholly integrated personality, at home and happy in a friendly universe." Here is the essential truth about William Temple.

This integration was attained without visible struggle. Temple's personality unfolded like a flower, naturally and painlessly. There were no sudden transitions, no crises serious enough that the resolution of them might have meant following some radically different path. Apparently Temple even made the passage through the conflicts and disturbances of belief common among undergraduates with a minimum of discomfort. Whatever intellectual difficulties may have threatened his Christian faith could not have been serious. In later life he used to say, "I got over my intellectual measles

³²Iremonger, William Temple, p. 499.

at Rugby."³³ At Balliol he was fascinated by G. B. Shaw, who 'emancipated' more than one turn-of-the-century youth from his traditional faith. This fascination was disturbing to some who were concerned for the orthodoxy of the son of Archbishop Frederick Temple. It did not disturb the Archbishop, however, who knew from his son's intimate letters that no revolution threatened either the youth's beliefs or religious habits.³⁴ In respect to his religious opinions, his mind seemed to his contemporaries at Balliol "almost full-grown."³⁵ His response to the preaching of the several Bishops who addressed the Oxford student body from time to time exhibited nuances of judgment which would have done credit to one much more experienced in the traditions, doctrines, and attitudes as represented by the Church of England at the time. George Adam Smith was "quite wonderfully good"; the Bishop of London was "exciting" but the Bishop of Stepney "more edifying", etc. These opinions were accompanied by penetrating analyses.

Once, when addressing a large audience of young people which contained many sceptical university students, he experienced his one remembered faltering failure with a youthful audience. By way of explanation he

³³Ibid., p. 51.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

said, "You see, I have never known what it is to doubt the existence of God, and I felt I had no right to be speaking to that audience of young people!"³⁶ The temperament of Temple was characterized by what W. R. Matthews described as a "naturally positive and believing quality." Matthews continues, "When we read some authors, such as Von Hugel, we are conscious of a sense of tension; behind the rugged sentences there is a struggle against ever present questioning; the faith has been wrought out with hard wrestling. When we read Temple we admire the equable unfolding of the exposition, but we are dimly aware that the main conclusions in his mind have always been unshaken."³⁷ This quality rendered Temple temperamentally incapable of dealing in full fairness with the Cartesian approach in philosophy, it will be argued presently, and would have made the nihilistic mood of current Existentialism repugnant to him.

This uninterrupted progression in Temple's life was rendered more probable by the nature of his boyhood homelife. His father was Frederick Temple, Headmaster of Rugby, Bishop of Exeter, Bishop of London, Archbishop of Canterbury. Prime Minister Gladstone defended his controversial appointment of the elder Temple to Exeter with

³⁶Ibid., p. 379.

³⁷Matthews, Estimate, p. 9.

the following tribute: "Dr. Temple is known and certified to be a man of deep personal piety, great ability, great administrative powers, and marked habits of conciliation in dealing with men."³⁸ According to Henry O. Wakeman, he was "cast in a heroic mold, with a burning enthusiasm for high causes."³⁹ In these respects, even if not entirely so in temperament, father and son were remarkably similar. The parallelism of their careers has been noted often. Bishop Temple and his two sons had the warmest affection for each other and lived on terms of comradeship, especially in things intellectual. William simply never forgot the influences of his home life in "making natural and spontaneous that whole outlook upon life which the Bible expresses."⁴⁰ In his enthronement sermon in Canterbury Cathedral, 1942, Temple said, ". . . he was and is, among men, the chief inspiration of my life."⁴¹ Iremonger reckons the influence of the father as being "beyond compute."⁴² While yet a student at Balliol,

³⁸Daniel Connor Lathbury (ed.), Ecclesiastical and Religious Correspondence of Gladstone (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910), I, 200.

³⁹Henry O. Wakeman, Introduction to the History of The Church of England (London: Rivington's, 1938), p. 486.

⁴⁰Iremonger, William Temple, p. 5.

⁴¹Temple, The Church Looks Forward, p. 6.

⁴²Iremonger, William Temple, p. 3.

William said, "Father will never tell me his views because he knows how much I am tempted to accept them without thinking."⁴³ In this congenial environment, to which the mother contributed only a little less conspicuously, Temple quickly found himself. His 'innate' interests and tendencies were called forth in an early manifestation. His gifts flourished as a plant in its native air, and he attained a precocious maturity by comparison with others of his age--and without priggishness. Relevant to this last point is the following portrait of William Temple, Rugby schoolboy, given by E. V. Knox:

If you were told that there was a boy at an English public school of fourteen or fifteen years of age, who was destined to be, and himself intended to be, a headmaster, and perhaps an Archbishop, what would you have expected to find? A boy aloof from his fellows and leading an inner life, like Arthur in Tom Brown's Schooldays? [i.e., an Introvert? REB] Or one of those many earnest authoritative fellows who figure in Dean Farrar's romantic tales? A saint? A scholar? Or a prig? And what . . . did you really find? A boy called Billy Temple, who was much more like Billy Bunter: and for the sake of those who don't know, let me say that Billy Bunter is, or was, the rotund, good-natured, ridiculous boy of that popular school fairy-tale, The Greyfriar's Annual, and its similar publications. . . . he was stout; he was good-natured; he was 'raggable'; he had that queer high laugh that went on so long and never left him: he was full of stories that he found at least as good as his hearers did. But from the start he had a sort of quiet purpose that

⁴³Ibid.

was recognized. It earned some respect: grudging, I suppose; for boys admire prospective athletes and soldiers, not embryo theologians . . . Temple could accept the rough and tumble, be a butt for mockers, give as good as he received, keep a fixed resolve and a simple faith, and interests in culture far outside the syllabus . . . Masters, with probably more willing admiration than boys, knew well that he had an almost certain career before him . . .⁴⁴

Altogether, a rather good portrait of a well-rounded Extravert.

To worship, to think critically and upon a high level, to be sensitive to injustice, to participate fully in the life of his community, to love nature and the arts with discrimination, to work diligently, to exercise initiative--all these traits which were typical of the Temple who was known to the world were present in their appropriate stage of development in Billy Temple the schoolboy. There are geniuses who "awake from their slumbers"--dogmatic or otherwise--late in life, like Kant. There are those who come to full realization of their powers, and to full confidence in them, only after reconciliation to tragic suffering, like Beethoven.⁴⁵ There are those who realize themselves only after rejecting the world, which they come to feel as alien, and turning

⁴⁴Iremonger, William Temple, pp. 35-36.

⁴⁵J.W.N. Sullivan, Beethoven: His Spiritual Development (New York: Random House, 1960), Book II, Chap. 2.

their attention inward, like Tertullian. Then there are those who, though they know their powers and interests, maintain an uneasy relationship with the world about them, like Berdyaev. Temple was none of these. Not tardiness and tragedy, but precocity and happiness, characterized him; not struggle and frustration, but a meteor-like career which afforded full scope for his powers. Temple was a happy man. He wrote to his brother on the latter's fiftieth birthday, ". . . we have had a big share of the things most worth having, haven't we?"⁴⁶

So Temple's life was amazingly whole and amazingly consistent in its development. It is doubtful whether one can speak of "stages" in his development. The now-obsolete mechanical transmission in an automobile, which must be shifted from "low" to "second" to "high," is a good example of stages. Temple's process of becoming was more like the contemporary continuous-acceleration automobiles. Temple the boy and Temple the youth were, to be sure, not Temple the man. But rarely is there one of whom it is more visibly true that "The child is father of the man," in Wordsworth's sense. His Balliol tutor could look back upon Temple's university days and say of him, "He was already the man that he was later, and when

⁴⁶Iremonger, William Temple, p. 499.

I look over the list of my old pupils . . . , I can think of none who changed less in every essential."⁴⁷ The available evidence affords no room for any other conclusion than that Temple's extraversion, like his other qualities and major interests, was bona fide and lifelong. He was an excellent example of Maslow's "self-actualizing" personality.

III. NICOLAS BERDYAEV: EXILE IN THE WORLD

To read the first three chapters of Berdyaev's autobiography is to recall, in line after line, Jung's description of the introverted personality. Assuming the validity of Jung's analysis, one could almost say that it would be sufficient proof of Berdyaev's introversion simply to reproduce large sections of Dream and Reality. Instead, the method will consist in commenting on Berdyaev's self-description as found in the first chapters of his book, then revealing the actual introverted pattern of his relations with the world. These two stages cannot be kept entirely separate.

Berdyaev goes to considerable lengths to emphasize that his life's preoccupation was with self. No moral connotation should be read into this, for his was the preoccupation of the Introvert, whose distinction from the

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 57.

Extravert is not a moral one. Yet by any consideration, to use the personal pronoun in its several forms seventy times on two pages, even in a "frankly and openly egocentric" autobiography, is a high degree of self-preoccupation.⁴⁸ Some of the qualities of this self-centeredness are revealed in terms of four major kinds of experience which belong to the central core of Berdyaev's life, and which are reflected in the following lengthy quotation:

. . . I know for certain that from the very beginning I was aware of having fallen into an alien realm. I felt this as much from the first day of my conscious life as I do at the present time. I have always been a Pilgrim. . . .⁴⁹

My realization of the alien character of the world resulted in an inability to acquire a firm footing in it and explains, perhaps, why I never entertained any ambitions in life. I have always been indifferent to the things which concern my person, in particular, to the appraisal of my work by others. Human appreciation struck me as touching only the superficial level, or the outer shell, of my thoughts, without ever reaching its real core. Some people were fond of me, or even enthusiastic about me, yet I was under the permanent impression of being disliked by "public opinion" and "society": I was disliked by the Marxists, by wide circles of the Russian intelligentsia, by politicians, by the representatives of "official" and academic philosophy and science, in literary and ecclesiastical circles. I never showed much capacity for teamwork and collaboration and always found myself in conflict and opposition. I rebelled against the society of the gentry and the revolutionary intelligentsia; against conservatives, liberals and communists;

⁴⁸ Berdyaev, Dream, pp. 36-37.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 1.

against the Russian émigrés and French society. Women have always shown greater regard for me than men; but their love cast a shadow on the years of my youth. I asserted my freedom too forcibly and habitually deceived their expectations. In the same way I disappointed all ideological movements which counted on my unreserved adherence. As a matter of fact, I adhered to no one except myself: I had my own "idea," my own vocation, my own search for truth. I have never experienced the delight and rapture of full union, either religious, or national, or social, or erotic; but I have often experienced the rapture of liberation and revolt. . . . Sometimes I have prevailed over my loneliness; at other times I would experience untold joy on returning to it, as if I had come from a foreign country to my own native land. The native land was still not myself, yet it was within me. Paradoxical though it may be, I am aware of something in my self that is other than and alien to myself, and, conversely, of something that is closer to myself than my own self.⁵⁰

It should be pointed out that Berdyaev expresses these feelings and attitudes again and again, in different ways. The passages quoted are merely representative.

By the evidence of this and related passages, Berdyaev experienced (1) the world as 'alien,' (2) interpersonal relations as misunderstanding and conflict, (3) his 'idea' as supersedingly significant, and (4) his self as containing an autonomous factor. These are typically introverted experiences, for lying at their root is the inwardness of the Introvert's reality, his subject-seeking and object-avoiding orientation.

First, what is the significance of Berdyaev's

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 36-37.

experiencing the world as 'alien'? In speaking of it in one place Berdyaev says, "I have always been a pilgrim. Christians ought to feel that they have no abiding city on earth, and they should be seekers of the city to come."⁵¹ But the image of the Christian pilgrim is inappropriate in Berdyaev's case, for that is not incompatible with warm earthly ties. Family ties, for example, may become all the more cohesive for the Christian commitment of a single member, even. Berdyaev's alienation extended even to his family: "I was never conscious of 'belonging' to my parents; and the relations of kindred, the ties of blood, the 'generic,' evoked a strange aversion in me."⁵² Berdyaev was alienated, but Christian consciousness of pilgrimage is more detachment than alienation. Even if this distinction is doubtful, the Christian attitude to the world need not be interpreted, and usually is not interpreted, as requiring an "aversion" to the "generic" and "ties of blood." This aversion gets expressed philosophically in a radical doctrine of individual freedom and a theory of near-absolute discontinuity between personality and the world.⁵³ In terms of social and political theory it emerges as anarchy.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 1.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³See following chapter for detailed treatment.

As a matter of fact, Berdyaev himself seems to have recognized the inappropriateness of the pilgrimage idea, for he follows its introduction with these words, "But I have never regarded such feeling and seeking as a virtue or achievement, in fact, it has even seemed to me to reveal a rift in my attitude to the world and to life." Then he confesses a strong affinity for the "Orphic myth concerning the origin of the human soul," as more nearly accounting for his attitude.⁵⁴ The idea of this myth, that man's spirit has fallen from a higher into a lower world, is taken seriously by Berdyaev. It affords no room for spiritual growth whereby 'lower' stages of human development become the bases for higher development, and are redeemed by their participation in that development, or whereby human relationships are transformed through infusion by a new principle. There is no growth of the foregoing kind in Berdyaev's thought; there is only a keeping and a recovering of what spirit possessed in full measure before it "fell" into this world. The biological basis of human life and the worldly ties of human society are not redeemed and transformed, they are repudiated. The realm of spirit, where alone Berdyaev could feel at home, is radically 'Other.' Berdyaev is in real and

⁵⁴ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 1.

literal earnest when he uses the term "alien" to describe the world. He places himself at the opposite pole from William Temple's experience of being "at home and happy in a friendly universe." For Berdyaev the universe is in man, not vice versa: "The world truly exists in the unobjectified subject."⁵⁵ And 'this world' with its 'public opinion' and its 'society,' by which one has "the permanent impression of being disliked," is experienced as pure threat by the "unobjectified subject."

Hence Berdyaev's posture of rebellion. He writes, "Man's actual condition is such as to make the intensity of his self-awareness a measure of his enslavement to an alien world; and he revolts against this world so as to stem the tide of its destructive pressures."⁵⁶ That he is speaking of himself is evident from many statements of which the following is an example: "The revolutionary and anarchic in me are intent on subverting the whole configuration of this alien world."⁵⁷ Berdyaev's own rebel stance is an aspect of his experiencing the world as alien.

But in the name of what does the "revolutionary" in him wish to subvert the "whole configuration of this alien world"? In the name of a new order? No! Berdyaev

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 286.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 308.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 314.

has no confidence in new orders. New orders are simply the old orders in new dress. No social arrangement can save man; he is always at the mercy of society, regardless of the order. The only new order will have to be built upon the ruins of all orders.⁵⁸ Any so-called new order arising in the phenomenal, empirical world will inevitably have the same alien character as the old order. It is the "objectivized" world against which Berdyaev rebels, and objectification occurs when reality is displaced outward, when it is projected from the subject, where it truly resides, to the objective world, where it does not belong. His intended subversion is in the name of spirit, personality, the subject. What is illustrated here is that process described by Jung as "dissimilation," whereby the subject distinguishes himself from the object and places his heaviest accent of value upon the subject.⁵⁹ The process is introverted. Since the value of reality is represented primarily by the subject, it may well be true for the Introvert that "his self-awareness" is the measure of "his enslavement to an alien world." But for the Extravert, who "assimilates" the object to the subject, the world is not felt as alien, though an obsolete

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 309.

⁵⁹Jung, Psychological, p. 583.

or oppressive order may require replacing by a new order. Therefore the world, qua world, is not experienced as alien. The reason assigned by Berdyaev for revolt (i.e., to stem the tide of the world's destructive pressures, refer to page 126), is true only from his one-sided Introvert's point of view. Needless to say, extraversion is equally liable in the matter of one-sidedness, and its confidence in "New Orders" may even run into fallacious utopianism.

Berdyaev is quite correct in his denial that this experience of the world's alien character is solipsism, which is the epistemological theory that only subjective states can be known, and the ontological theory that only the self exists. Berdyaev holds no such theories. He simply experiences the world as alien, without having a concept for it unless "objectivization" be that concept. Viewed psychologically, the proper concept for the experience is introversion. It is the manifestation of Berdyaev's psychic "attitude," in Jung's technical sense of that term, which prepares Berdyaev to apprehend the world in a definite way, and which--because it screens out what is "irrelevant" to its own orientation--prevents him from appreciating the opposing point of view.

Secondly, why did Berdyaev insist that he was always misunderstood, and why was he in perpetual conflict

with the people, individuals and groups in his life? To begin with, Berdyaev might have considered that the reason he felt "disliked" by "society" was that he truly was disliked, on a reciprocal basis. He reveals little insight into his own genuine and sometimes violent dislike for many people. By his account, his quarrels were for the sake of principle, but this was by no means always apparent to the objects of his sometimes mountainous rages. He lays claim to "an intense love for man,"⁶⁰ and one does not wish to dispute the claim. But the love was not always clear in his dealings with specific persons and groups. How could a man expect not to be disliked when, due to a fastidiousness that was little short of insulting to his less sensitive fellows, he went through life "with half-closed eyes and holding his nose"?⁶¹

The pertinent question, then, is the one concerning the reasons for Berdyaev's antagonisms toward society. A large part of the answer lies in the Introvert's habitual devaluation of the object. By this he is already pre-disposed to exaggerate the weaknesses and negative qualities of the object. To the Introvert the objective world can be just as threatening as the depths of the psyche are to the Extravert. Hence he must be always

⁶⁰ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 2. ⁶¹ Ibid., p. 21.

engaged in neutralizing the power of the object. Jung writes of his attitude that it "neither responds nor advances to the object, but, on the contrary, seeks to withdraw from it, and to ensure itself against any influence on the part of the object by creating a subjective psychic activity whose function it is to paralyze the effect of the object."⁶² One way of doing this is to simulate an amiability toward the object that is not felt. Another is to break with it on some pretext or other, and the Introvert is an expert at finding faults in the object that will justify the break.

By the same token, the Extravert, in his yearning for the object, is prone to exaggerate its good qualities. Jung says of him that he is characterized by a "free movement of response, transveying a subjective content into the object; thus producing a subjective assimilation, which brings about a good understanding between subject and object, or at least simulates it."⁶³ One manifestation of this tendency in Temple, for example, produced what even many of his greatest admirers thought was a weakness, that is, in his Episcopal capacity, to make some undesirable appointments. Randall Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury, said of this, "The trouble with

⁶²Jung, Psychological, p. 362. ⁶³Ibid., p. 361.

dear William is, he is so kind that he cannot say No."⁶⁴ The remark scarcely conceals Randall's impatience. Some thought Temple naive and impractical. Canon Baker, however, insisted that he "was not such a fool as some people think . . . [he] took the line he did quite deliberately . . . He believed in the fundamental goodness of men and worked for it. He hoped for the vindication of unworldliness and waited for it."⁶⁵ That Temple did actually hold such a belief is indicated by one of his comments on a passage in St. John's Gospel, in which he declared that the cynic will have his bad opinion of men justified, for they will show to him only the side he expects to see; while the loving and trustful man will find his experience confirming his trust in the finer side of human nature.⁶⁶ In terms of the Jungian dynamic one can say that Temple "transveyed a subjective content into the object," thus producing a "subjective assimilation" which brought about a "good understanding" between subject and object. Baker maintains that Temple's confidence in his appointees was justified as often as not.

⁶⁴Iremonger, William Temple, p. 498.

⁶⁵Matthews, Estimate, p. 97.

⁶⁶William Temple, Readings in St. John's Gospel (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955), p. 134. (Cited as Readings.)

Philosophically, Temple revealed this same extraverted empathy in defining value as the mind's discovery of itself, or of what is akin to itself, in its object.⁶⁷ It is the basis of his theistic argument. Here is also the reason why those who experience the cosmos as threatening can never accept Temple's argument, no matter with what logical cogency it be pressed.

Berdyayev was one of those who would be forced by his own psychology to reject any world view which begins from the pre-supposition of a "friendly universe." In the same way, he could not fully trust his colleagues, or credit their ideas, aspirations, and projects. He could not afford to value their appraisals of his work, for this would presuppose too great a dependence upon the object. Thus he brushed aside their appreciations as being "superficial," never touching the "real core" of his thought. In spite of the fondness which some had for him, he persisted in feeling disliked by everyone. As for women, who seem genuinely to have loved him, he could never bring himself to compromise his treasured "freedom" sufficiently to satisfy their expectations of him, or to gratify their yearnings for intimacy. He habitually disappointed them, at least during his younger years. He

⁶⁷ William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan Co., 1953), Lecture VI. See pp. 149-50 in particular.

would become active in various projects and schemes, taking a leading part in the discussions. Then, after having aroused the expectation in his colleagues of greater and more important participation by himself, would precipitate some quarrel and break with them, leaving them disappointed. As for criticisms of his writings, he would either respond vitriolically, or, figuratively speaking, would shrug his shoulders and tell his critics to take it or leave it. His autobiography bears out his self-judgment, "I adhered to no one except myself." Like Tertullian, he listened only to the testimony of his own soul, and like Tertullian he found himself at odds with the world. It is little wonder that he "never experienced the delight and rapture of full union." "Liberation and revolt" brought him the only rapture that he knew. He was lonely with the loneliness of the Introvert in an "objectivized" world.

It would be a mistake to assume that when Berdyaev says that he "adhered to no one" except himself he was confessing a fault. Far from it; this was his idea of freedom. Freedom is independence, the integrity of the subject. This will be treated in detail in the chapter on Berdyaev's doctrine of freedom, but it is necessary to mention it now in order to explain Berdyaev's attitude toward sex. The sexual act is for him a compromise of the

integrity of the self; it is the loss of freedom.

Berdyaev never discusses his actual sexual experience. He was married, of course, but he refuses to discuss his most intimate human relations. But he expresses strong disgust with the sex act, and one may surmise from this that it was not an important part of his experience. "I had a strong and well-formed body, yet I was always conscious of a feeling of revulsion against its physiological functions . . ."⁶⁸ He declared that the flesh had never been a particularly great problem for him; then with specific reference to sex he says, "I could never think of 'the flesh' in terms of either its 'sinfulness' or its 'holiness.' I could only ask whether or not the flesh denies or does violence to freedom."⁶⁹ His answer was that it does do violence to freedom.

It has already been mentioned that Jung's experience taught him to regard sex as the most potent symbol of attraction to the object. It is, therefore, an area of human experience that is extremely sensitive to the functioning of the extraversion-introversion dynamic. The object-avoiding tendencies of the Introvert give him

⁶⁸Berdyaev, Dream, p. 23.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 24.

strong inhibitions in regard to it. In Berdyaev this attitude received elaborate philosophical expression, in his application of the doctrine of the Androgyne.⁷⁰ The original Man, the real bearer of the imago dei, was androgynous. Only the "youth-maiden," the "integral bisexual man," can bear the image of God.⁷¹ In the fall of Adam the natural female element becomes separated from him, and he becomes a slave to the power of feminine nature. Then, reminiscent of Plato's myth in the Symposium, he says, "And sex, differentiated and fallen-- becomes the source, in the world, of tormenting, insatiable thirst for union."⁷²

The sexual act cannot satisfy this craving for union, however. The reason is that sex is not something that has to do with a single function or a single organ of the body. It does not even have to do exclusively with the body. Sex pervades the whole man. "In man's sexuality we perceive the metaphysical roots of his being."⁷³ We can speak of a man as a sexual being, where we cannot speak of him as a food-digesting being. "Sex is not merely one of many sides of man--it includes and

⁷⁰The doctrine is summarized here from Nicolas Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act (New York: Collier Books, 1962), Chap. 8.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 172.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., p. 179.

determines the whole man."⁷⁴ The natural sex act is the manifestation of the differentiation of the whole sex-energy by which the whole man is determined. When a man engages in the sex act he is giving only a part of himself, not the whole; he is fractionalizing himself.⁷⁵ Therefore, virginity, so far from being the denial or absence of sex, is actually the true sex-life: "It is the maintenance of the integrity of sex, the refusal to let it be fractionalized."⁷⁶

Man's wholeness, i.e., his freedom, is best maintained in chastity. When the androgyny falls apart into the male and female components and man and woman, now separate, engage in the sex act, they fall victim to the "insatiable thirst for union," of which the sex act is the source. The consequences for the male are particularly serious, for woman represents the "natural, cosmic element," while the man represents the "anthropological human element," and in turning to the woman man becomes enslaved to the element of nature. The woman, too, is enslaved, inasmuch as she becomes subject to "natural-necessary attraction." However, real freedom lies with the microcosm, as we shall see presently, and "The woman

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 170.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 171.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 170.

is a part of the cosmos, but not a microcosm--she does not know the cosmos, for she thinks the cosmos is her own temporary condition, for instance her unrequited love."⁷⁷ Therefore, woman 'swallows' man, 'smothers' him, stands on the shore and berates him for taking off to sea when he should remain at home with her. It was for this reason that Berdyaev disappointed the women who loved him in his youth. He could not bear to lose his freedom to them. There seems little room for doubt that Berdyaev saw himself as an androgyne, and it was this, not the 'sinfulness' of sex, that underlay his asceticism. Here seem to lie the roots of that extreme "fastidiousness," not only with regard to sex, but to "squabbles for social position, rivalries, ambitions, and the struggle for power."⁷⁸ Even with regard to the "bourgeois" humdrum of daily existence, which he detested. One is reminded of the declaration of the Calvinistic, ascetic, intellectual Woodrow Wilson, made shortly before the entry of the United States into World War I, to the effect that there is such a thing as a nation's being "too proud to fight." How those words infuriated the omnipresent and 'rambunctious' Teddy Roosevelt! And

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 172.

⁷⁸ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 23.

Berdyaev was accused of pride; he was even accused of rivalry towards God. But many an Introvert has been glibly accused of haughty pride without the accuser's realizing that it was psychologically impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for him to behave otherwise than in the way that got him accused of pride. And perhaps it is pride, in moral terms. But in psychological terms, it is the protection of his self, his subjectiveness, which for him far outweighs in value anything that lies outside. His 'pride' is his response to the threat of the object-world. One final word in regard to Berdyaev's attitude toward sex: It was probably impossible for him to 'take it in his stride,' as Temple took all aspects of life. For Berdyaev, its metaphysical significance, and therefore its significance for the whole meaning of the life of man in the world, was too great for him to treat it as a biological function. He could not but feel that he was "cutting himself in pieces" in the practice of it.

In the third place, Berdyaev had his "own idea," which he experienced as supersedingly significant. This is another way of saying that he cherished his freedom above all else, except that in this connection it receives specific application to what he frequently referred to as his "search for truth." Philosophy was for Berdyaev a

"vocation" in the old sense of a definite calling. His 'idea' may be thought of as comparable to Socrates' "daimon." The comparison is not fanciful, for in this Twentieth Century, when philosophy had become professionalized, bewilderingly complex, and highly technical, when it had largely lost its ancient character as "love of wisdom," and philosophers seemed to be writing more for each other than for the enlightenment and guidance of their fellow men; in short, at a time when philosophy had taken on a definitely 'official' character, under the aegis of an all-conquering science, Berdyaev ignored the 'authorities' and went his own way in pursuit of "meaning in life," which he preceived, at first feebly then with increasing conviction, to be subjective in character.

Since Berdyaev's conception of philosophy is to be dealt with at some length in the following chapter, the discussion of it here will be brief. The following passage is significant in this connection:

From childhood I have had a strong sense of vocation. There was never any question for me what I should choose in life and which path I should take; for, while still a boy, I was sure that my calling lay in philosophy. This did not mean that I would specialize in a certain subject--viz. philosophy--produce theses, and become a professor. Generally speaking, I never looked forward to any career, and had no disposition whatever to an academic life. I disliked scholars as a class and could not stand the scholastic mentality in any shape whatsoever . . . As I became conscious of my vocation as a philosopher, I thereby became conscious of myself

as dedicated to the search for truth and for the revelation of meaning in life . . . when I was fourteen, [I] discovered Schopenhauer's World as Will and Idea, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind . . . I watched the formation of a subjective world which gradually evolved in me and which I opposed to the objective world around me . . . The other, the objective world, always seemed to me somehow of less interest. I was able to comprehend the world without and be one with it only in virtue of its inherence in me and as an inner component of the world of "self." I could understand Schopenhauer, or Kant, or Hegel when I discovered their universe of discourse within myself. All the things which confronted me as an object to be penetrated from without left me uncomprehending; I understood only by returning to the subject, from within.⁷⁹

Here we have an example of the subject-orientated nature of thought described in Jung's account of the introverted thinker. In the context of Berdyaev's passionately conscious search for authenticity it becomes inevitable. The mood of contemporary Existentialist thought is thoroughly introverted, and this is why it is accurate to say that it is a challenge to the ideal of 'scientific' philosophy.

Berdyaev tested every philosopher he read by the criterion of compatibility with the supreme reality he knew, viz., his "own 'idea'." Berdyaev was not out to 'chime in with' or to refute other philosophers for the sake of a philosophical system. As Alexander Vucinich says in his Introduction to one of Berdyaev's books,

⁷⁹Ibid., pp. 37-38.

"Berdyayev did not belong to that category of philosophers, typified by Aristotle, Leibnitz, Kant and Hegel [and we may add Temple to the list], who are inclined toward building impersonal, systematic and logically integrated systems of thought. All of his writing was a projection of his own inner struggle to decipher the moods, promises or calamities of modern times in terms of his personal philosophy."⁸⁰ Berdyayev 'used' philosophers; he did not regard them as authorities who must be somehow 'worked in.' He could accept a modified version of the great Kant's noumenon and phenomenon, but with equal readiness he could turn to obsolete concepts, 'fantastic' elements in the history of thought, and to myth--to anything, in fact, that could help him to articulate the results of his philosophical journey of self-discovery. Berdyayev did not really care how he said things, just so he was intelligible. He was not nicely precise in definition, and he was a bit cavalier toward the demands of logical consistency. His style was aphoristic, repetitious, and often disjointed. He usually disdained to defend his works and courted no appreciation for them. His underlying themes were the supremacy of the subject over the object, freedom over determinism, and aristocratic

⁸⁰Nicolas Berdyayev, The Russian Idea (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), p. vi.

"creativity" over the "Euclidean" mentality. His method is intuitive, and his writing is informed by mystical experience. The work of Berdyaev contributes to the demonstration that thinking with such a pedigree can get itself taken seriously as philosophy.

Fourthly, Berdyaev experienced what, by the title of Cohen's book on LSD, could be called "The Beyond Within." This refers to that sentence in the passage on which we are commenting in which Berdyaev says, "Sometimes I have prevailed over my loneliness; at other times I would experience untold joy on returning to it, as if I had come home from a foreign country to my own native land. The native land was still not myself, yet it was within me." Berdyaev experienced the Other within himself. A few sentences above those just quoted, and in direct connection with them, he says, "Always and everywhere I am allured by and drawn toward the transcendent, the Other, which reaches out beyond all boundaries and limitations and holds within itself the mystery of life."⁸¹ The figure of the exile's return is especially suggestive in view of Berdyaev's banishment from Russia and the nostalgia to which he confesses during his later years in Paris. But Berdyaev suffered from a more

⁸¹Berdyaev, Dream, p. 37.

poignant nostalgia than the longing for his native Russia, a nostalgia that afflicted him even when he was still in Russia. He was not speaking of his political exile when he said, "Sometimes I suffered agonies of nostalgia . . ."⁸² He was speaking of the anguish which, he says, never left him all his life.⁸³ He spoke at length of this anguish [angst], and defined it as a "longing for another world, for that which is beyond the boundaries of this finite world of ours."⁸⁴ Berdyaev was not only an exile in Paris; he was an exile in the world. He rejected the notion of the "'goodness' of creation" and experienced his deepest anguish precisely during those moments which others called 'happy moments.'⁸⁵ "I have always been afraid of happy, joyful experiences, for they have always brought me the most vivid memories of the agony of life. On great feastdays I almost invariably felt anguish, perhaps because I was awaiting some miraculous transformation of ordinary, workaday life: but it never came . . . I have often experienced a burning anguish under a wonderful starry or moonlit sky or on a glorious sunny day; in the quiet of a blossoming garden or in the silent immensity of the steppes; on looking into the face of a beautiful woman

⁸²Ibid., p. 41.

⁸³Ibid., p. 39.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 40.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 41.

or at the moment of the awakening of love . . . there is anguish in sex, which . . . bears the signature of the fallen nature of man . . . I have always found it hard to bear the hour of twilight . . . Twilight intensifies the longing for eternity, for eternal life."⁸⁶

Berdyaev rejected the suggestion that these experiences had their origin in the "sub-conscious," and says instead, "I am deeply convinced that the transcendent is present in human life: it allures man and acts in human existence."⁸⁷ And so, frequently, turning inward from the commonplace tedium of 'life,' he found adumbrations of the Transcendent, and the experience was like the homecoming of the exile. By comparison, the external world was a grey wasteland. Here lie the roots of his philosophical "vocation":

It has been said that "green is the tree of life and grey is the theory of life" . . . I am inclined to think that the reverse is true: "grey is the tree of life and green the theory thereof" . . . What is known as "life" . . . is as often as not an embodiment of the commonplace and consists of nothing but the cares of workaday existence. "Theory," on the other hand, may be understood as creative vision, as the Greek theoria, which raises us above the habits of daily life. Philosophy, the "green theory of life," is free of anguish and boredom. I became a philosopher and a servant of "theory" that I might renounce and be relieved of this unspeakable anguish.⁸⁸

⁸⁶Ibid., pp. 41-43.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 44.

⁸⁸Ibid.

Despite Berdyaev's rejection of it, the suggestion of an unconscious origin for these experiences is strong, especially if we take the Jungian view of the unconscious. Berdyaev had said that the "native land" to which he returned from his loneliness was within him yet was not himself. To this he adds, ". . . I am aware of something in my self that is other than and alien to myself, and, conversely, of something that is closer to myself than my own self."⁸⁹ And, in relating occasions on which the anguish would come upon him, he said, "Thus we would go, the four of us, for a walk in the country . . . and I would suddenly have a sense of the presence of a fifth, come I know not whence, and I would forget how many of us there were."⁹⁰ The possibility of an experience of the unconscious as of something alien yet as not a not-self is suggested by the following characterization by Jung of that part of the psyche:

Because the unconscious is not just a mirror-reflection, but an independent, productive activity, its realm of experience is a self-contained world, having its own reality, of which we can only say that it affects us as we affect it,--precisely what we say about our experience of the outer world . . . The idea of psychic objectivity is by no means a new discovery. It is in fact one of the earliest and most universal achievements of humanity: it is

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 37.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 43.

nothing less than the conviction as to the concrete existence of a spirit-world.⁹¹

This could account for the sense of the "presence of a fifth."

One may hesitate to label these experiences 'religious,' but the fact is that Berdyaev did connect them with his conviction that "the transcendent is present in human life." At any rate, the unconscious produces such experiences, for it is the foundation of consciousness,⁹² and is compensatory to consciousness. It often presents material to the conscious which has the vividness and 'otherness' of externally presented materials. Jung holds that "It is the medium from which the religious experience seems to flow."⁹³ One could build a strong case for the contention that Berdyaev lived in closer contact with his unconscious than is usual. With the inner-directedness of introverted psychic energy-flow the unconscious receives a higher accrual of energy than in the case of the Extravert, and will more readily manifest itself.

The difference between Extravert and Introvert is

⁹¹Jung, Two Essays, pp. 194-95.

⁹²Jung, The Undiscovered Self (New York: New American Library, 1959), p. 101.

⁹³Ibid., p. 102.

very striking at the point of their respective attitudes toward the generic, the institutional, and the 'official.' The assimilation between the object and the extraverted means that the latter is much less likely to experience authority as oppressive. The process of socialization is much easier with him. The Introvert, on the other hand, dissimilated from the object as he is and experiencing the superiority of the inner reality as he does, is a potential rebel even when he gives the appearance of cooperation. In Berdyaev's case the latter disposition was marked by a pattern of strong, and at times violent, resistance to authority, and even by intolerance of opposition.

Although Berdyaev assures us that he despised no one and felt no intolerance, this is doubtful in view of the facts concerning his interpersonal and institutional relations. At any rate, he was quite aware of his negative attitude toward his surroundings: "There are people who always tend to put themselves over against their environment, who dissent from and resist their surroundings, and I am one of them . . . I have always broken with every group to which I belonged; I could never conform to any collective. I was never able to go with the stream of the world around or bow submission to anyone or anything; my life has taught me that this could not have

been otherwise."⁹⁴

Though a specific act of rebellion or refusal to submit was, no doubt, as voluntary as human acts are capable of being, Berdyaev is right in saying that his attitude of dissent and resistance could not have been otherwise, for one must needs orientate one's life according to one's basic perceptions of what is real and valuable. Temple, also, could have said that his pattern of positive intimacy with society could not have been otherwise, but in an extraverted society there would be no occasion to say it, for the pattern of positive intimacy is taken as the norm and is even accorded a positive moral value. Berdyaev was well aware of the criticism to which strong and persistent dissent exposes one in the West; hence his insistence that he had been true to himself.

That he "broke with every group" to which he belonged is perhaps the most obvious feature of his autobiography, so it is unnecessary to repeat that whole story here. Insight into it can be gained, however, by a brief examination of its earliest manifestations in his relations to his parents and to the companions and authorities of his school days. These earlier relations

⁹⁴Berdyaev, Dream, p. 15.

are representative. Berdyaev is quite frank concerning the weakness of his ties to family:

I was never conscious of "belonging" to my parents; . . . I am unable to entertain a liking for the principles of family life and domesticity, and the attachment to these principles prevalent in Western society astonishes me. Some of my friends used to call me in fun "the enemy of the human kind"--and yet I have an intense love for man. I was always repelled by family resemblances, as between parents and children, brothers and sisters; family likenesses have always struck me as a challenge to the dignity of the human person. I only held dear the distinctly individual, the particular in man.⁹⁵

Berdyaev always wants us to know that he loves man, but the unfailing impression gained by his entourage is evident in the misanthropy which was attributed to him "in fun." Of his parents he said, "I loved and esteemed them," but added immediately, "but my attitude was rather that of a father than a son. I cared for them, I was anxious lest they fall ill . . . my feeling of sonship . . . was always weak. I could never see why people attached such importance to the principle of motherhood,⁹⁶

There is a distinct impression of condescension toward his family, if not downright hostility. His attitude toward his mother was, to say the least, very objective. He seems to have regarded her as weak, with

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 1.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 2.

her addiction to French ways, her bad Russian, and her hypochondria. Toward the father there is evidence of conflict and perhaps even of rivalry. It is certain that Berdyaev never submitted to any family discipline. In the first place, his family was under the influence of liberal Western ways, and the father seems to have exercised very little discipline. Berdyaev describes him as being willful, obstinate, and impetuous, but Berdyaev met these with his own outbursts of anger and even paroxysms of rage.⁹⁷ He describes his brother, who was fifteen years older, as "unstable, neurotic, lacking in character, and very unhappy because he was not able to realize his gifts in life."⁹⁸

The Berdyaev home was an unhappy one, haunted by "a sense of some affliction and of maladjustment to life; . . . [by an] absence of true concord, with the result that susceptibilities and sensibilities were easily aroused."⁹⁹ In this household of frequent discord, young Nicolas often played "the part of peace-maker," ordinarily a father's role.¹⁰⁰ He compared his family to the families described in Dostoevsky's novels. Comparison with the secure and happy home life of William Temple is

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 6.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 8.

⁹⁹Ibid.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., p. 17.

inevitable. A child whose very introduction to the objective world is gained in a home so unstable and neurotic as Berdyaev's, is forced from the beginning to find his reality within. Introversion is the natural product of such an environment.

The pattern thus established in the home was continued in school. Berdyaev was educated at a military academy, the Kiev Cadet Corps. He is his own best raconteur of the nature of his relations there: "I did not like the Corps or the army; I disliked all things military, and I rebelled from childhood against regimentation."¹⁰¹ As evidence of this dislike, Berdyaev refused to wear regulation military dress and went out of his way to avoid having to salute officers. Is it merely a coincidence that both the father and grandfather were military officers? Positive evidence is lacking, but the suggestion is strong that he transferred to his superiors at the Corps his dislike for "family resemblances," and his conflicts in the home. He continues:

. . . whenever I found myself in the intervals between lessons amongst a crowd of my fellow-cadets, I felt extremely miserable and forlorn. I never enjoyed the company of the boys of my own age and always avoided mixing in their company: I was able to get on only with girls. The society of boys always seemed to me very coarse, and their talk low

¹⁰¹Ibid., pp. 10-16.

and stupid . . . The cadets seemed to me particularly uncouth, commonplace and intellectually callow. Moreover, my companions sometimes laughed at the nervous tic from which I had suffered since childhood. I did not develop any feelings of comradeship, and this affected my whole life . . . The boys regarded me as a snob, a son of the nobility and a future Guards officer, whereas most of the others were to be officers of the line. But my divergence from the cadets and the whole atmosphere of the Corps had still deeper roots. In very early years there awoke in me an interest in philosophical problems, and already as a boy I became conscious of my philosophical vocation.¹⁰²

Again, comparison with Temple is illuminating. The young Temple was also set apart from his schoolboy companions by the recognized "quiet purpose" to which E. V. Knox testifies.¹⁰³ However, as we know from the same source, Temple was well liked by his comrades and entered fully into the common life of the school. No one thought him a prig, but it is difficult to see how Berdyaev, the schoolboy, already conscious of his philosophical calling, could have avoided being regarded as priggish. As for Berdyaev's preference for girls, they were more acceptable to his fastidious taste, and in a society where the male is dominant they were less threatening as objects. We have seen already that Jung recognizes the proneness of Introverts to form inferior relationships in their eagerness to avoid close contacts with potent objects. Berdyaev testifies to what must be

¹⁰²Ibid.

¹⁰³See above, pp. 117-18.

considered such a relationship, at least from the social point of view, in speaking of the only childhood friendship he enjoyed. The friend was "N. M. (a sailor), whom my father helped financially with his education."¹⁰⁴

Berdyaev's rejection of institutional life was reflected in his intellectual experiences at the Corps:

But fundamentally I was unable to reconcile myself with any institutional education, even that of the University . . . My abilities betrayed themselves only when I took the initiative in my thinking, when my mind became consciously active and creative: they remained hidden and unknown to myself while my mind was passive, merely assimilating or memorizing something that was external to me . . . I could not, so to say, put myself in the position of someone who is set a task . . . I instantly want to develop my own line of thought . . . Nobody ever suggested to me that I should study philosophy: the impulse came entirely from within me. I never belonged, or indeed could belong, to any "school" of thought . . . my knowledge of truth is my own relation to truth.¹⁰⁵

Continuous with the young Berdyaev of home and school was the man, who was exiled and imprisoned by two Russian governments, who broke with every circle of the intelligentsia with which he associated, who rejected and was rejected by the Russian émigrés of Berlin and Paris, who as a member of the Russian Orthodox Church held its hierarchy and its theologians in low regard,

¹⁰⁴ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 11.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

and who resolutely refused to become assimilated to the Western society that harbored him in his exile.

The conclusion is that the key which best enables us to understand the life of this strange man lies in C. G. Jung's analysis of the introverted personality type. Indeed, Berdyaev, who had read Jung, virtually confesses to being an Introvert:

I was frequently conscious that "inwardness," to which I attached so much importance, did not suffice after all: there was need of "outwardness," of exteriorization, of action without. To use Jung's terminology, I acknowledged the legitimacy, for myself and for others, of extroversion as well as introversion; yet, at the same time, I could not help being aware of the tragic failure of every outward action.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 39.

CHAPTER IV

BERDYAEV'S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM

Many Westerners who praise Nicolas Berdyaev for his lifelong defense of freedom would probably esteem him less if they knew him better. The exiled 'Apostle of Freedom' is an attractive figure to an embattled democracy. Rejected by the Bolsheviks for his defiance of totalitarianism, he is easily mistaken as 'one of us.' But it is not so. Berdyaev belongs to no one. He never did. His rejection of our vaunted free institutions of the "bourgeois" West was fully equal to his rejection of Communism. Berdyaev, like all prophets, was a lonely man.

Naive interpretations of Western 'freedom' and Communist 'enslavement' are rudely shaken by Berdyaev's refusal to endorse the self-image of the West as the home of freedom. For example, he writes:

Herzen . . . was soon disillusioned and, indeed, repulsed by the suffocating bourgeois spirit prevailing in the West. I too have reason to be "disillusioned" . . . I feel with Constantine Leontyev the hideousness of the democratic age and share his passionate hatred of the democratic herd. . . . who believe in progress and want to introduce their paltry democratic perfection into this splendidly imperfect world: . . . like Herzen, we left, or were driven to leave, Russia, hoping to find freedom in the West. We did, admittedly, find greater freedom than we would have enjoyed in the midst of the destructions and constructions of revolutionary and post-revolutionary Russia. But even this relative

freedom in the West is drawing to its end; It is judged by its own betrayals, which plunge man into ever more abject servitude.¹

It was not that democracy was becoming less democratic but that democracy like communism, and like every other form of social organization on earth, was stifling to the human personality in an increasing degree. Anti-communists found no ally in him, and the Russian émigrés of Paris finally rejected him, though he had first rejected their illusionary dream of the return to a regime that was better off dead. "If I opposed communism," he wrote, "I did so solely on account of the freedom of the spirit, not because I desired to preserve this or that social or political order. I opposed communism precisely because I believed in the freedom and ultimate independence of the human spirit vis-à-vis all social and political orders."² In this fallen world social organization was necessary but not desirable. In so far as government was necessary Berdyaev continued to "regard the Soviet government as the only representative national government" in Russia.³ "No true Russian," he said, "can feel or believe the communist regime to be an alien

¹Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), pp. 282-83. (Cited hereafter as Dream.)

²Ibid., p. 241.

³Ibid., p. 320.

occupation, or will accept the view that its foreign policy is in conflict with 'national interests'."⁴

Despite this concession to necessity, Berdyaev could say, "My sympathies are at bottom with anarchism and, in the end, I disapprove of all governments."⁵

Communism was not all bad, and Western culture did not always gain in a comparison of the two.

I did not . . . oppose communism in so far as it deals with the delimited sphere of social and economic organization and is based on a scientific analysis of certain aspects of social life. I believe that the organization of material resources for the benefit of all and the curtailment of economic individualism will make men not less but more aware of those final realities and values of human existence which are imperilled by communism and anti-communism alike.⁶

Most Westerners are not prepared to accept the judgment that economic individualism is not only not identical with freedom, but is opposed to freedom, though in college classrooms it has long been recognized that tension exists between our ideals of equality on the one hand and individual freedom on the other. "I am prepared," Berdyaev said, "to describe myself as a socialist, but my socialism is personalistic, not authoritarian: it precludes the primacy of society over the person, for it springs from a recognition of the supreme

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 241.

value of each individual human being made in the image of God and endowed with a free spirit. If Marxism is in earnest about its avowed aim to liberate humanity from servitude to economics, then I am a Marxist."⁷ It will seem perverse to many Westerners for Berdyaev to argue for socialism on the grounds of the primacy of the person, the imago dei, and freedom, for these are the very grounds advanced in the West for the rejection of Marxism. Berdyaev, however, simply did not recognize the West as the home of freedom. Indeed, "As a critique and judgment upon proletarianized capitalist society, with its privileges and vested interests, . . . communism seemed to me irrefutable, and I regarded all attempts at refuting communism which proceed from the assumptions on which that society is built as unconvincing, futile and stultifying."⁸ Berdyaev thought that he might have been less socialistic had he been allowed to remain in Russia; his sojourn in the "bourgeois-capitalist" world confirmed and strengthened his socialism.⁹

Totalitarianism in Russia "and in the West alike," taught Berdyaev that freedom is to be sought in no historical order. "I would say that it has imbued me

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 242.

⁹Ibid.

with a bitter feeling for the verdicts of history. At times the historical stage is dominated by those who call out

Away from the shouts and the sniggers, the hands that
are slimy with blood,
Away, to the camp of the outlawed who struggle
and perish for love.

And they go down into history as men and women who have made supreme sacrifices and surrendered their lives for a good cause. But then the hour strikes for them and their cause to triumph and be victorious: and lo, they too are quick to turn into those who shout and sneer and whose hands are slimy with blood. . . . Thus the tragi-comedy of history goes on forever in unremitting, perpetual recurrence."¹⁰ In America we believe that we have created "the world's last, best hope" and have escaped the usual "verdict of history"; Berdyaev's universal historical pessimism is not flattering.

Freedom such as Berdyaev desired is not given by this world; it is alien to the world's spirit, not to be realized in any social organization. He writes:

When people tell me that a "new order" is to be brought about and man is to be released by a change in the mechanism of society, I want to say to them: for God's sake refresh your memory! Your new order is as old as any other. There has never been a time when man was freed by society:

¹⁰Ibid., p. 243.

he was always at its mercy, at its religious and secular mercy. So it was among the primitive tribes, so it has been ever since and, no doubt, so it will be until the end. A "new order" will arise on the ashes of all orders and as a result of the only effective, the personalistic revolution.¹¹

In such a world the passionate lover of freedom becomes a rebel. Berdyaev said, "The revolutionary and anarchic in me are intent on subverting the whole configuration of the alien world. . . . I have held to life with no support save a bare search for truth wholly and utterly unlike the world, and with no passion save the passion for freedom which dissolves the congealed and petrified modes of life and consciousness."¹² It was not only in Paris that Berdyaev was an exile, but in the whole world also, including Russia; the world was alien territory. Rebellion was a necessity for him, for only in rebelling against it could he find the world endurable. If Sartre found existence in the world nauseating, Berdyaev found it suffocating. His search for truth, like his passion for freedom, was a hunger for authenticity.

I. THE REJECTION OF 'THIS WORLD'

Albert Camus defines "lucidity" as one of the primary qualities of Absurdist morality; lucidity is the

¹¹Ibid., p. 309.

¹²Ibid., pp. 314-15.

denial of the mind's capacity to find more than a very immediate and limited meaning in existence. The sin of sins for the Absurdist is to accept a solution for life's contradictions which presupposes that they are other than the grim, inescapable reality which he experienced them to be. "He must preserve their true character which is their inability to be satisfactorily answered."¹³ This can be applied to Berdyaev, in its essence. Berdyaev's basic perceptions included that of the false and enslaving character of 'this world' with its preoccupation with what is external and 'common.' He steadfastly refused to come to terms with the mass organization of society, with all 'systems' which claimed to reduce the unique experience of the individual human personality to rationality. Berdyaev's rejection of 'this world' is intimately related to his understanding of human freedom.

Man cannot find the meaning of his existence in the world and no movement or program can give it to him. He writes:

The true way is not a movement to right or left in the plane of "the world," but rather movement upward and downward on lines of the ultra-worldly, movement in spirit and not in "the world."¹⁴

¹³As quoted by John Cruickshank, Albert Camus and the Literature of Revolt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 68.

¹⁴Nicolas Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act (New York: Collier, 1962), p. 11. (Cited as Meaning.)

The world is a prison, for in it the human spirit is in bondage to "necessity."¹⁵ Man's hope lies in the realization of his cosmic being, but "'This world' is not the cosmos; it is a non-cosmic condition of divisions and enmity, the atomization and falling apart of the living monads of the cosmic hierarchy."¹⁶ The movements and programs and systems which profess to lead the way to human fulfillment are "reactions" and "opportunistic adaptations" in and to 'this world.'¹⁷ "I confess an almost manichean dualism," wrote Berdyaev in 1914.¹⁸ "'The world' is evil, it is without God and not created by Him. We must go out of the world, overcome it completely; the world must be consumed, it is of the nature of Ariman."¹⁹ Thirty years later he was still proclaiming that "This world is ruled not by God but by the Prince of the World."²⁰ Running through his entire life's feeling and thought was this theme of the world's "stricken" and "fallen" condition.

This is the reason for Berdyaev's eschatological type of Christianity.²¹ No historical trend can be relied upon for the solution of the ills and problems of the

¹⁵Ibid. ¹⁶Ibid. ¹⁷Ibid. ¹⁸Ibid. ¹⁹Ibid.

²⁰Berdyaev, Dream, p. 299.

²¹Ibid., p. 290.

world. "It is part of our predicament," he wrote, "that we are caught within the net of all our 'developments,' and there is but one issue--the eschatological."²²

Again:

It has always surprised me how people can rely on the gradualness of human development, on the stability of human nature, on rational appeals to truth, on the objective standards of good, and all the other ambrosial illusions, in view of the unrelieved corruptibility and transitoriness of human life and the mortal wounds inflicted on man by every death, every parting, every betrayal, every passion.²³

Berdyaev watched history with the expectation of its repeated failure and lived continually under the cloud of impending disaster. Everywhere he saw the failure of society.

The touchstone of all movements and developments lies in what happens to personality in them. "Man has disappeared; there remain only certain of his functions."²⁴ The "fallen," the demoniacal quality of the age is revealed in the fact that this dehumanization process defines the real nature of modern civilization; the disease is fatal; ". . . modern barbarism is a civilized barbarism."²⁵ Berdyaev writes:

²²Ibid., p. 291.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Nicholas Berdyaev, The Fate of Man in the Modern World (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 33.

²⁵Ibid., p. 30.

It would be a mistake to think that modern bestialism and its attendant dehumanization are based upon the triumph of base instincts and appetites and a denial of all the values ordinarily held to be idealistic. Modern bestialism and dehumanization are based upon idolatry, the worship of technics, race or class or production, and upon the adaptation of atavistic instincts to this worship.²⁶

Assuming civilized form and utilizing the technical instruments of civilization, the "human mass" is returning to that state "which preceded the development of personality."²⁷ Thus modern man worships the very forces that are dehumanizing him; his very idealism is corrupted; he is caught in a snare of his own making. Therefore he has no way of extricating himself from his predicament by any of the means belonging to his civilization. To pin our hopes on any of the developments and movements of the age is to ask the goat to guard the cabbages. Modern civilized man has lost his spirituality, his awareness of his own spiritual dimension, and ". . . only a new spirituality, which has not yet defined itself as an historical force, can bring real recovery."²⁸

The hallmarks of the present age are the machine and the collective society, the mechanical domination of nature and the rationalized social order. Together these represent man's seizure of the control of his own destiny;

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid.

²⁸Ibid., p. 109 (Italics mine.)

man becomes God unto himself. In this development a new world takes shape, "moved by other values than the value of man or of human personality, or the value of truth: it is moved by such values as power, technics, race-purity, nationality, the state, the class, the collective. The will to justice is overcome by the will to power."²⁹ Berdyaev analyzes the dialectic of the dehumanization as follows:

Man desires power, power for himself, but this leads him to put power above self, above man; it leads him to readiness to sacrifice his own humanity for the sake of power. Power is objectified and drawn away from human existence. Such values as those of technics, the state, the race or the class bestialize man: for the sake of these sorts of power, any desired treatment of the individual is permitted.³⁰

Thus it is modern man's highest value which destroys him. The machine, "His latest and greatest love," turns man himself into a machine.³¹ The economic life built upon the machine becomes autonomous, crowding aside the spiritual life and taking over the direction of life. The technics of the age demand that "all men become the objects of organization."³² It is a moment in history in which "the masses burst in upon the center of the stage," and this is accompanied by "an obsession for

²⁹Ibid., p. 29.

³¹Ibid.

³⁰Ibid., p. 30.

³²Ibid., p. 55.

organization."³³

The rise of the collective, now "generalized and made universal," has resulted in what Berdyaev calls the "prosaicness of history."³⁴ The following excerpts summarize his meaning:

The direst result of this new role of the mass, organized into collectives, and their participation in culture, is a lowering of cultural quality. . . . The cultural elite is undergoing a regular pogrom. . . . The masses demand that men of thought and cultural creativeness serve them, fulfill "social" orders and commands. Thinkers are feeling the cruel results of the dictatorship of dominant orthodoxy and dogmatics and are forced to accept the prevailing symbolism. . . . new dictatorships demand a far sterner orthodoxy of men of creative thought than ever was demanded in the middle ages. The form taken by this demand for orthodoxy in Russian Communism is well known. . . . In the collective, personal consciousness is extinguished and replaced by that of the collective itself. Thought is regimented, and instead of personal conscience we have the conscience of the group. . . . What once was falsehood to the personal consciousness now becomes part of human duty in the conscience of the collective. Thinking as well as critical judgment is compelled to march in step.³⁵

Not only in Communism, Fascism and Naziism is man dehumanized, but in the democracies also. Berdyaev never let the West forget it. "Individualism has not been personalism at all; instead, it was another sort of tribal and collective instinct."³⁶ Stated briefly, Personalism

³³ Ibid., p. 72.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 72 ff.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 71.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 76.

is "the realization in man of the image and likeness of God."³⁷ Christianity, through which this revelation was made to the world, had itself yielded to the obsession with organization and now "History judges Christianity for having been conquered by history."³⁸ But at the same time, "The failure of Christianity is the failure of history as well."³⁹

'This world' as perceived by Berdyaev was calculated to please the heart of Dostoievsky's Grand Inquisitor, being regimented, rationalized, and thoroughly plebian in spirit. That same Grand Inquisitor would have burned Christ the Liberator, with whom Berdyaev identified in a fellowship of spiritual aristocracy which dared to assume the burden of freedom.

II. FREEDOM AND SLAVERY; CHRIST AND ANTICHRIST

For Berdyaev, we are faced with sharp alternatives: ". . . on the one side, freedom; on the other, contentment, well-being, rationalized organization of life; either freedom with suffering or contentment without freedom."⁴⁰ Most people choose the latter. Men are

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸Ibid., p. 121.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰Nicholas Berdyaev, Dostoevsky (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 190.

not herded into great collective masses against their will. The modern dictators are the creatures of their subjects, thrust forward by the people themselves in an almost frantic desire to be rid of Moses and return to the fleshpots of Egypt. The spirit of the Grand Inquisitor, the Antichrist, is abroad in the world, believing in neither God nor man. Because of this unbelief men reject freedom; acceptance of freedom presupposes the faith that sustains in suffering, for "without suffering there can be no freedom of choice."⁴¹ Unbelief prefers happiness in its one-dimensional, horizontal plane of here-and-now existence.

Berdyaev's doctrine of freedom is in essence but the exposition of a vision which for him was embodied supremely in the Legend of the Grand Inquisitor. It was Berdyaev's encounter with Dostoevsky which largely initiated Berdyaev into his anthropo-centric, metaphysical type of philosophy.⁴² Repeatedly throughout his writings he refers his views of human freedom back to the great novelist, and to the Legend in particular. Of the influence of Dostoevsky, Berdyaev writes:

Dostoevsky has played a decisive part in my spiritual life. While I was still a youth a slip from him, so

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Berdyaev, Dream, p. 304.

to say, was grafted upon me. He stirred and lifted up my soul more than any other writer or philosopher has done, and for me people are always divided into "dostoevskyites" and those to whom his spirit is foreign. It is undoubtedly due to his "cursed questioning" that philosophical problems were present to my consciousness at so early an age, and some new aspect of him is revealed to me every time I read him. The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor, in particular, made such an impression on my young mind that when I turned to Jesus Christ for the first time I saw him under the appearance that he bears in the Legend.⁴³

In the Legend, there is a confrontation between Christ the Liberator and what amounts to men's preference for "contentment without freedom." The latter is represented by the figure of the Grand Inquisitor, who would burn Christ because his offer of "freedom with suffering"⁴⁴ threatens the regimented happiness of the weak, childlike human race. The Inquisitor is an "impressive figure." He is consciously motivated by pity for men; he desires their happiness, but he knows they are weak and must be cared for. He is willing to devote himself to this consuming task. But the Inquisitor "has a secret: he does not believe in God or in any meaning of life which alone could give sense to people's suffering in his name, and, having lost this belief, he sees that large numbers of persons have not the strength to bear the burden of

⁴³ Berdyaev, Dostoevsky, "Foreword."

⁴⁴ This and the quoted phrase immediately preceding are Berdyaev's.

freedom conferred by Christ."⁴⁵ "'Why distinguish these diabolical principles of good and evil, when to do so is the cause of so much unhappiness?'," he asks Christ.⁴⁶ He accuses Christ of pitilessness because he insists that men choose freedom even though it may bring suffering. The Inquisitor thoroughly understands the nature of freedom; that is why he rejects it. "During my lifetime," writes Berdyaev, "I have frequently had an intense experience of the conflict between freedom and pity."⁴⁷ The Greeks thought tragedy was of Fate, but Berdyaev had the insight to realize that it is of Freedom.⁴⁸ Freedom is not a one-way street; evil as well as good is free, and the conflict between them is the source of the world's tragedy. Furthermore, slavery is attractive; it offers much; this is the chief point of the Legend. He who chooses freedom must surrender much and must suffer. This also is tragedy.

In The Meaning of the Creative Act, Berdyaev wrote that "man is in danger of falling into the power of an Antichristology of man, a false anthropology which will destroy man."⁴⁹ The anthropology of the Grand Inquisitor

⁴⁵ Berdyaev, Dostoevsky, p. 189.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 190.

⁴⁷ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 57.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Berdyaev, Meaning, p. 87.

is a case in point. He "set himself against God in the name of man," observes Berdyaev, then continues:

Those who devote themselves to the earthly welfare of mankind rarely believe that man is destined for a higher, a divine life. The euclidean mind, full of revolt and self-limitation at the same time, tries to improve on the work of God. He created a universal order that is full of suffering and imposed on man the intolerable load of freedom and responsibility; in the euclidean world there will be no suffering or responsibility--of freedom either. That mind necessarily leads to the Grand Inquisitor's system, the human ants' nest.⁵⁰

Most men like the system. They will gladly surrender freedom for peace, an easy conscience, a secure though unexciting happiness, for bread. They want to be overawed by miracles, coerced by a system of universal truths logically demonstrated. The Inquisitor thought that Christ missed a great opportunity to lead the world when he refused the three temptations, especially the temptation to turn stones into bread. Men wanted to be rid of their freedom but Christ "didst increase it."⁵¹ The Inquisitor's formula for gaining power over men is well understood by the Totalitarians of the world: give them 'togetherness,' take charge of their conscience, prescribe for them the rules of living, be indulgent of their weaknesses, entertain them in return for the work they must perform, and, above all, insure their bread. Do these

⁵⁰ Berdyaev, Dostoevsky, pp. 190-91.

⁵¹ Ibid.

things and they will follow of their own accord. Berdyaev hears the echo of the socialist argument in the words of the Inquisitor: "'Freedom and enough bread for all cannot go together, for men will never be able to share and share alike voluntarily'."⁵² Christ offers freedom instead of bread, therefore most men prefer the Grand Inquisitor, for it is he who pities them; he is for the tens of millions who are too weak for the religion of Christ.

The Inquisitor was disturbed by the "aristocratism of Christ's religion."⁵³ He warns Christ on pain of death never to return. It is the fate of Christ to be crucified afresh by every generation in this slavery-loving world. The true friends of Christ are the spiritual aristocrats. The spiritual aristocrat is one who, regardless of his place in the social hierarchy, recognizes that man is a "God-like spiritual being" and affirms his freedom against this organized world, refusing to be bound by any necessity of civilization or of nature.⁵⁴ The revelation made by Christ was that of the divinity of man and the humanity of God.⁵⁵ Hence the essence of religion is not Schleiermacher's 'sense of dependence,' but Christ's spirit of independence. "If God exists, man is a

⁵²Ibid., p. 193.

⁵³Ibid., p. 192.

⁵⁴Berdyaev, Dream, p. 180.

⁵⁵Ibid.

spiritually independent being; and his relation to God is defined as freedom."⁵⁶ It is not man's obedience but his fellowship that God desires. God is present "not in the power or powers of this world, but in truth, beauty, love, freedom, and creativity." It is a wretched sociomorphism to speak of God in terms of power and use the "language of meek obsequiousness" and call it humility.⁵⁷ Sin is not disobedience to some sovereign power, but "a loss of freedom or the trial of freedom."⁵⁸ To be a Christian is to know the deepest and truest foundation for belief in the dignity and creative freedom of man. Christianity and true humanism are not incompatible, for true humanism consists not in affirming man to the point of negating God, but rather to the point of "affirming him in God."⁵⁹

But in what sort of terms does Berdyaev discuss the nature of freedom? Gordon W. Allport confessed that, much to the consternation of scientific psychologists, "Recent events have raised the issue [of freedom] all over again," and he named as one of these events the fact that "Existentialism insists on freedom."⁶⁰ "The scientist's frame of reference," writes Allport, "is like the frame

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 179.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 180.

⁵⁸Ibid.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Gordon W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 83-84.

of an omniscient being; to him all things have time, place, and determined orbits. But this frame is definitely not the frame of the acting person. . . . It is because existentialism takes always the acting person's point of view that it insists so strongly upon the attribute of freedom in man's nature."⁶¹ These words fit no one better than Berdyaev; few have pressed the issue of the existent personality and its freedom more urgently. And for few philosophies has the language of the subject-object antithesis been more fundamental than for Berdyaev's. Being is not the basic category, but freedom; freedom is the foundation, the beginning and the end of his thought. "The world truly exists in the unobjectified subject."⁶²

In harmony with this subjectivity, Berdyaev does not discuss freedom in the familiar language of the traditional free-will controversy. Both the determinist and his free-will opponent are talking about the nature of the world, whether freedom exists in it. As Allport says, their frame of reference is like that of the omniscient being. The libertarian party to this controversy sees freedom as the possibility of choice between alternatives, and as such it guarantees man's moral responsibility and his accountability to the law. Berdyaev's

⁶¹Ibid.

⁶²Ibid., p. 286.

objection to this is that it presupposes a norm determining good and evil and which stands over against man.⁶³

Berdyayev speaks of the nature of the human personality when he speaks of freedom; freedom belongs to the "unobjectified subject." Taking always the frame of reference of the acting person, he defines freedom as "first and foremost my independence, determination from within and creative initiative, . . . my freedom is my own norm and my own creation of good and evil."⁶⁴ He contemplates a freedom which is not reconcilable with any kind of causal nexus, even when the cause is spiritually conceived. Freedom is equally misunderstood by those who conceive of it merely as a denial of necessity and determinism, as a realm of chance and willfulness, and by those who think of it as determination "from within the human spirit."⁶⁵ He writes, "In so far as the human spirit is part of the order of nature, everything in the spirit is determined, just as are all natural phenomena."⁶⁶ Spiritualism no less than materialism can be naturalistic and, in its own way, subject man to determinism. Freedom is:

. . . a positive creative force, unconditioned by anything else and based upon nothing else, flowing

⁶³ Ibid., p. 52.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Berdyayev, Meaning, p. 135.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

up from a spring of boundless depth. Freedom is the power to create out of nothing, the power of the spirit to create out of itself and not out of the world of nature.⁶⁷

In harmony with this view, Berdyaev declares the central idea of his philosophy to be that of "objectivization set over against existence and freedom."⁶⁸

Concerning the concept of objectification Berdyaev writes,

My critique of objectification denotes an inability to believe in or rely on the firmness and stability of the "objective" world, i.e., the world of our natural and historical environment.⁶⁹

If any single sentence can summarize Berdyaev's philosophy, it is the following: "Original reality is creative act and freedom, and the bearer of original reality is the person, the subject, spirit rather than Being, nature or object."⁷⁰ Objectification signifies a distortion, a displacement of reality-value, the false projection of reality into objective things, whether physical objects, society, state, or institutions. This is not to be taken as a repudiation of 'objective knowledge,' of science, but of the reality of things. Concerning science Berdyaev

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 136.

⁶⁸Nicholas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 11. (Hereafter cited as Slavery.)

⁶⁹Berdyaev, Dream, p. 286.

⁷⁰Ibid.

writes:

Scientific knowledge deals with an objectified world and invests man with a power to master and mould this world. But it does not itself objectify: rather it deals with a reality, namely nature, which is already in a state of objectification. . . . I regard as "object" not the subject-matter of knowledge but that which marks a certain relationship within the existential sphere, whereby man takes up a certain cognitive attitude towards something, whereas his attitude ought to be that something. In true knowledge man transcends the object or, rather, possesses the object creatively and, indeed, creates it himself.⁷¹

Objectification occurs, therefore, as the result of an estrangement within the subject. What Berdyaev is seeking is a way of expressing his intuition that the wrongness of this world lies in the subservience of the human person to necessity and disunion. "Objectification" is a "symbolical description of the fallen state of the world."⁷²

Personalism is one side of the coin; objectification is the other. As stated above, "personalism" refers essentially to the primacy of the image of God in man. Berdyaev writes, "I have come to attach supreme importance to the human person in opposition to--not by way of escape or flight or turning away from--all the impersonal and supra-personal manifestations of the objective world which constantly threaten to crush and to engulf man."⁷³

⁷¹Ibid., p. 287.

⁷²Ibid., p. 288.

⁷³Ibid., p. 289.

Clearly, the major source of this thinking lies in Berdyaev's personal passion for freedom. Objectification is the enemy of personality; personality is victory over the world of nature and history.

In "official," "scientific" philosophies the problem of freedom is set by the primacy of the world and the affirmation of freedom involves the problem of refuting the deterministic interpretation of the world. Or, more precisely, the problem is to identify a unique existent in a world ruled by law, in a vast uniformity. But Berdyaev begins with the primacy of personality; personality, free personality, stands over against the world. The problem of freedom is a spiritual challenge rather than an intellectual puzzle. Berdyaev writes:

The whole burden which is laid upon man by nature and society, by history and the demands of civilization, confronts us in the form of difficulties which demand resistance and creative transformation into the personal, uniquely the personal.⁷⁴

Personality is the exception to all that is law-governed. "In human personality there is much that is generic, belonging to the human race, much which belongs to history, tradition, society, class, family, much that is hereditary and imitative, much that is 'common.' But it is precisely this which is not 'personal' in personality."⁷⁵ The realm of the personal is original, it is

⁷⁴Berdyaev, Slavery, p. 24.

⁷⁵Ibid.

authenticity.⁷⁶ "Personality . . . is an act . . .
 opposition, victory over the dragging burden of the world,
 the triumph of freedom over the world's slavery. . . .
 Personality is effort and conflict, . . . conquest, . . .
 emancipation."⁷⁷

Personality is determined by nothing outside
 itself. One must distinguish between the individual,
 which is "a category of naturalism, biology, and soci-
 ology," and personality, which is "the freedom and
 independence of man in relation to nature, to society,
 and to the state . . ."⁷⁸ The individual can be called
 an individual only as a part of a whole; personality "is
 not the atom in relation to any whole whatsoever, cosmic,
 family, or social."⁷⁹ Personality has no heredity, no
 family, no father or mother, no context of process.⁸⁰
 Personality emanates from another world, it springs from
 mysterious, elemental depths. Personality can be expli-
 cated by no science and only by a philosophy which takes
 man as "absolute existential centre."⁸¹ Spirit must be
 given the primacy.

"Organic-hierarchical" interpretations of personal-
 ity dissolve personality into a universal principle.⁸²

⁷⁶Ibid. ⁷⁷Ibid. ⁷⁸Ibid., p. 35.

⁷⁹Ibid. ⁸⁰Ibid., p. 36. ⁸¹Ibid., p. 26.

⁸²Ibid., p. 22.

Personality transcends the fundamental categories of Platonic and German idealisms, for man is more than his rational and moral nature; he is also "free being."⁸³ "Personality is my whole thinking, my whole willing, my whole creative activity."⁸⁴ It includes "my personal reason and especially my personal will."⁸⁵ Neither can naturalistic philosophies, whether evolutionary or vitalistic, do justice to personality, for in their hands it merges into "impersonal, cosmic, vital process."⁸⁶ As for the so-called 'sciences of man,' they look upon personality externally and see what is superficial, objectified, subordinate to a whole. Inevitably all these approaches reduce man to a very small atom, overwhelmed by the massiveness of being and its categories; they render him an object among objects, whereas he is a "subject among subjects."⁸⁷ To be sure, man has a relation to the universal, but the universe is in man and not vice versa; man is "microcosm."⁸⁸ "The universal does not lie in an ideal suprapersonal sphere, but in personality, which belongs to the existential plane."⁸⁹ The 'realist'- 'nominalist' controversy stated its problem falsely as an

⁸³Ibid., p. 25.

⁸⁴Ibid. ⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 26.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 22.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 38.

'either-or'; both positions lay in the realm of objectification, where things are falsely sundered. One should not be forced to choose between the concept and the object, between the general and the particular. 'Universalialia' exist neither 'ante rem' nor 'post rem,' but 'in rebus.'⁹⁰ "I am concerned," writes Berdyaev, "to find a universal in the particular, to understand the abstract concretely, instead of understanding the concrete abstractly."⁹¹ The preservation of the universal and the particular is realized in the eternal image of the particular person, in personality as a "primary quality" not derived from quantitative experience.⁹²

Berdyaev calls this philosophy "Personalism," but its Existentialist orientation is also apparent. ". . . Personality is a universal" can serve as a strong Existentialist formula.⁹³ The passionate, agonizing, acting person stands always at the center of this thinking. His loves, his sufferings, his creative activity, are the clues to the mystery of the universe. "The entire world is nothing in comparison with human personality, with the unique person of man, with his unique fate."⁹⁴ Berdyaev

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 38.

⁹¹Berdyaev, Dream, p. 289.

⁹²Berdyaev, Slavery, p. 38.

⁹³Ibid.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 20.

is keenly, even distressingly, aware of the contradictions in his nature. A man like Berdyaev can say that man "is a being who is polarized in the highest degree."⁹⁵ Berdyaev speaks appreciatively of Tolstoy's portrayal of the double life of man:

He always depicts . . . the outwardly conditioned, unreal life, replete with falsehood, which he brings into relation with society, the state and civilization, and his inner real life in which man confronts primary reality, and the deeps of life.⁹⁶

There are those who will say to Berdyaev at this point, "Speak for yourself." To such men life seems most real when they are in relation with society, immersed in its affairs, contributing to its work. They feel no contradiction which would justify a distinction between "the profound and the superficial ego."⁹⁷ There is, for example, no evidence that Temple could say, in Berdyaev's words,

Personality finds no place in the continuous complex process of world life, it cannot be a moment or an element in the evolution of the world. The existence of personality presupposes interruption; . . . it is inexplicable by any sort of uninterrupted continuity.⁹⁸

By this Berdyaev meant something more than an emergent or creative leap in the process of evolution. "Personality is of another origin."⁹⁹ "Personality is . . . a breaking

⁹⁵Ibid. ⁹⁶Ibid., p. 25.

⁹⁷Ibid. ⁹⁸Ibid., p. 21. ⁹⁹Ibid.

in upon this world; it is the introduction of something new."¹⁰⁰ "Man is a personality not by nature but by spirit."¹⁰¹

But even this is not the last word in Berdyaev's removal of personality from 'this world'; he refuses even the body a real participation in the objective realm. Refusing to equate the body with matter, he says in a paradox that "body is spirit."¹⁰² By this he means that the essence of the body is its form rather than its material substance, and that "the form of the body pertains to man's personality and will inherit eternal life."¹⁰³ Berdyaev says:

The face of man is the most amazing thing in the life of the world; another world shines out through it. It is the entrance of personality into the world process, with its uniqueness, its singleness, its unrepeatibility.¹⁰⁴

Personality was for Berdyaev a "spirit-soul-body entity" and is subject "to no mechanism whatever."¹⁰⁵

Hence the question of the dignity of the body and its daily bread is a spiritual question.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, that the body belongs to the world of spirit and not to the physical has a bearing upon the location of the

¹⁰⁰Ibid. ¹⁰¹Ibid.

¹⁰²Berdyaev, Dream, p. 175. ¹⁰³Ibid. ¹⁰⁴Ibid.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 32. ¹⁰⁶Berdyaev, Slavery, p. 32.

dualism in Berdyaev's account of man. He repudiates as false the traditional body-mind dualism associated with the name of Descartes. "Such a dualism does not exist."¹⁰⁷ Body, soul and spirit permeate each other in a "vital unity." "Dualism exists, not between soul and body, but between spirit and nature, between freedom and necessity."¹⁰⁸ That is to say, Berdyaev rejects the dualism that can be rationalized for a dualism only one term of which belongs to the rational; the other term has no concord with the rational. Speaking externally and on a superficial level, man can be assigned to the rational. Speaking of man as man, i.e., as personality, the categories of rationalized thought are inappropriate.

III. THE SLAVERY OF THE RATIONAL

The freedom of personality, as the unique and unrepeatable, does not belong to that which can only be thought. That which is 'common' can only be thought, for it is an abstraction. The body-mind-spirit integrality which is personality has its relations, but they are existential relations. Even if personality is essentia, it is only secondarily so; primarily it is existentia. Personality is "bound up" with "the consciousness of

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 31.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

vocation."¹⁰⁹ Each individual, regardless of the nature and extent of his gifts, has the calling to put his gifts to creative use. He will listen to the "inward voice" and obey only that.¹¹⁰ He refuses to conform "so far as the world is concerned."¹¹¹ Personality is connected with asceticism. The free man is one who concentrates his "inward strength," refusing to mingle with "impersonal forces."¹¹² He actively exhibits and preserves the image of the personality, actively resists the enslaving world.¹¹³ "Asceticism is the conflict of personality with slavery."¹¹⁴ Personality is "bound up with suffering and tragic contradiction."¹¹⁵ No theodicy is possible with regard to this suffering for God is himself personality, and he suffers through sacrificial love. Man's very relation to God is a source of torture, for it makes man aware of the contradiction of his nature. And without enslaving the personality, the contradiction cannot be resolved by absorption into any "ontological totalitarianism."¹¹⁶ Personality inherently suffers anguish. Similarly to Kierkegaard, Berdyaev explains that "Man feels himself to be a creature which is suspended over an

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 48.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 49.

¹¹¹Ibid.

¹¹²Ibid.

¹¹³Ibid.

¹¹⁴Ibid.

¹¹⁵Ibid.

¹¹⁶Ibid.

abyss, and it is just in man as personality, as he is breaking away from the primitive trend to collective existence, that this feeling reaches a special degree of acuteness."¹¹⁷ It is at this point that man faces the "mystery of being and non-being," and is smitten with anxiety. No anxiety, no personality. Personality is bound up with agony, for "Personality is that which loves and hates."¹¹⁸ "Love is the path to the realization of personality," hence there can be no personality without passion.

Personality, then, is the "absolute existential centre," and is supreme over essence. Freedom depends upon the active maintenance of that supremacy. As with Kierkegaard, so with Berdyaev; personality must not be allowed to become a 'paragraph in a system.'

But the real threat to personality and its freedom arises within man himself. Man contains within himself "that also which is not personal, and this non-personal in man rebels against the fact that the realization of personality is possible only through contradiction and disruption."¹¹⁹ This impersonal in man seeks always to eject personality into the realm of objectification, the realm in which reason can construct its monisms and its

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 52.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p. 58.

¹¹⁹ Berdyaev, Slavery, p. 59.

theodicies which smooth away all contradictions. Man rebels against freedom's call to rebellion. Man even seeks and loves slavery.¹²⁰

Personality realizes itself only on the path of "transcendence." This means a passing over into the realm of the "trans-subjective," and occurs in the "existential meeting with God, with other people, with the interior existence of the world."¹²¹ But man is lured along another path, the path of objectification. "This is the way which leads out into society with its forms of universal obligation, it is the way of science with its laws of universal obligation."¹²² On this path the personality becomes enslaved in the rational, the universal. Personality is realized in the continuous transcending of self, but unless the suprapersonal which man meets has itself a personal character, the personality is enslaved, because it enters as a part into a whole. Only in the existential encounter of subject with subject does personality remain integral.¹²³

An example of the enslavement of personality is "the enchantment of ontology."¹²⁴ Ontological philosophers cannot find the 'common' for which they seek in what

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid., p. 29.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 30.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 75.

actually exists, in the tears and laughter of the "absolute existential centre," so they turn to what must be thought, viz., the abstraction Being. "Being is a concept, that is to say it is something which takes place as a result of objectivized thought."¹²⁵ Such philosophies, bearing the "imprint of abstraction," eject man into the external, subordinate him as a part in the whole. Freedom may be discussed in them, but "a philosophy of freedom is not an ontological philosophy."¹²⁶ Ontological philosophies derive freedom from being; in them man "is not free in relation to being"; freedom is represented as "the offspring of necessity."¹²⁷

But freedom is precisely the independence of personality in relation to being and to everything else outside of personality itself. Freedom is spirit, and spirit is within man. "The psychological life of man contains an active creative principle which synthesizes personality; it is the activity of the spirit in man, which penetrates not only the life of the soul but also the bodily life."¹²⁸ One must simply choose between a philosophy in which being is primary and one in which spirit, freedom ("primordial, undetermined, and underived") is primary.

¹²⁵Ibid., p. 73.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 79.

¹²⁷Ibid., p. 76.

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 48.

The choice must be determined by the will as well as by the thinking.¹²⁹ The choice exists because of the two incompatible paths which lead out from the closed circle of subjectivity, the path of transcension and the path of objectification, and this also makes the choice necessary. The point being made here lies at the heart of Berdyaev's doctrine of "uncreated freedom," of which more will be said in its proper place.

The choice of the primacy of freedom is an affirmation of, and a winning through to, personality. To make the choice is to answer the Divine call, to follow one's vocation. "Man ought to be free, he dare not be a slave, because he ought to be a man."¹³⁰ One's choice of a philosophical path, then, involves one's moral integrity. What is called 'intellectual honesty' ought not to lead one into slavery.

Believers think that they know perfect freedom in the service of God. But God, too, has been objectivized. By analogy with nature and certain aspects of society, God has been rationalized in sociomorphic and cosmomorphic and anthropomorphic terms. Man is in slavery to God, or to the human idea of God. Essentially, the master-slave relation is taken as the prototype of the divine-human

¹²⁹ Berdyaev, Slavery, p. 76.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 48.

relation. God is conceived of as power. "But no power is inherent in God."¹³¹ Again, "God is Spirit and knows nothing of the relation of domination and slavery."¹³² God is not our Master; he is our Liberator. He is Subject, not Object. He exists outside all objectification. He is "love and freedom."¹³³ It is not God, but theology which has enslaved man. Rational theology with its 'concepts' of God is wrong. "One must not work out any concept about God and least of all is the concept of being applicable. It always indicates determinism and in that case always, rationalization has already entered in."¹³⁴ When God is equated with what must be thought, man stands in an unfree relation to him; God exists as Subject and is known in existential encounter between Subjects.¹³⁵ As with Pascal, so with Berdyaev; it is the 'God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob' who liberates, and not the God of the philosophers nor, indeed, of the theologians.

Not only ontologies and theologies, but cosmologies, also, lure man into slavery. Berdyaev's use of the term 'nature' is based upon his conception of the "fundamental dualism" which is "nature and spirit."¹³⁶ Thus he follows

¹³¹Ibid., p. 82.

¹³²Ibid.

¹³³Ibid., p. 83.

¹³⁴Ibid.

¹³⁵Ibid.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 94.

the Kantian dualism of nature versus freedom, but without drawing some of the deductions drawn by Kant. Nature and the supernatural, nature and civilization, the material and the psychical--all of these denote secondary dualisms in which both terms remain caught in objectification. Nature is the realm of "alienation, determinability, impersonality."¹³⁷ "Personality breaks in upon that cycle of natural determined life as a force which comes out of another order, . . ."¹³⁸ Anyone can see that materiality enslaves, but there is a more subtle, refined form of slavery which occurs when "even spirit and God" are understood in a naturalistic way.¹³⁹ By such an understanding, "Everything is turned into object, but objects always indicate determination from without, alienation, ejection into the external, and impersonality."¹⁴⁰ Slavery to nature becomes especially subtle when it presents itself to man as "a world harmony, . . . the world whole, world unity, world order."¹⁴¹ This lure may take the form of sex, nation, blood and soil, race and family, or the social-collective. All forms of Dionysism are enslaving, that longing for emancipation from the "separated individual existence" by being taken into the "maternal bosom of the cosmos."¹⁴² The Romantic notion of beneficent and

¹³⁷Ibid. ¹³⁸Ibid. ¹³⁹Ibid., p. 95.

¹⁴⁰Ibid. ¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 97. ¹⁴²Ibid.

healing Nature beckons man sickened by civilization and overwhelms his personality in an objective cosmic 'order' which seems to hold the promise of freedom but which enslaves by its supremacy over spirit.¹⁴³ Not even the teleological interpretation of the world process gives freedom, for it is but an "ideal spiritualized determinism."¹⁴⁴ Thus all naturalisms enslave, even though they include the concepts of "world soul" and "world harmony."

Few philosophers have made such a clean sweep of all that is 'mass,' all that is institutional, all that is of the nature of the general concept, as Berdyaev. The lure of society, of sex, of civilization, and of the aesthetic are all included in his ban. Nothing is permitted to compromise the uniqueness and independence of personality, for the maintenance of these is the essence of freedom. Then what kind of world view does Berdyaev have?

IV. A 'FANTASTIC' WORLD-VIEW

Having seen the absoluteness of Berdyaev's basic dualism and the all-inclusiveness of his category of error, i.e., "objectification," it is now in order to bring into sharper focus the character of the world-view which is the context of, or which he considers commensurate

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 99.

with, his exalted anthropology. What emerges here are what Heinemann calls the "fantastic" elements of Berdyaev's philosophy.¹⁴⁵

Heinemann's term is accepted here, but without his negative value judgment. Here it will be taken as denoting the fact of Berdyaev's philosophical 'heterodoxy' in relation to 'orthodox,' scientifically oriented philosophy, his non-conformity in relation to what he calls the "official" philosophies.

Berdyaev writes, "Not one of the official philosophers has any serious doubts as to the rightness and propriety of this effort to turn philosophy into a scientific discipline, no matter what the cost."¹⁴⁶ Having doubts about themselves as philosophers, and believing in knowledge only by way of analogy with science, these philosophers have "raised these doubts to the place of a principle."¹⁴⁷ He includes among them most of the metaphysicians as well as positivists and "criticists." Aiming at the liberation of philosophy "from all dependence . . . by its final transformation into a special science," this scientific philosophy "lays claim to lordship over life."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁵F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 159.

¹⁴⁶Berdyaev, Meaning, p. 23.

¹⁴⁷Ibid.

¹⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 23-24.

For Berdyaev, however, "Philosophy is in no sense a science and in no way should it be scientific."¹⁴⁹ Nothing should be scientific except science itself. Philosophy is "Sophia"; it preceded and produced science. And now the expectation is that the child shall produce the father! But philosophy is an independent "sphere of culture, and not an independent sphere of science."¹⁵⁰ As previously stated, Berdyaev is not against science, but opposes the "scientific." He writes,

The "scientific" is based on the belief that science is the supreme criterion of the whole life of the spirit, that everything must be subject to the order established by science, that its permissions or prohibitions have decisive meaning everywhere.¹⁵¹

But this belief is "bondage of the spirit to the lower spheres of being, . . . [to] the power of necessity, . . . [to] the things of this world."¹⁵² It represents the loss of freedom and the creative spirit.

Science is "obedience to necessity," and nothing could be more useless to philosophy, for philosophy is a "creative act," the expressive surging up of the free human spirit. Philosophy thirsts for "knowledge of the secret of the world."¹⁵³ Science is practical; its aim is "adaptability to the given conditions of being."¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 26.

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

Philosophy is adventurous; it has a vision of "freedom in the world," as science does not. Consequently, science is "knowledge without danger," and knows "truths" but not "Truth."¹⁵⁵

Berdyayev's conception of the creative life, "the only life which is worth the living," is a reflection of his "aristocratism." As we have seen, this has nothing to do with social class but denotes the unwillingness to live a "passive," "bourgeois" life of conformity to the necessities of the world. "Creativeness presses forward, not toward cultural values, but towards new being."¹⁵⁶ Creativity is "creation out of nothing," by which Berdyayev means, not "the absence of resistant material but only an absolute increment or gain which is not determined by anything else."¹⁵⁷ The free human spirit is a source of bona fide novelty in the world. The phrase "creation out of nothing," is an accommodation to the prejudice of deterministic thinking which sees freedom as being "nothing." This view of philosophy as creative act is well reflected in the following excerpts from his The Meaning of the Creative Act (pages 29 through 55). Berdyayev assures us that this book "contains in . . . raw form all my dominant and formative ideas and insights."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵Ibid.

¹⁵⁶Ibid., p. 223.

¹⁵⁷Ibid., p. 134.

¹⁵⁸Berdyayev, Dream, p. 210.

. . . philosophy is a general orientation to the whole of being and not a partial orientation in partial conditions of being. Philosophy seeks the truth, not truths. Philosophy loves wisdom. . . . By its essence and by its purpose philosophy has never been adapted to necessity. . . . Even if the given world were exclusively material, philosophy would not have to be materialistic. . . . Philosophy is art . . . because it is creation . . . because it predicates a calling and a special gift from above . . . because the personality of its creator is impressed upon it. . . . Philosophy is the art of knowing in freedom by creating ideas which resist the given world and penetrate into the ultimate essence of the world. . . . Science represents man's bitter need; philosophy is luxury, a superfluity of spiritual forces. . . . the history of philosophy is the history of the human spirit's self-consciousness, the integral reaction of the spirit to the totality of being. . . . The problem of universal validity is not a problem of logic--it is a problem of spiritual communion, of the oecumenicity of the collected spirit. . . . In philosophical knowledge, creative intuition struggles toward freedom. . . . In the final analysis, discursive thought is only an instrument of intuition; it is intuition which makes all beginnings and all endings. . . . Logic is only a ladder by which intuitive philosophy descends to the given world. . . . In the creative, knowing act of philosophy there is an upsurge towards another being, another world, daring to approach the ultimate mystery. . . . Philosophic knowledge is in being itself, since the knower is in being. . . . (as for truth, it is) not the duplication, the repetition of being in the knower. Truth is comprehensiveness and liberation of being, it presupposes the creative act of the knower within being; . . . To deny freedom is to deny truth. . . . And today all philosophy must pass through the heroic act of denying the "truth." Then philosophy will become a creative act of knowing. . . . Reflection and doubt, however, deprive philosophy of its active-creative character, make it passive. . . . Creative philosophy is dogmatic philosophy, not critical, and not sceptical; it is integral and not divided. . . . The true philosopher is a man in love, he who has chosen the object

of his knowing love. . . . Philosophy is an erotic art. . . . philosophic knowledge takes place in an anthropological milieu. . . . Man precedes philosophy; man is the pre-requisite of all philosophic knowledge, . . . Philosophy is man's self-consciousness of his imperial and creative role in the cosmos. . . . The source of philosophy is . . . the intuition of being.

This manifesto of independence from "official" philosophies does not mean that philosophy is not a weighty and serious enterprise. On the contrary, it is the weightiest of undertakings; its obligatory nature is signalized from the beginning by the fact that "the mystery of man is the initial problem of a philosophy of creativity."¹⁵⁹ For Berdyaev the anthropological question was an all-consuming one; he was pre-eminently an "anthropological" philosopher.

Man's relation to the Transcendent is defined by his creativity. "Creativity . . . is its own justification in virtue of the very existence of man; it is that which constitutes man's relation and response to God."¹⁶⁰ From the standpoint of Orthodox Christianity, man's relation to God is defined by sin and redemption. Berdyaev confesses to an acute awareness at times of man's sinfulness, but thinks it not good to dwell upon it, for "to surrender oneself entirely to the sense of sin spells frustration

¹⁵⁹ Berdyaev, Meaning, p. 55.

¹⁶⁰ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 207.

and a disablement of life."¹⁶¹ Creativity cannot flourish under "lameness and impotence."¹⁶² The fact is that Berdyaev was impatient with the sense of sin and with the religious doctrines and institutions built upon it. He was really not the representative of Russian Orthodoxy that the West thought him.

The distinction between redemption and creativity is defined in part by the direction of the revelation by which each becomes known. Redemption is revealed from God to man; creativity is revealed from man to God. God "does not reveal to man that which it is for man to reveal to God."¹⁶³ It is in vain that one looks to Scripture for a revelation concerning creativity. "It is, in fact, the concealed, rather than the revealed, will of God that man should dare and create, and such daring and creativity are a token of man's fulfillment of the will of God."¹⁶⁴ Man is not justified "solely by obedience to a higher divine power," but also "by his human endeavor and creative ecstasy."¹⁶⁵ As "ek-stasis" creativity is "a breaking through to eternity."¹⁶⁶ Both redemption and creativity are phases in the divine-human drama; God redeems man in order that man may respond to him in creativity; man is redeemed in order that he might take

¹⁶¹Ibid. ¹⁶²Ibid., p. 208. ¹⁶³Ibid.
¹⁶⁴Ibid. ¹⁶⁵Ibid. ¹⁶⁶Ibid., p. 209.

his "flight into the infinite."¹⁶⁷ The church is wrong in its fixation at the level of redemption, which is after all a preliminary phase of the divine-human drama. This preoccupation leads to a constant harping on man's sinfulness and his duty of obedience to a higher power. Berdyaev writes, "I realized the fallacy of an exclusively soteriological religion. It is only in the creative act that man prevails over the oppression and enslavement of extraneous influences. The creative act reveals the absolute priority of the 'self,' the subject, over the 'non-self'."¹⁶⁸ This, after all, is precisely the meaning of the creative act. Berdyaev's doctrine of creativity represented in part his attempt to work out the relation between his radical view of freedom and the Christian faith. The Meaning of the Creative Act was written, he states, in reaction against the Orthodox circles of Moscow. Even after he joined the Orthodox Church the problem of the relation of creativity to redemption continued, and at the end of his life he was still laboring the point in Dream and Reality. He really never succeeded in reconciling the two, and many who are not less devoted to freedom than he will find his view of redemption too cramped, allowing far less room for

¹⁶⁷Ibid.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., p. 210.

freedom than seems justified to them in their own experience of redemption.

Berdyaev turns to the Incarnation for the Christian foundation of his view of creativity. He finds it implied in "the fundamental Christian truth of God-

manhood."¹⁶⁹ The "theandric" existence of man is a Christian theme. In reply to his critics, who accused him of defying God, Berdyaev affirmed that "God's idea of man is infinitely loftier than the traditional orthodox conceptions of man, which are as often as not an expression of a frustrated and stunted mind."¹⁷⁰ Man is God's "greatest idea," and God "awaits the birth of man in himself."¹⁷¹ Relevantly to his doctrine of freedom, this means that for Berdyaev man has a high degree of independence in relation to God.

Berdyaev reveals some philosophical affinities which are "fantastic" enough from the standpoint of scientific philosophy: The Kabbala, Jacob Boehme, Franz von Baader, Rudolf Steiner. And the greatest of these is Boehme, who was almost as important for Berdyaev as Dostoievsky. Berdyaev saw Boehme as "the greatest mystic-gnostic," but this, which in Berdyaev's eyes was Boehme's virtue, is, in the eyes of the scientific

¹⁶⁹Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁷⁰Ibid.

¹⁷¹Ibid., p. 209.

philosophers, his vice. The great German mystic revealed to Berdyaev "insights which rise above and beyond time itself."¹⁷² His highest praise is given to Boehme's "mystic rapprochement of heaven with earth, God with man, Christ with Adam."¹⁷³ Berdyaev quotes "Boehme's most essential word on Christ and Adam":

"Understand that human nature must be preserved, and that God did not cast it out entirely, so that a new and strange man should rise from the old; rather he must arise from the nature and qualities of Adam and from the nature and qualities of God in Christ, so that man should become Adam-Christ--Christ a Christ-Adam, God-man and man-God."¹⁷⁴

"This," comments Berdyaev, "is what I call man's birth in God, his entry into Divine Life. Christ is the Man Absolute, the Heavenly man, man born in God, as a hypostasis of God."¹⁷⁵

This means that man in his essence, in what constitutes his humanity (including his bodily form), is divine. He is not of 'this world' which is studied by science, and his nature cannot be elucidated by science or by scientific philosophies. There are "mysterious and cosmic powers" in man, in virtue of which he "surpasses all the phenomena of the world and is himself the supreme centre of being."¹⁷⁶ Such things are

¹⁷² Berdyaev, Meaning, p. 64. ¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 66. (Italicized by Berdyaev.)

¹⁷⁵ Ibid. ¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 63.

"unknown to official science and to the ordinary everyday consciousness of man . . ."¹⁷⁷ Whoever would expound the true nature of man must transcend rational and logical thought with a "special listening faculty" for hearing the "harmony of the spheres."¹⁷⁸ Man is called to "a royal and creative role in the world to the continuation of creation."¹⁷⁹ Man's highest self-consciousness is "Christological consciousness" and "Christology is the only true anthropology."¹⁸⁰

This kind of thinking about man differs radically from the type represented by Temple's Nature, Man, and God, for example. Temple's order is continuous, and its constitutive principle, from Berdyaev's point of view, is necessity. Berdyaev contemplates two orders, the order of being and the order of freedom. The two are opposed. In that continuous order, science may validly pursue its practical aims. Freedom, however, cannot be revealed by the ontological and metaphysical philosophies which confine themselves to that order, for freedom is the constitutive principle of a different order, the God-man order. The relation between the two orders is neither that of ontological monism nor that of ontological

¹⁷⁷Ibid.

¹⁷⁸Ibid., p. 67.

¹⁷⁹Ibid., p. 71.

¹⁸⁰Ibid., p. 78.

dualism, for both relations are rationalizations and belong to determinism.¹⁸¹ Their relation is a mystery, for it is "almost incomprehensible, how a tiny bit of nature, completely dependent upon its irresistible round, should dare to rise against nature and demand his rights as a descendant of another world, as a being with another destiny."¹⁸² Again, this world does not contain the possibility of "outgrow[ing] itself into man's highest consciousness of himself."¹⁸³ Man can only speak of himself in his freedom symbolically.¹⁸⁴ He can evoke images, such as the God-man or the Adam-Christ, which point to the "transcendent Mystery"; he can invoke the aid of "limiting notions," such as "objectification" and "uncreated freedom," to express a relation which does not "lend itself to logical definition."¹⁸⁵ Proof is impossible, but, He that hath ears to hear the "harmony of the spheres," let him hear.

What is the relation of man to the universe? Man is the center of the cosmic hierarchy. With his fall 'this world' became fallen, degraded to a lower sphere. By virtue of its being centered in man, nature is a living

¹⁸¹ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 288.

¹⁸² Berdyaev, Meaning, p. 59.

¹⁸⁴ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 288.

¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

organism. But when man, the "king of nature," falsely directed his freedom, the deadly mechanism of necessity began. Even death in nature is the result of man's sinful freedom. "Man gives life and spirit to nature, through his creative freedom, and he kills or fetters it through his own servitude and his fall into material necessity."¹⁸⁶ Thus, so far is freedom from being the product of necessity that the necessity into which the cosmos has fallen is the product of freedom, abused freedom. "The fall of the highest hierarchical centre of nature carries with it the fall of all nature, of all its lower ranks."¹⁸⁷

But man by the abuse of his freedom was dethroned as king of nature. He became subject to the world's necessity, poisoned by the death which he himself had caused. "'This world' the world of natural necessity, fell with the fall of man, and man will have to renounce the temptations of 'this world' to regain his regnant place in it. Man must free himself from the lower ranks of the hierarchy of nature, must become ashamed of the fact that he is slavishly dependent upon that which is lower than himself and which should rightly depend upon him. Nature must be humanized, liberated, made alive

¹⁸⁶ Berdyaev, Meaning, p. 68.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

and inspired by man."¹⁸⁸

Fallen man "remains a microcosm and contains within himself all the ranks and all the powers of the world, . . . The cosmos shares the fate of man and hence shares the fate of the cosmos. Only the man who takes the place in the cosmos prepared for him by his Creator, has the power to transform the cosmos into a new heaven and a new earth."¹⁸⁹ It was not the individual man, but the "all-man," the "first Adam," who fell. Hence it is the all-man who must and can rise. "The liberation and creative upsurge of the all-man is the liberation and creation of the cosmos."¹⁹⁰ This is accomplished through the "absolute Divine Man," whose appearance in the world as "the incarnation of God's Son," restores the divine-human.¹⁹¹ "Adam, reborn through Christ into a new spiritual man, is no longer passive and oppressed and blind, but a clear-seeing creator, the son of God who continues his Father's work."¹⁹² In Christ, and only in Christ, man can respond to the divine call in creative freedom.

It would seem from this that theology and philosophy are one, and this is a result sufficient to justify

¹⁸⁸Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁸⁹Ibid., p. 70.

¹⁹⁰Ibid.

¹⁹¹Ibid.

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 72.

the charge of "fantastic" from the "official" philosophers. The identification of theology and philosophy is characteristic of the Gnostic mind.

This statement of the relation of man to the cosmos, a relation in which man is called to the regaining of his lost "royal glory," illuminates Berdyaev's view of the relation between science, false philosophy, and true philosophy. With its practical aim, science is properly obedient to the mechanism of nature. It cannot objectify, for its proper sphere is a sphere which is already objectified in the Fall; science has to do with this fallen world. Philosophy, however, as Sophia, as penetration to the secret of the world, should transcend the materiality and mechanical necessity of the fallen world; "philosophy should look beyond [the mechanism of nature] and see organism."¹⁹³ Philosophy can objectify, by interpreting man as a part in relation to the cosmic whole, by applying to him the mechanical processes of fallen nature, by failure to perceive him as "the absolute existential centre" of the universe, in which the whole series of the cosmic hierarchy inheres. False philosophy is that which falls into this objectification; it includes most or all of the rationalizing ontologies

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 68.

and cosmologies, especially those that aspire to be 'scientific.' True philosophy is that which sees in man the clue to the mystery of the universe, which refuses to objectify, which builds upon the perception that "the world truly exists in the unobjectified subject."

We know from Berdyaev's autobiography that his doctrine of "uncreated freedom" is another aspect of his philosophy which has baffled some. The doctrine is his way of emphasizing that freedom is determined only by itself and that it cannot, therefore, be derived from being.¹⁹⁴ Freedom is beyond the "determining and begetting agency of anything or anybody."¹⁹⁵ Before any rational account of the source or nature of freedom, it "flees into the inexplicable depth, the bottomless abyss."¹⁹⁶

Again it is Boehme, this time with his doctrine of the "ungrund," upon whom Berdyaev calls for aid in expressing his vision of freedom. The following excerpts illustrate Berdyaev's interpretation and application of the ungrund:

¹⁹⁴ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 288.

¹⁹⁵ Nicolas Berdyaev, The Beginning and the End (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957), pp. 104 ff. (Hereafter cited as Beginning.)

¹⁹⁶ Ibid.

. . . before being and deeper than being lies the Ungrund, the bottomless abyss, irrational mystery, primordial freedom, which is not derivable from being. . . . The Ungrund, then, is nothingness, the groundless eye of eternity; and at the same time it is will, not grounded upon anything, bottomless, indeterminate will. But this is a nothingness which is "Ein Hunger zum Etwas." At the same time the Ungrund is freedom. In the darkness of the Ungrund a fire flames up and this is freedom, neonic, potential freedom. . . . freedom is like nothingness, but from it something emanates. The hunger of freedom, of the baseless will for something, must be satisfied. . . . The freedom of the Ungrund is neither light nor darkness, it is neither good nor evil. Freedom lies in the darkness and thirsts for light; and freedom is the cause of light.¹⁹⁷

Even to attempt to translate this language into something more rational or literal would be as inappropriate as to treat, let us say, the Genesis account of the six days of creation in the same manner. What could one say, for example, about "the groundless eye of eternity"? What is that? It evokes an image of primordial mystery, and one had best let it rest there. This is not supposed to be an objective account of anything. Berdyaev has chosen this way of philosophizing, because he had first chosen the primacy of freedom over being. One cannot have it both ways, and "the choice settles two types of philosophy."¹⁹⁸ Berdyaev simply perceived or experienced that the subject is superior in reality-value to

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

the object, and his mystic-gnosticism, his symbolical and prophetic manner of presentation is appropriate to the basic perception. For example, in speaking of Boehme's use of the language of symbol and myth he says that ". . . it may be just for that reason that he succeeds in letting in some light upon that depth the knowledge of which is not attainable in rational philosophy."¹⁹⁹

After comparing Boehme with the "majority of professional metaphysicians," Berdyaev states his conclusion in a passage in which figures of speech abound, the aim of which appears to be that of affirming an irrational principle at the very source of being:

Everything leads us to the conclusion that being is not the ultimate depth, that there is a principle which precedes the emergence of being and that freedom is bound up with that principle. Freedom is not ontic but meonic. Being is a secondary product and it is always the case that in it freedom is already limited, and even disappears altogether. Being is congealed freedom, it is a fire which has been covered and has cooled; but freedom at its fountain head is fiery. This cooling of the fire, this coagulation of freedom is in fact objectification. Being is brought to birth by the transcendental consciousness as it turns to the object. Whereas the mystery of primary existence with its freedom, with its creative fire, is revealed in the direction of the subject.²⁰⁰

The function of this conclusion is to provide Berdyaev a standpoint beyond 'this world' for his posture of revolt

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 110.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 111.

against 'this world'. Meonic freedom expresses itself in revolt. The irrational, mythologizing mode of thought is the path deliberately chosen by this rebellious philosopher. A vulgar person would say to the "official" philosopher, "Your slavish minds are incapable of true philosophy." Berdyaev says the same thing by affirming, "Being is congealed freedom." Of course, the "official" philosophers catch the implication, and their retort is, "Your philosophy is 'fantastic'." But for Berdyaev, truth is in the "absolute existential centre" and its underived, primordial freedom, and is in inevitable tension with the assumed primacy of being. "Spirit is freedom, and freedom is spirit," declares Berdyaev, "and the matter of revolt is closely allied to that of freedom."²⁰¹ Again, "Rebellion marked not a phase of my intellectual development but an innate quality of my thinking and living."²⁰² In Nikos Kazantzakis' novel, Zorba the Greek rebelliously transvalues the conventional moral values of a society which his existentialist "lucidity" [Camus] tells him is vain: "But I shall go to Hell because one night in Salonica a woman waited for me on her bed and I did not go to her."²⁰³ Berdyaev

²⁰¹Berdyaev, Dream, p. 56.

²⁰²Ibid., p. 54.

²⁰³Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba The Greek (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1963), p. 103.

transvalues the conventional intellectual values of rational philosophy: "Freedom is the explanation of the genesis of being and at the same time of the genesis of evil: it is a cosmological mystery."²⁰⁴ The mystery cannot be dispelled by the categories of rational thought. It can only be communed with, existentially experienced. Not amenable to conceptualization, it is efficacious as the dynamic of living for those who resist this world and yearn for the authentic.

V. BEYOND 'THIS WORLD'

Freedom has its positive aspect in creativity.

Realized creativity is the victory of freedom, of spirit, over the heaviness of the world; it is the destruction of objectification, hence it means the ascendancy of subject over object; it is 'the revealing of the sons of God'; it is the coming of the Kingdom of God.

But the creative act suffers a tragic fate in this world. Always, there is "painful disparity between the creative idea and its embodiment in the world."²⁰⁵ Partial and fragmentary embodiment is all that is possible

²⁰⁴ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 54.

²⁰⁵ Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 209.

for it. Creativity is "a tremendous effort which is destined never to succeed" under the conditions of "inertia, . . . laws and compulsions" of this world.²⁰⁶ Creativity is caught in the paradoxical situation of being simultaneously powerful yet impotent; powerful in making cultures and civilizations yet impotent to bring about the "real transformation" which is its goal. Cultural and social institutions, even of the highest order, are but tokens and symbols of the real transformation of the world.

The essential nature of the creative act is expressed in the following paragraph:

The primary creative impulse takes place outside the objectified world, outside the time of this world; it happens in existential time, in a flash of the present; it knows neither past nor future. A creative act is a noumenal act, but the product which is created by it belongs to the phenomenal world. Beethoven makes a symphony and thereupon in this creation of his people discover "objective" regulating principles. But the creativity of Beethoven ought to have led to the whole world's breaking into sound like a symphony. And in the same way the creative power of a genuine philosopher should have led to the changing of the world and not merely to the enrichment of it by new and expensive books.²⁰⁷

Here, too, is the fate of the creative act. As "a flight into the infinite; not an activity which objectifies in

²⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 214.

²⁰⁷ Berdyaev, Beginning, p. 181.

the finite but one which transcends the finite toward the infinite," the creative act never succeeds in breaking through the closed cycle of being.²⁰⁸ The real significance of creative acts in this world lies in their character as prefigurations of "the end of the world"; creative acts are eschatological.²⁰⁹

The hope of free personality, then, does not lie in 'this world'. It must look beyond. The hope that is offered by rational thought, namely, world harmony and progress, is a false hope, and in any case it is not a hope, but the despair, of man as "absolute existential centre."

"World harmony," writes Berdyaev bluntly, "is a false and enslaving idea."²¹⁰ It is an offense to the dignity of personality. From the standpoint of the absolute existential center there can be no justification for the calamities, the oppressions, and the sorrows it suffers. Whatever degrades and oppresses the absolute good, viz., personality, is absolute evil. "What value does the very idea of world order, world harmony possess, and could it ever in the least justify the unjust suffering of personality?"²¹¹ Again, "No

²⁰⁸ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 214.

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Berdyaev, Slavery, p. 88.

²¹¹ Ibid., p. 87.

world harmony, no world order can be reconciled with unmerited suffering, even if it be only one creature, with one tear of a tortured child."²¹² World harmony purchased at such a cost is too dear; "The entrance ticket to world harmony must be returned."²¹³ Better that the world should not have been made than that unmerited suffering should be essential to its existence.

With this thinking we are close to the real reason for the Gnostic type of world-view. World disorder is too appallingly real ever to be reconciled in a scheme together with world harmony. The difficulties of attributing such a world to God are too great for the Gnostic mind to encompass. Berdyaev's path runs straight from his view of personality as microcosm to his abandonment of 'this world' to the Prince of the World.

The philosophical monisms and the rational theological theodicies, in explaining evil by attributing it to the parts of a whole, dishonor both God and man, justify godlessness rather than righteousness, essentially deny the reality of evil, and are prolific sources of atheism. God is Freedom, and is the Liberator, not the Pantokrator. He seeks not to rule over men but to be born in them, and they in him. Man as microcosm and

²¹²Ibid., p. 86.

²¹³Ibid.

as existential center is not to be ejected into the realm of objectification and made the means to an end. Evil is not to be servilely accepted in false humility before a non-existent world order; evil is to be resisted, because to resist it on behalf of freedom and spirit is man's vocation. The intrinsic evil of evil cannot be explained away by turning it into an instrumental good, and a man ought to be ashamed to be happy at the expense of another's happiness. Many a theology has foundered on the rocks of the 'problem of evil' and instead of strengthening faith has led to atheism. Berdyaev relates, "A friend of mine told me in so many words that Leibnitz was the most terrible pessimist in the history of thought. . . . [For] if the best of all possible worlds is so horrible, how pessimistic such a doctrine is."²¹⁴

As for the doctrine of progress, it is, au fond, a religious belief which has been mutilated and distorted by its subjection to determinism. "The doctrine of progress is bound to be a religious faith, since there can be no positive science of progress. Such a science can only be one of evolution."²¹⁵

²¹⁴Ibid., p. 89.

²¹⁵Nicholas Berdyaev, The Meaning of History (New York: Meridian Press, 1962), p. 162.

Berdyaev understands the doctrine of progress as teaching that "in the torrent of time and generations whereby the destinies of human history are achieved, man advances steadily to some strange untrodden height, to some nobler and better state in relation to which all that has gone before is but a means and an instrument and not an end in itself."²¹⁶ In his denial of this doctrine Berdyaev points out that evolution has nothing to do with progress, for "Evolution is a naturalistic term, whereas progress belongs to the spiritual category."²¹⁷ Progress is axiological, for it presupposes appraisal "from the point of view of a principle which ranks higher than the process of natural change."²¹⁸ The Christian messianic hope gave birth to the idea of progress as "the expectation of the Kingdom of God as the consummation of history."²¹⁹ But the nineteenth century secularized the hope, opposed it to the "religious type of these dispositions," and grounded it upon evolution.²²⁰ The resultant doctrine of progress was a naturalized expectation which belongs to the realm of objectification.

The realm of objectification, however, is ruled

²¹⁶Ibid., p. 163.

²¹⁷Berdyaev, Beginning, p. 164.

²¹⁸Ibid.

²¹⁹Ibid.

²²⁰Ibid.

by necessity, determinism. Here arises a second objection to the idea of progress: the human destiny which it envisions is the result of the necessary process in so far as progress is thought to depend upon natural development. Destiny in the real, the Christian messianic, sense of the word, depends upon freedom.²²¹ The Christian consciousness associates destiny with original freedom, so that it is neither compulsion (as in the Greek idea of Fate), nor necessity (as with many of the theoreticians of progress), but is "the antinomous union of God's will and human freedom."²²² Human destiny is realized in man's response to the call of God, who denies "any perfection of man" that is not born of freedom.²²³

Berdyaev's most passionate objection to progress is expressed in the following words:

In the world of objectification progress treats the present as a means to serve the interests of the future. One generation is a means which serves the interests of the next, progress carries with it not only life but death also. In the natural and historical world birth is pregnant with death.²²⁴

Berdyaev's sense of personality is deeply offended by this. Man becomes a pawn in the hands of history. The

²²¹Berdyaev, The Meaning of History, p. 77.

²²²Ibid.

²²³Ibid., p. 76.

²²⁴Berdyaev, Beginning, p. 164.

microcosm, which contains the universal in itself, is made a part of an objectified universal whole. One generation is 'manure' for the next. The existential center is treated as though it were a thing. "Progress, which has a habit of offering up every living human generation and every living human person as a sacrifice to a future state of perfection, which thus becomes a sort of vampire, is only to be accepted on the condition that history will come to an end, and that within that end all previous generations and every human person who has lived on earth will be able to enjoy the results of history."²²⁵

This "vampire" character of progress means that endless history would be indifferent to one's personal fate, hence meaningless from the standpoint of Personalism. Universal meaning and personal meaning must be the same. Without an end, history buries personal existence beneath its multiplying layers of time, on and on through an "evil infinity."²²⁶ Each successive stage serves to emphasize the finitude of man. The triumph of finiteness is equivalent to the triumph of death; human existence turns out to be an absurdity. "It is only an end . . . which takes the form of resurrection into which all the

²²⁵Ibid., p. 209.

²²⁶Ibid., p. 230.

creative attainments of all human beings enter" that can give meaning to personal existence.²²⁷ Berdyaev feels this alienation from history, yet at the same time he feels deeply implicated in it: "History takes place within me, for I am . . . a microcosmos"; and again, "History and the end" and "my own history and my own end" are interdependent, even if the relationship is beyond clear definition.²²⁸ This tension between history as alien to me and history as "my own history" cannot be resolved in history itself. There must be an end; the resolution can come only with the victory over objectification and alienation, in the great apocalyptic event.²²⁹

We desire to ask Berdyaev about the where, when, and how of the end. However, such questions presuppose historical time, and they demand an answer that is commensurable with historical time. No such answers can be given. In thinking about the end we get caught in a Kantian-like antinomy: the end of objectification must not be objectified or it is no end to objectification; time must be dispensed with in thinking of the end of time, else it is not the end of time of which we are thinking. Yet how is it possible to think of the end of

²²⁷Ibid.

²²⁸Berdyaev, Dream, pp. 294-95.

²²⁹Ibid.

history as being entirely outside history?²³⁰ Can we rationalize the matter by having recourse to 'transcendence' and 'immanence'? Only if we understand these concepts as being "relative and conditional"; then we can say that "The transcendent, lying beyond the confines [of history], acts immanently. The immanent in history is a power which is transcendent to it."²³¹ Yet the relation of "the finite and the infinite, . . . time and eternity" permit only of paradox.²³²

Only existential time can be applied to the coming of the end. Existential time is measured "by the degree of tension and vigor in the condition of the subject."²³³ Existential time is experienced in the depths of subjectivity as the "eruption of transcendent forces" in moments of personal and historical catastrophe, in nearness to death, in creative ecstasy. Herein lies the way out toward eternity. At such moments we forget to 'watch the clock,' for their significance comes from beyond the flux of the time of 'this world.'²³⁴ 'This world' and that other order to which the end belongs commingle in

²³⁰ Berdyaev, Beginning, pp. 231-32; Berdyaev, Dream, p. 295.

²³¹ Berdyaev, Beginning, p. 230.

²³² Ibid. ²³³ Ibid., p. 231.

²³⁴ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 295.

existential time. Berdyaev writes:

It is a mistake to separate this world and the other altogether. It is in fact precisely the concrete life in this fallen objective world . . . which contains the noumenal core in it; a noumenal core which is not to be found in the abstractly common . . . The eschatological outlook, the transformation of the world, is a possibility precisely because there is a noumenal basis within the concrete life of the world.²³⁵

This "noumenal" is a quality of life which, gaining the ascendancy in the overcoming of the objective realm and the return to the existential center, transfigures the world and "stems the torrent of time's disintegrating flux."²³⁶

The eschatological attitude is not a passive waiting for the end. The transfiguration of the world does not result from a necessary process of development, nor is it a kind of divine fatality. Berdyaev regards "the Second Coming of Christ in power and glory as dependent on the creative act of man."²³⁷ The last judgment, the final revelation of God-manhood, is both divine and human. Time is a torment; history is a ghastly failure; even "Historical Christianity has grown cold and intolerably prosaic; [occupied] mainly in

²³⁵ Berdyaev, Beginning, p. 234.

²³⁶ Berdyaev, Dream, p. 296.

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 297.

adapting itself to the commonplace, to the bourgeois patterns and habits of life."²³⁸

But Christ came to send heavenly fire on earth, and what will He, if it be already kindled? That fire will not be kindled until the fire of man is set ablaze.²³⁹

Now is the time for "daring and creative endeavour" in an attempt to break through the 'heaviness' of this world.²⁴⁰ Here, where the precious reality of divine humanity is always being siphoned off into the enslaving realm of objectification, it is the imperative calling of the eschatological outlook to rebel, and to rebel, and always to rebel.

²³⁸Ibid.

²³⁹Ibid.

²⁴⁰Ibid.

CHAPTER V

WILLIAM TEMPLE'S VIEW OF FREEDOM:

FREEDOM THROUGH SUBMISSION

Where pessimism in regard to the fate of personality in 'this world' is the context in which Nicolas Berdyaev's philosophy of freedom gains its significance, the opposite is true for William Temple. The world is experiencing moral progress toward the Kingdom of God, and the attainment of true freedom is constitutively related to that progress. For Berdyaev, man ought to be free and is free unless he cravenly surrenders that freedom to the world which seeks always to enslave him. For Temple, also, man ought to be free, and will be, if he surrenders himself to that Purpose which is guiding the world to its destiny. For Berdyaev all men are endowed with freedom, in virtue of their status as personalities standing over against the Whole, unless they surrender their birthright of personal authenticity for a mess of 'collective' pottage. For Temple, some men are free and some are not free, in virtue of the fact that some do and some do not transcend their ego-centric fragmentariness by submission to the Whole. For Berdyaev, freedom is a datum, a treasure to be jealously guarded by resistance to the world. For Temple, freedom is a

possibility, to be made actual through discipline and surrender. For Berdyaev, it is a present possession, unless . . . For Temple, it is a future possession, if . . . Freedom, says Temple, is found "when a man not only recognizes that an action is his own, but when he feels that he has truly expressed his whole nature in it and can wholeheartedly rejoice in it."¹ Beyond the mere absence of external coercion, freedom is the conquest of "inner compulsion."² Ultimately, this requires the Grace of God.

For William Temple freedom is determination by the good. If this seems paradoxical, it is due to the traditional identification of freedom with indeterminism. But, to be in the world is to be determined in some way. The question of freedom is not whether events are determined or not, but "what is the mode of the determination of any particular event."³ Freedom is determination in a mode that is appropriate to personality, and its opposite is to be determined mechanically or

¹William Temple, Christus Veritas (London: The Macmillan Company, 1949), p. 58. (Cited hereafter as Christus.)

²Ibid.

³William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London: The Macmillan Company, 1953), p. 229. (Cited hereafter as Nature.)

organically, or by "irresistible compulsion."⁴

The identification of freedom with indeterminism is prompted by the sound motive of safeguarding man's responsibility, for how can a man be responsible for what he cannot avoid? Much of the traditional defense of freedom, therefore, has taken the form of anti-deterministic polemic. Its problem is that of discovering room in the world for indeterminism. It must show that causation is not universal. Indeterminism affords a foil against which Temple's position comes into sharper focus.

Partly as the presupposition and partly as the consequence of their defense of freedom, libertarians have affirmed the continuity, but denied the identity, of man with nature. "Nature," here, means the entire realm of determinability and of the impersonal. It is the sphere of the sciences, the physical, the biological, the social, and the sciences of mind in so far as the latter presuppose the universality of causation (conceived either substantially or statistically) and the uniformity of nature. Nature so defined is, after all, the presupposition of triumphant science, and the libertarians could not repudiate it, and were not disposed to do so. But they could define man in such a way

⁴Ibid.

that his responsibility should not be lost in the causal nexus. Thus Robert L. Calhoun, for example, describes man as being something more than nature, even though not entirely something other.⁵ A part of him belongs properly to each of the categories represented by the major sciences, yet he is not fully analyzed by any or all of them. Man's freedom belongs to a 'more yet.' Libertarians have made careful and responsible attempts to adjust the claims of science and the individual's claim to freedom.

By way of illustration, the author of the article on Free Will in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, who is definitely a libertarian, devotes fully one third of his space to the "Scientific Problem" involved in the affirmation of freedom of the will. The polemic of the article is directed against an implied Weltanschauung, based on the presumed omniscience of scientific method.⁶ His argument is a form of the a fortiori. If the Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy bids the notion of certain calculability to walk softly in the realm of physics, where the notion first arose and where (if anywhere) it had the best chance of establishing itself,

⁵Robert L. Calhoun, What Is Man? (New York: Association Press, 1939).

⁶John David Mabbott, "Free Will," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1963), IX, 746-50.

how much more should it walk softly in the realm of volitional events. Of course, the "'principle of indeterminacy' is not a 'principle of indeterminism'"; nevertheless, it has come to pass that "all scientific prediction is based on observed statistical regularities and can never yield more than a probable result." Free will, if it had to, could exist in this crack in the continuity of the causal nexus, for "no free will theory need claim that a man can choose in complete independence of his past and his environment, nor deny that decisions of a certain kind are probable . . ."⁷

But the theory of free will actually has a wider standingplace than this, for three major features of the scientific method cannot be applied in their full rigor to human conduct. They are: measurement, analysis, and repetition.⁸ Psychological phenomena themselves cannot be measured, only their physiological accompaniments. But this is to fall into discredited Behaviorism or into epiphenomenalism, or both. Now, epiphenomenal states are useless to the organism, since they make no difference to physiological processes. Therefore, by the theory of evolution, they should have disappeared long ago. As for analysis, it means abstracting one feature of an object

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

and relegating the others to irrelevancy. But the "unity of the self and of its psychological states" defeats this analysis, for it must 'murder to dissect.' "The units of a man's character are so interwoven that none of them would be what it is without the others . . ."⁹ The feature of repetition cannot be applied because of the uniqueness of personality. " . . . study of the behaviour of Smith, Jones and Brown is poor evidence for the behaviour of Robinson."¹⁰ Thus no method is available which affords the basis for certain predictability in either nature or man, especially in the latter.

This argument does not, of course, prove the case for indeterminism, but it contributes to the disproof of determinism, leaving indeterminism in possession of the field. This is the author's aim.¹¹ He has assumed that responsibility requires indeterminism, which is equivalent to freedom. "What free will requires is that our volition should be uncaused . . ."¹² Therefore, he not only rejects scientism and its claim of universal determination, but he also rejects every attempt to give a positive sense to freedom, such as William Temple's attempt to identify freedom with assent to the good. All such identifications are "fatal to responsibility," which

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

requires that "Service of the devil must be perfect freedom too."¹³ Furthermore, he rejects all theories of self-determination, even those which are willing to do without prediction. He admits one strong argument for self-determinism: "When we praise an action we praise the self whose action it is; and we are therefore committed to a necessary connection between the self and the action, and this is determinism." But this argument is based upon a confusion of "the relation between a cause and its effect with the relation between a disposition and its manifestation," and is therefore invalid.

One criterion for the classification of theories of freedom lies in their relation to the concepts of 'freedom from' and 'freedom for.' The sheer indeterminism sketched above, with its practical aim of assessing moral and legal responsibility for the particular volitional act, falls heavily on the side of 'freedom from.' Freedom is the absence of determination. An adequate account of freedom has been given when it is possible to say that at the moment of commission of a volitional act the agent was so free of external, characterological, and motivational influences that he was "responsible" for the act. It is at the point of over-weighted emphasis on 'freedom from' that the crux of Temple's

¹³Ibid.

difference with views represented by the above lies. For Temple, freedom is "for" the good, and this requires that the good exercise a determining influence in the conduct of life. Presently it will become necessary to show how the good becomes effectual in a person's life, but at the moment it is important to observe the reasons for Temple's rejection of indeterminism.

While it does not lie at the heart of this rejection, it is worth noting that Temple considers an extreme form of indeterminism as damaging to the idea of responsibility as is determinism, so long as mechanistic determinism is left out of the picture.¹⁴ Without some continuity of moral character, an individual's volitional acts become a series of isolated decisions. "The culprit when charged with his offence might say that he did choose that course at that time, but he is not choosing it now; for all moral purposes he is now a different person."¹⁵ Thus, in order to be sure that responsibility is assigned justly, the individual should be praised or blamed or punished immediately upon the commission of his act. Even this might not be soon enough. But continuity

¹⁴ Temple, Nature, p. 224.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 223.

of moral character is a limitation upon freedom of choice, and indeterminism is thus compromised.

In fact, for legal purposes determinism is better than indeterminism. Assuming that the law does not wish to punish the wrong person, it cannot be sure of not doing so on indeterminist grounds, for the reason noted in the last paragraph above. But if deterrence is the law's purpose in punishing, then it is justified in punishing an individual who has been convicted of a crime, regardless of how he got to be what he is.¹⁶ (Provided, of course, that he is not insane or mentally incompetent, which would mean that punishment would not deter him in future and would disgrace the law in the eyes of the public.) But punishment for deterrence implies determinism. The article on Free Will in the Encyclopaedia Britannica, cited on page 225, would object that punishment for deterrence is perfectly compatible with punishing a man for a crime he did not commit.¹⁷ And this is unjust. Temple would admit both the probability and the heinousness of such miscarriages of justice, but the indeterminist theory does not render justice less, but more, difficult. His point seems to

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 224.

¹⁷ John David Mabbott, "Free Will," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1963), IX, 748.

hold true, that "for legal or civic purposes, it is easier to associate responsibility with Determinism than with an extreme doctrine of Free Will."¹⁸

This argument is not Temple's reason for accepting a form of determinism, but is an argument against indeterminism. He is simply saying that the problem of responsibility is more intricate than the typical defenders of indeterminism seem to acknowledge. He is attempting to clear the ground for his own approach to the problem of freedom. He will not reject determinism, exclusive of mechanistic determinism, on the grounds that it is impracticable in the assignment of responsibility, for it is not. But he does reject determinism taken as external coercion or inner compulsion, on the grounds that it is morally destructive in that it treats persons as things.¹⁹ However, believers in freedom unnecessarily complicate their defense of it when they take it as being effectively present in the moment of the particular volitional action, for there seems to be no way of deciding just how much freedom of choice is present on each occasion and why the free will chooses as it does.²⁰ This is an important point, for it is the opposite of Temple's insistence that freedom is to be

¹⁸ Temple, Nature, p. 224.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 225.

²⁰ Ibid.

predicated on the concrete person and not to an abstracted "will," as we shall see.

It is important to Temple's philosophical objection to indeterminism that the latter insists on arguing in terms of efficient causation. He finds this the major source of the difficulty in which the position finds itself.²¹ Categories derived from physics and chemistry cannot easily be applied even to biology, to say nothing of psychology and ethics. Such categories pre-suppose the regnancy of efficient causation throughout, and lead to what Temple calls "Stark Determinism."²² But this is also "stark nonsense": "Stark Determinism presents us with the spectacle of nothing-at-all differentiating itself into this richly varied universe through the mutual interaction of its non-existent parts."²³ How is this true? Pure determinism is the theory that "everything is constituted by its relation to other things--that it consists, in fact of these relations . . ."²⁴ This means that:

In a system A B C, A is only A in virtue of its relation to B and C; B and C determine it as A. And that seems easy; but why is B, B? It must

²¹Ibid., p. 227.

²²Ibid., p. 227.

²³Ibid.

²⁴William Temple, Mens Creatrix (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), p. 69.

be determined as B by A and C. And similarly C by A and B. If then, each term is nothing till its external relations constitute it, we are confronted with the spectacle of nothing at all developing internal differentiation by the interaction of its non-existent parts.²⁵

Thus the theory becomes nonsense. The truth is that, while things are constituted what they are by their relations to other things, still each existent "must have been something in its own being, so to speak, in order to be influenced by those others. And each of them must have been something in order to exert or submit to influence."²⁶ Let the affirmation and defense of freedom begin with this differentiation as a fact, and the way is open to the avoidance of the difficulties in which that defense has found itself.

This differentiation, or "principle of individuality," is found at every level of the "cosmic continuum," but becomes increasingly significant as our analysis moves from the simplest toward the most complex structures of the world. Even at the level of simple particles individuality is present, but in such minute degree as to be negligible for all purposes except "the metaphysical interest in the principle of individuality itself."²⁷ Metaphysically it is important even at that

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Temple, Nature, p. 227.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 229.

level, however, for, "If this has no application at the physical basis of the scale of being, it would be very hard to account for its appearance at other stages."²⁸ Thus even "the generic character of scientific knowledge requires the individuality of things, from which it abstracts in order to make sense of itself."²⁹ After tracing through the various grades of being, the increasing importance of individuality in the reactions and relationships observable in the world, and finally arriving at the human level, Temple writes:

. . . where the mind frames ideas drawn from, but also separable from, its particular experiences; where the moral person selects his ends independently of biological or even (in the narrow sense) personal, interests, aspiring, it may be, towards an ideal of which neither his own experience nor all recorded history supplies the origin--at every stage the individual is playing a greater part in determining his own reactions to the environment which is the field of his activity.³⁰

Then he says, "It is with the reaction of such an entity to the environment that we are concerned in the problem of freedom."³¹

This differentiation must not be interpreted as independence of the environment. This is crucial to Temple's view of freedom, as we shall show. Freedom arises in the interplay between the individual and his

²⁸Ibid., p. 230. ²⁹Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 70.

³⁰Temple, Nature, p. 230. ³¹Ibid. (Italics added.)

environment; in fact, the freer a man is, the greater is his dependence upon his environment. Herein lies the greatest contrast between the views of Temple and Berdyaev.

How far does this view lie from that preoccupation with the moment of action and the question of whether causality is present or absent in that moment, which is characteristic of the traditional free will controversy! How far from the dispute about whether the "principle of indeterminacy" is or is not also a "principle of indeterminism," upon which, in the minds of some, seems to hang the possibility of human freedom in a world dominated by causation! Just as the modern physician has come to regard the sickness of a man as a condition involving the whole man, so Temple treats the problem of freedom as a question involving the whole, concrete person, and not of an abstracted bit of him, nor of the man as abstracted from his world. The problem of freedom has to do with the question of how a human kind of life, as opposed to the sub-human kind, is to be lived within its environment. So Temple writes:

Freedom is not absence of determination; it is spiritual determination, as distinct from mechanical or even organic, determination. It is determination by what seems good as contrasted with determination by irresistible compulsion.³²

³²Ibid., p. 229.

I. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF FREEDOM

In the brief statement of contrast with Berdyaev with which this chapter began, it was claimed that in the thought of Temple a man becomes free. Becoming is a process, and that process must now be examined. The questions to be answered are: (1) What is the original state from which a man moves toward freedom? (2) What are the powers and agencies by which he moves, or, in what does the movement consist? Finally, (3) What is that state of a man in which he can be said to be free? These questions do not require to be answered in precisely this order, but the exposition of Temple's view of freedom must contain the answers, whether in this order or some other and whether explicitly or implicitly.

There is nothing esoteric about Temple's doctrine of freedom. One looks in vain for strange new content in the thought of this religious philosopher. This is not to say that he lacks originality; in view of his impact one should hesitate to say that. Perhaps it is true to say that his originality is methodological, i.e., the application of the famous Dialectic to the problem of the reconciliation of philosophy and theology, best exemplified in Nature, Man and God, his magnum opus. In any case, Temple himself thought that his view of freedom

was as old as Plato and Aristotle, for he acknowledged his indebtedness to Aristotle for his explanation of choice ("the union of Appetition and Intellect"), and to Plato for the ideal in this regard ("out of many to become one").³³

Combined, these two ideas are identical with what we have learned to call the integration of personality. This is the essence of freedom, in Temple's view. A man is free when his impulses are coordinated, when he becomes "one agent instead of many."³⁴ "This is the true freedom of man, when his whole nature controls all its own constituent parts."³⁵ In a passage already quoted, Temple declares that a free act of a man is one in which "he feels that he has truly expressed his whole nature . . . and [in which he] can wholeheartedly rejoice . . ."³⁶ The personality becomes one whole system, as it were, dominated by some purpose. He of whom this is true is free because he is directing his own life. He is moved neither by coercion from without nor by irresistible compulsion from within, but by that upon which he has set his mind. By the power of his

³³Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 167.

³⁴Ibid., p. 169.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Temple, Christus Veritas, p. 58.

thought he has compared the ends that are open to him and has selected one of them as his own. He has calculated, and continues to calculate, the means to the achievement of that end. Segmental drives and impulses are kept in careful subordination to the dominant purpose.

Gordon Allport offers an excellent example of the integrated life in citing the case of Raold Amundsen, the arctic explorer. Allport is expounding his concept of "proprie striving," which he advances as being a more adequate account of human motivation than the "drive" theories so widely relied upon. The characteristic feature of proprie striving is "its resistance to equilibrium," whereas the mechanistic theories postulate the reduction of tension as being the very crux of human motivation. In the face of seemingly insurmountable odds, and against every temptation to settle for less, Amundsen maintained his aspiration to become a polar explorer, a passion which dated from his fifteenth year. Failures did not discourage him, and successes only spurred him on. He sailed the Northwest Passage, painfully discovered the South Pole, then, finally and after years of planning and discouragement, flew over the North Pole. Allport comments, "Not only did he maintain one style of life, without ceasing, but this

central commitment enabled him to withstand the temptation to reduce the segmental tensions continually engendered by fatigue, hunger, ridicule, and danger."³⁷

When freedom so conceived has been ideally realized in the life of a man, then one must say that it is the man who is free, not merely an abstracted part of him called the "will"; one must say that freedom is the state of his existence, not that freedom is present in certain acts which shall be called "volitional." The man and his will have become one; or, as Temple would express it, in becoming free the man developed a will. Following Locke, Temple equates the questions, "Is man free?" and "Has man a will?" But, with Locke, he repudiates the question "Is the will free?" as being nonsense, for it only means "Has the power to choose got power to choose?"³⁸

Man is not free, then, until he becomes so; man has no will until he develops one. Temple writes:

Will, then, as the agent in truly moral action is the whole organized nature of the person concerned; it is his personality as a whole; and it is so far from being an initial endowment of our nature, that the main function of education is to fashion it--a process which is only complete

³⁷Gordon W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 49.

³⁸Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 167.

when the entire personality is fully integrated in a harmony of all its constituent elements.³⁹

The problem involved here is to fashion a single moral life out of the individual's initial chaos of impulses. The problem is not solved by the repression of impulses or by otherwise eliminating them; a king does not gain sovereignty by killing off his subjects, but by ruling them. Certainly since Freud we know what mutilations of personality are produced by repression. "The impulses of human nature all have a place in the economy of the ideal human life," writes Temple, "but they can only be elements in such a life by much effort."⁴⁰

The process begins with the concrete person as a "self-organizing system of impulses, instincts, sentiments, emotions, ideas . . .", etc. These elements are at the service of the physiological organism, to meet its needs; thus they possess an initial unity. Each of the elements, however, is capable of independent activity, in response to the appropriate impact of the environment. This capability means that the initial unity is of small magnitude in comparison with the chaos which it feebly limits. It is Mind which furnishes the basis for the unity that finally becomes freedom.

³⁹ Temple, Nature, p. 234.

⁴⁰ Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 169.

Temple writes, "For while the organism makes demands for its sustenance, its physical appetite is translated by consciousness into the appetites of hunger and thirst. Need becomes desire, and it is as desire that it influences movement and action."⁴¹ Desire generalizes from the objects toward which it is directed, so that this particular apple or glass of milk or fire in the grate becomes food, drink, and warmth. From the generalizing nature of desire arises the apprehension of universals "which makes possible the free and rational movement of thought." Thus, "Freedom of thought has its source in the appetitive and conative part of nature."⁴² This is vital to Temple's account of freedom, as we shall see in a moment. Meantime, however, it is to be pointed out that desire, in spite of its generalizing power, is disorderly, for each desire can become active independently of the body's needs.

As consciousness develops, this trouble develops; for the power of imagination, whereby attention can be given to the general idea of what is not present to the senses, vastly increases the stimulation of desire, so that it may operate without reference to the proportion required by the life-process of the organism.⁴³

Desire is brought into harmony by the power of thought,

⁴¹Temple, Nature, p. 232.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

which is not something injected from without at some point along the way, but has the same starting point as the riot of desire itself.⁴⁴

In the beginning, however, the power of thought is no match for undisciplined desire. And at first the individual cannot supply that discipline himself, for "he is just the chaos of impulses."⁴⁵ It is society which educates and disciplines him for freedom.⁴⁶ The early education of the individual is described, and its purpose emphasized, by Temple in a passage that bears quoting:

. . . The first thing to be done is to create a power of concentration, of attending to some one thing whatever it may be. And so we insist that for a period every day he shall not allow himself to be distracted by anything. That period is called lessons. It scarcely matters at this stage what subject is taught. It should be as attractive as possible, so that attention may be concentrated easily. The vital matter is that the child should learn "attention" or "concentration" in general. Gradually the period is extended, and the whole system of regulations, called "discipline," is developed, till "lessons" and "discipline," together cover nearly the whole of life; then the external pressure is relaxed again, and the individual is set free in the sense that he is now left to the guidance of the habits which discipline has created in him; and the educator may say, "I have created a will in you; at first you were a mere mass of impulses; I have coordinated and systematised those impulses, and

⁴⁴Ibid. ⁴⁵Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 169.

⁴⁶Ibid. See also, Temple, Nature, p. 233.

I have developed your power of thought alike in calculating means to ends and in comparing together the various ends open to you, so that now you have a real will and purpose of your own; I have forced you into freedom; now go and exercise that freedom."⁴⁷

"Forced into freedom," and that by society! This is a long way indeed from Berdyaev's view, according to which freedom is an original endowment of man, given to him from another world, and requiring constant safeguarding against the encroachments of society.

It was stated above that the mind's capacity for the free and rational movement of thought is vital to Temple's account of freedom. The relationship of Mind to freedom is apparent already from what has been said, especially from Temple's account of the role played by education in the fashioning of the free individual. It is Mind that chooses among the ends that are open to the individual; and it is Mind that effects the coordination of his unruly desires so as to produce in him a will, or to make him free. The discipline provided by society in early education simply enables Mind to gain the ascendancy over desire. Now, Mind is a basic category in Temple's philosophy, and its status as the basis for his solution to the problem of freedom will become clearer through a brief notice of its characteristics.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 168.

Temple states that Mind, wherever it is found, is "the principle of unity of that through which it is active."⁴⁸ Thus it is his clue both to the problem of freedom of the individual and the problem of Reality. The distinguishing characteristic of Mind is its power to form "free ideas," or concepts. Concepts are the products of the mind's directing its attention to the general qualities of the objects supplied by the environment for the possible satisfaction of the needs of the organism.⁴⁹ These qualities become detached in thought from their objects, and can thus be handled independently of the objects, combined, and compared. Transferable from one context to another, these "free ideas" signify that the mind is not in bondage to the empirical occasion.

This ability of the mind to create free ideas enables the experiencing subject, first and foremost, to transcend successiveness. To Mind, the present is not just the sense-impression of the moment; it is what might be called an expanded present. "The present is so much of the empirical process as is immediately apprehended."⁵⁰ This includes all that is apprehended as

⁴⁸ Temple, Nature, p. 201.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 203.

being "continuous with that [sense] impression." A long stretch of duration may be included. Thus man is capable of grasping his existence historically. It is important to note that the inclusion of the past in the present is not the result of a process of intellectualizing; it is the way in which Mind apprehends the world. As Temple expresses it, "The primary datum of experience is a continuum." Compare this with the dictum of Roquentin, Sartre's Existentialist hero: "The past does not exist."⁵¹ This absolute disagreement between Temple and Sartre at this point (assuming that Roquentin represents Sartre's view) is a disagreement over what is apprehended. For Roquentin, at the moment of his utterance, there was nothing but the sheer here-and-nowness of the roots of the famous chestnut tree. On this issue Temple attacks Sartre indirectly through Descartes, who, says Temple, could have been just as sure of the stove as of himself on the day of the famous "cogito ergo sum." (By "attacks Sartre" is meant, of course, that in Temple's attack on Descartes, Sartre, too, stands attacked.) Temple apprehends 'essence' (thus presupposing existence) and therefore the meaningfulness of the world is a datum for him. Sartre apprehends sheer 'existence,' thereby

⁵¹Jean Paul Sartre, Nausea (New York: New Directions Publishing Corporation, 1964), p. 130.

excluding not only 'essence' (meaningfulness) but also a valid starting point for thinking his way through to essence; meaningfulness must be created out of nothing but man's freedom, through a commitment for which no objective reason exists. This difference of apprehension can be of enormous utility in reading the conflicting philosophies of this century. "Of course!" it may be said. But if it really were a matter of course, there would be less acrimony in philosophical disputes. A philosophy is the exposition of a man's apprehensions. What is needed is that this "comforting doctrine" be "properly considered." But all this is to anticipate; back to Mind's apprehension of the time-span. Does this also include the future?

Temple claims that when the mind is seen in action, "and not only in contemplation," that it does include the future in the present.⁵² It does this through conception or imagination. He seems not to include the future in the expanded present in the same way as the past, but he says:

. . . it is of capital importance to notice that man's deliberate conduct is far more determined by expectation of the future than by any kind of impulsion from the past.⁵³

In regard to the question of freedom, this is precisely

⁵²Temple, Nature, p. 206.

⁵³Ibid.

the point made by Allport in his discussion of the "proprium"; in the same extended passage cited above, Allport says, "People, it seems, are busy leading their lives into the future, whereas psychology, for the most part, is busy tracing them into the past."⁵⁴ To treat the future as supplying the motive for its own realization through man's efforts in the present receives a pragmatic proof, for, "The more completely a man acts on the supposition of real continuity in events, the more he is confirmed in his belief by experience."⁵⁵ "The most significant characteristic of Mind, after all," writes Temple, "is not such knowledge as is possible to us while we are subject to the conditions of our present life, but purpose--not the apprehension of the world as it now is, but the constant effort to make it something else."⁵⁶

Purpose is directed toward Value, and the Mind's apprehending and cherishing of this imparts to Mind great power for the integration of personality. Values are those "free ideas" of the Mind which are characterized by their inclusiveness; "They bring more and more of experience into some sort of unity."⁵⁷ Among them are

⁵⁴Allport, Becoming, p. 51.

⁵⁵Temple, Nature, p. 207.

⁵⁶Ibid.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 236.

ideas corresponding to the age-old trio of values, Truth, Beauty, Goodness, which Temple accepts. Then Temple summarizes the role of Mind in the attainment of freedom, or integration of personality:

Thus the mind finds itself equipped with leading principles for the co-ordination of that living entity of which it is itself the reflective awareness; by the direction which it gives to attention it determines the form of co-ordination or integration which takes place. It is here--in this constant direction of attention--rather than in the moment of action that freedom is found to be effectively present.⁵⁸

What is it, then, for a human being to become free?

It means that a "living entity" who is "self-regulative" from the start, goes through the process--which is unconscious at first but which becomes more and more conscious--of transferring control of his conduct from impulse to Mind, through the instrumentality of the "free ideas" of which "values" appear and are apprehended as ends lying in the future for the guidance of conduct in the present. By the power which this "self-regulative" "living entity" has to direct its attention to any of these values he can determine for himself the direction of all his striving. His freedom becomes observable in the form of self-control. Not only do his

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 237.

actions take on the appearance of goal-directedness, but he becomes known for certain "splendid incapacities," so that if he is accused of some act which is out of harmony with the observed direction of his life, men say, "He could never have done that."⁵⁹ On occasion he may be surprised by a set of powerful circumstances to which his response will be out of character. He is still responsible for this act, for, being "self-regulative" from the start his response is his own. But, "in most cases the main decision is not made then; it is made by the discipline . . . of the life of thought and imagination, which determines the general quality of character and consequently also the actions which will be done in the various combinations of circumstances that arise."⁶⁰ (Note here how there is no freedom without direction of attention, and this is the whole point: becoming free is in learning to direct attention to considerations that unify the elements of the personality.) The free man is radically self-determined. His actions are caused, but it is final, not efficient, causation. Prediction of his future action is possible only if knowledge of him includes "apprehension of his unrealised ideals and the strength of their appeal to him."⁶¹ Mere knowledge of

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 236.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 237.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 238.

what he has been and of his circumstances will not suffice for prediction, for the free man lives largely in terms of the future rather than the past. He cannot predict his own actions, for he is a growing personality and "the ground of his action is only revealed in the action itself."⁶² But the action when it occurs is recognized as his own, and he says, "I did it, and I am glad I did it, and if opportunity arises I will do it again."⁶³

The man is glad because he expressed his whole nature in his act, which is to say that his act was the realization of his ideal. This, in turn, is to say that he discharged his sense of self-constraint; his personality is wholly organized for action in terms of the end to which his attention has been directed, so that to have acted otherwise would have been self-frustration.

Now it is apparent that for Temple freedom and obligation are one, and that to be free is to be subject, for in so far as a "free idea" manifests the quality of Value it is "apprehended as laying a claim or obligation upon the mind entertaining it."⁶⁴ And the more inclusive

⁶²Ibid.

⁶³Temple, Mens Creatrix, p. 170.

⁶⁴Temple, Nature, p. 237.

a "free idea," i.e., the higher the value-quality of it, the greater is the sense of obligation to it. An absolute value carries an absolute obligation. He whom no ideal claims is not free, and the very fact that he may do anything at anytime is the sign of his bondage to some part of himself.⁶⁵ His soul is chaotic.

In short, the free man is the self-conquered man. As with all conquests, the winning of freedom is not easy; as with many conquests, the struggle is prolonged. This figure of conquest can be expanded to express a major distinction between the views of Temple and Berdyaev on freedom: Freedom is a citadel; but for Berdyaev the individual is defending the citadel, while for Temple he is attacking it. For Berdyaev the enemy is the Cosmic Whole, which wants to destroy the integrity of the individual by reducing him to the status of a mere part. Freedom requires safeguarding by unrelenting resistance to the World. For Temple, the enemy is the chaotic, anti-Wholistic complex of tendencies within man himself, which want to keep him in a fragmentized state so as to prevent his realizing his true and proper status in the Ordered Cosmos. Freedom requires to be won through obedience to apprehended Value, which is inherent in the Cosmos, to the secret of which Mind is

⁶⁵ Temple, Mens Creatrix, pp. 170-71.

the clue. The two uncompleted sentences in the introduction to this chapter may now be completed: "Man is free, unless he permits himself to be swallowed up by Being." "Man will be free, if he overcomes his fragmentariness and submits his conduct to the leading principles of that Mind which is the reflective awareness of Being itself."

II. FREEDOM THROUGH SURRENDER

What has been described in the foregoing section is ideal freedom, in so far as it has been identified as the wholly co-ordinated personality. For such a person, Purpose would be in complete control, all of his segmental urges would be in their proper place in the ordered hierarchy of his being. Such freedom would be conformable to its ideal under all circumstances. It would be, in Temple's words, "non posse peccare, inability to sin."⁶⁶ A will so perfect would, in one sense, render freedom of choice meaningless: "Such a soul chooses indeed, but not between any 'real alternatives,' for by its very constitution it renders one of the alternatives impossible."⁶⁷ There would be temptation, to be sure, arising from this or that impulse, but the victory over it would be a foregone conclusion. Such a

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 242.

⁶⁷Ibid.

person would be self-determined never to fail in duty.

Such perfect freedom does not exist, and the reason lies in the limitation of that very self-determination which constitutes man's freedom. That limitation is that the self cannot determine the self to rise above that self which is the very center of its own endeavor.⁶⁸

But can this be true? Is not the scientist acting selflessly, who, as one of the Huxleys is supposed to have said, "Sits down before fact as a little child," willing to follow wherever it leads, having no preconceived theory of his own to protect but seeking only the truth? Is not the artist acting selflessly when in the presence of Beauty he experiences not pride, as though Beauty were his own creation, but worshipful humility, as one who has been vouchsafed the favor of looking upon that which exists above him? Is not the devoted servant of men acting selflessly when he sacrifices fortune, convenience and comfort for the common good?

Furthermore, does not Temple himself teach that the essential condition of Value--Truth, Beauty, Goodness --lies in the mind's discovery of itself, or what is akin to itself, in the objective world; and does he not

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 243.

devote his considerable philosophical talents to showing that this proves the world-process to be grounded in Mind which transcends man's own mind, so that when man orders his conduct by one of his own mind's "leading principles" he is in reality responding to the initiative of the "Spirit of the Whole"? Does he not teach that "The environment has the initiative"?⁶⁹ Does he not further teach that "the great individual is the man who is reacting to the greatest number of the elements of Reality"? And that "Greatness of mind is primarily a matter of receptivity"?⁷⁰ Temple teaches all of this.⁷¹

Yet, even though Mind is capable of turning the very process within which it occurs into a constituent element of its own non-successive experience,⁷² and even though Mind supplies to Value the condition of its actualization,⁷³--in short, even though the world process becomes conscious of itself through Mind, thus making Mind the most important episode to occur in that process --it nevertheless remains true that the particular mind is finite, and its finitude prevents it from totally

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 387.

⁷⁰Temple, Christus, pp. 54-55.

⁷¹Temple, Nature, Lectures V-VIII, XV, pp. 384-87; Temple, Christus, Chaps. I-II.

⁷²Temple, Nature, p. 204.

⁷³Ibid., p. 364.

transcending the apparent good to grasp the real good. Man is self-centered and cannot cure his own self-centeredness. Temple writes:

. . . The mind by a necessary tendency of its own nature attaches more importance to values which find their actualisation in itself than to those which find it elsewhere; or to put it crudely, each man cares more about what seems to be good for him than about goods which he does not expect personally to enjoy. Even so far as he knows of these, they take a second place for him; and about many of them he knows nothing. So he becomes not only the subject of his own value judgements, which he can never cease to be, but also the centre and criterion of his own system of values, which he is quite unfit to be.⁷⁴

The mind's apprehension of true values affords only a partial escape from this self-centeredness.

The man of science is drawn out of himself as regards one whole range of his activity by the concentration of his attention on the object of his study in his search for truth; the artist, by a similar concentration in his search for beauty; the good man or public-spirited man, by a similar concentration in the service of his cause. But none of these can cover the whole of life. Always there remains a self-centred area of life, and sometimes by a natural process of compensation those who are most selfless in the search for truth or beauty, or in public service, are most selfish, fretful and querulous at home. No ideal which a man purposes to himself will deliver him from the tyranny of self.⁷⁵

What implication has this for freedom? It means that although man is free enough to be totally

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 365. (Italics added.)

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 243. (Italics added.)

responsible for his actions, he is not free enough to make those actions totally good. Theologically expressed, man is a sinner in need of the Grace of God.

Here, then, is a limitation of man's freedom. It arises from his finitude, but finitude does not relieve him of his responsibility; it only robs him of that success in the pursuit of the good which would make his action the source of joy and peace instead of regret and guilt. Man is free enough to say of his actions, "They are my own." He is not free enough to "rejoice wholeheartedly" in them. Limitation of freedom with no corresponding limitation of responsibility! That is the human predicament. Temple says, "The man is free, for the origin of his actions is himself; yet he is bound hand and foot, for from himself there is no escape. Of what avail is it for Kant to say, 'You can' if this only elicits the reply 'I will not'?"⁷⁶ Thus self-determination turns out to be bondage, yet to surrender self-determination is to surrender one's humanity.

Just so far as [man] is lifted above the brutes by the fact that his self-determination is self-conscious and guided by deliberately chosen ideals, he is sensitive to his failures and harassed by inability to attain to the ideals which he has chosen. The almost animal man is near to contentment; the man of moral aspiration is filled with self-contempt and despair. If his

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 241.

only freedom is that because he ought he can, he will be conscious of bondage in proportion as his aspiration is noble.⁷⁷

This is the reason for Paul's despairing cry, "The good which I would I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I practise. But if what I would not, that I do, it is no more I that do it, but sin which dwelleth in me. O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?"⁷⁸

This brings us to one of those dialectical transitions which have become Temple's trademark as a philosopher: The freedom of man without God is traced to the point at which God is required for its perfecting, so that one level of being is seen in its full significance only in the one above it; in this case, the moral is fulfilled in the spiritual. There can only be a theological solution for the human predicament. Thus Temple writes:

Self-determination is the characteristic of man as a moral being, and without it he could never be called into fellowship with God. But it is not the last word of human development; on the contrary it contains the sentence of endless frustration as truly as it affords the opportunity of entry upon the spiritual enterprise. For the self which determines cannot carry the self which is determined above its own level. Self-determination must fulfil itself in the recognition of an Other which may lift it to heights forever out of its own

⁷⁷Ibid.

⁷⁸Ibid., quoted on p. 240.

reach; self-determination fulfils itself in self-surrender to that which is entitled to receive the submission of the self.⁷⁹

This ultimate failure of self-determination belongs to the tragedy of man. Our very freedom becomes an inexorable Fate, hurrying us on to the commission of evil which we never intended; tragedy lies in the paradox that men are free yet bound to themselves. A man chooses the direction of his attention, but the choice determines the character, upon which depends his apparent good.⁸⁰ And it is by his apparent good that a man is governed. "To desire evil strictly for its own sake is impossible."⁸¹ If this works out to a bad result, says Temple, "it is because the apparent good is not the real good."⁸² And this conflict goes back to his finitude. The inescapability of man from himself is supremely illustrated in the tragedies of Shakespeare:

The sense of a fate brooding over the world and luring all to the appointed end is even stronger, I think, in Shakespeare, where the Fate works through the free choice of the characters, than among the Greeks where it works upon them from without; for in the latter case it seems comparatively accidental and arbitrary, but in the former the people are their own fate, and it is because they are they, that the tragedy arises. Fate is thus made less arbitrary but even more inexorable; it is the law of the world of which

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 244.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 362.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Ibid.

men and women are members; they make it and obey it; they cannot escape it, for it is themselves; nor can they modify it, for that would involve themselves becoming other people.⁸³

Here, then, lies the explanation, or at least a partial explanation, of the moral evil in the world. It does not arise because men say, "Evil, be thou my good," for this is impossible unless the evil first be made to appear a good. Churchill used to refer to Hitler as "That bad man," but the badness of Hitler and his Nazis was merely more spectacular and was carried out on a grander scale than ordinary badness. It was continuous in quality with that of the petty tyrant of the household whose oppressions are, of course, always for the others' "own good." Nor is evil simply the echo of the padded footfall of the beast in a life that has moved on to a rational stage of existence. "The centre of trouble," says Temple, "is not the turbulent appetites, though they are troublesome enough, . . . But the centre of trouble is the personality as a whole, which is self-centred and can only be wholesome and healthy if it is God-centred."⁸⁴ The death of Socrates was a moral evil, but it was perpetrated by the 'best people' of Athens

⁸³ Temple, Mens Creatrix, pp. 143-44.

⁸⁴ Temple, Nature, p. 367.

toward an end which seemed good to them but which was chosen against the real good. The death of Lincoln was a crime, but it was accomplished by a Southern patriot whose good was too narrowly conceived. The crucifixion of Jesus was a most abhorrent moral evil, but it was accomplished not by degraded animals, but by the pillars of church and society, and for the choice of ends which were not intentionally self-assertive, but which were revealed to be such when measured against the real good. Even the asphyxiation of six million Jews was intended as "the final solution of the Jewish problem"--a solution!

According to Kazantzakis, the betrayal of Christ was made by the only one of the disciples to take him seriously, and Jesus loved him for that seriousness of purpose.⁸⁵ Consonant with this suggestion, there is an interpretation of Judas' action which illustrates the point being made. Since the interpretation is fairly common, no special documentation is offered: Like the Zealot that he was, Judas burned to see the hated Roman conquerors thrown into the sea. He believed that Jesus shared his hopes for the independence of Israel, and that he would use his supernatural power to accomplish

⁸⁵ Nikos Kazantzakis, The Last Temptation of Christ (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1960).

them. But as week after week passed and Jesus did no such thing, Judas became impatient and resentful. Casting about for some way to provoke Jesus to the attack, Judas hit upon the scheme of betraying him into the hands of the Romans. For he reasoned that when Jesus felt a Roman sword at his throat he would do what must be done. But instead, Jesus submitted to their torture and went to the cross. Judas never intended this, and, overwhelmed with remorse, went and hanged himself. By this interpretation Judas was not simply a sordid character who would sell out his Messiah for a handful of silver. The silver was merely a cover-up for his real motive. He was rather a tragic figure who, in bondage to himself, chose ends that were inimical to the real good. Where is the Christian who has not had a little of Judas in him and tried to make Jesus the sponsor for doctrines, ideologies, schemes and 'virtues' which Jesus would repudiate? Hence Temple writes:

. . . as soon as consciousness advances to full self-consciousness, so that self, distinguishing itself from its environment, not only chooses what appetites it shall satisfy but even what ends it shall pursue, self-centredness becomes self-assertion.⁸⁶

But if evil is the result of my finitude, should I not blame it on God? It is "not utterly necessary"

⁸⁶ Temple, Nature, p. 366.

that finitude should lead to sin, says Temple,

. . . and therefore it is not true to say that God made men selfish, or predestined them to sin. But that it should be so was "too probable not to happen"; and it is true to say that God so made the world that man was likely to sin, and the dawn of moral self-consciousness was likely to be more of a "fall" than an ascent.⁸⁷

Of course, to redeem this "fall," once it occurred, was also part of the Divine plan.

We are brought, then, to the submission of the mind of man to "that Mind in which the Cosmic Process is grounded, that Spirit of the Whole," as the only cure for the self-centeredness of man.

If it be possible to establish fellowship between the human soul and that Spirit, such fellowship would be the source of the true freedom of man. For just because it is the Spirit of the Whole, it is not alien from, however much it may transcend, any existing thing. The human spirit will find here something which has for it the appeal as well as the claim of kinship, and will be drawn to make a response, which is at the same time a submission, to the Spirit of the Whole, and therein attain to the fulfilment of itself in the freedom which is also peace.⁸⁸

Temple believes such fellowship to be possible, but it is not within the purview of this chapter to examine his doctrine of Revelation.

There is a final question to be asked: How can submission, even to God, really be freedom? This question flows with peculiar urgency from that dictum of

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 243.

Berdyaev's: "The world truly exists in the unobjectified subject."⁸⁹ This affirmation of freedom as being a radical kind of independence, even independence in relation to God, cannot easily contemplate any sort of submission. The rebel does not wish to submit, but to resist; he is preoccupied with the "limits" (Camus) beyond which he feels that he is no longer a man. How does one ask a man to surrender that will, carefully built up over the years with such effort and even suffering, to the will of God, even granting that God is the Spirit of the Whole? Is it not to ask him to surrender his very self? Can there be freedom in surrender? Temple has two answers to this, one philosophical and the other the answer of religious experience.

When religious experience has made the surrender it knows its freedom, a fuller freedom than it ever knew before. The problem of Grace and Freedom is intellectual, not experiential.⁹⁰ Religious experience, "When it is most intense," affirms God's priority and all-sufficiency: "All is of God; the only thing of my very own which I can contribute to my own redemption is

⁸⁹Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 286.

⁹⁰Temple, Nature, Lecture XV.

the sin from which I need to be redeemed."⁹¹ Intellect can deduce from this a pure passivity, and several intellects have found it difficult to understand why predestinarian Calvinists were so enormously active. The Calvinists had no difficulty, however, except when they tried to intellectualize and communicate it. In any case, they went right on ascribing everything to God while working as though the very universe depended upon their efforts. Religious experience's best answer to the question is as follows:

When a man acts to please one whom he loves, doing or bearing what apart from love he would not choose to do or bear, his action is wholly determined by the other's pleasure, yet in no action is he so utterly free--that is, so utterly determined by his apparent good.⁹²

Fully to experience this is to understand it.

Philosophically, the question is answered by the entire sweep of Temple's vision. We can elicit that answer through an imaginary confrontation between Berdyaev and Temple. Berdyaev says:

Personality finds no place in the continuous complex process of world life, it cannot be a moment or an element in the evolution of the world. The existence of personality presupposes interruption; . . . it is inexplicable by any sort of uninterrupted continuity.⁹³

⁹¹Ibid., p. 401.

⁹²Ibid., p. 399.

⁹³Nicolas Berdyaev, Slavery and Freedom (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944), p. 21.

Temple replies:

For as it is true that matter is the necessary condition for the actuality of life and this also of spirit, so also is it true that, in our experience at least, spirit arises within and as part of an organism which is also material, and expresses its spirituality, not by ignoring matter [nor by rebelling against it], but by controlling it.⁹⁴

But Berdyaev interjects, "The world is evil, it is without God and not created by Him. We must go out of the world, overcome it completely; the world must be consumed, it is of the nature of Ariman."⁹⁵

Again Temple replies:

. . . in so far as the universe is a single system, its "highest principle of unity" must be sought in spirit. This is not merely an affirmation that in the hierarchy of modes of being the spiritual is to be recognized as having some pre-eminence of honour. It is a claim that where spirit exists it exercises control, and all other entities are truly intelligible and explicable only by reference to Him. He is παντοκράτωρ. The whole universe is the expression of His will.⁹⁶

"No!" expostulates Berdyaev. "I, too, believe in God. I believe that He calls us to freedom; that He is Freedom, as well as Love. But I do not believe in Him as Will. I have said before and I will say again, it is fellowship, not obedience, that He wants of us. He is

⁹⁴Temple, Nature, p. 477. (Italics added.)

⁹⁵Nicolas Berdyaev, The Meaning of the Creative Act (New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1962), p. 11.

⁹⁶Temple, Nature, p. 479. (Italics added.)

not Pantokrator, but Liberator. You are guilty of what I have called a 'wretched sociomorphism'."

"And a No! to you, too, M. Berdyaev," retorts Temple. "It is true that God liberates; it is true that He is Love. But it is truer to say that He is Loving Will than that He is Freedom. As I said in my Gifford Lectures, 'We are clay in the hands of the Potter, and our welfare is to know it.' If we are episodes in the world process (and we are) which is grounded in and controlled by Divine Purpose, and if that Purpose requires our Selves for the completion of His grand design, and if He appeals to us through His Self-disclosure in such a way as not to violate our selfhood, leaving the decision concerning our response to us, then it cannot be slavery to surrender to Him when we learn from His Self-disclosure that He is utterly worthy of our surrender. Furthermore, M. Berdyaev, as for history and civilization, which you once said were tottering to ruin, it is really true that 'The Eternal fulfils itself in its historical self-expression,' as I have already said elsewhere. Finally, M. Berdyaev, it is only by taking my 'sacramental' view of the universe, as regards both its material and its spiritual elements, that 'there is given hope of making human both politics and economics and of making effectual both faith and hope.' If

civilization goes to its ruin, it will be by default of men, for God works through their willing submission. This is that true spiritual freedom which, following the Purpose of the Whole, will make the world better. Now, if you will excuse me, I must hurry to make a speech in Albert Hall, where I hope to convince the Bankers of the spiritual uses of credit. I do a lot of that sort of thing, you know, while you are in your study in Clamart writing of the Apocalypse."

"Yes, I have heard," murmurs Berdyaev. "But, do you succeed?"

Temple's final position of freedom, then, can be summarized as follows: Freedom is Spirit, Spirit's very nature. Man is truly free only in so far as he is Spirit. This freedom is not something which exists between Spirit, Matter, God, and World, enabling man to choose; it is this Spirit itself. When the self is free from the World it is in God, but to be in God is to be in Freedom. Man is not truly free, then, to choose between God and not-God. This is a contradiction. Only after God has chosen him and he has surrendered can he be free of the bondage to self. One cannot speak of being free from God, for this either means slavery or freedom from some inferior God in the name of a higher God. In recognizing that man is spiritualized by grace

alone, and not by himself, Temple is recognizing the limits of man's freedom. The modicum of freedom which man enjoys immediately is due to the inherent spiritual element in man himself, but man loses this freedom out of God in that he comes to recognize it as bondage to self. Being free does not mean being free from all forces whatsoever; it means being dominated by God, who nevertheless lets us be. God's grip on us is precisely that of letting us be. But man is not free apart from God; he is free under the domination of the only Power that is worthy to dominate Man.

CHAPTER VI

PSYCHOLOGICAL TYPES AND PHILOSOPHICAL TYPES

We have before us, then, two distinct views of human freedom. Furthermore, it is clear that they diverge from each other at points that are so integrally involved in the essential nature of each view that no facile intellectual reconciliation is thinkable. Indeed, they are antithetical to each other in some respects. For William Temple, the threat to freedom arises from within; for at first, freedom comes into existence through the arduous process of subduing the individual's own segmental, instinctual urges; finally, the attainment of complete freedom is blocked by the inability of the integrated self to lift itself out of its own orbit by its own bootstraps. For Nicolas Berdyaev, on the other hand, the threat to freedom is from without and comes from the direction of society and its institutions, from the realm of "objectivization." Now for Temple, it is precisely society and its institutions which provides the initial discipline necessary to put the individual on the road to the realization of his freedom, while for Berdyaev every contact with society is fraught with danger to original freedom, which comes from a source lying "beyond" this world and which is not of "this

world." For Temple, the existential, as opposed to the intellectual, problem of freedom is the conflict between prideful self-will and humble surrender to the Spirit of the Whole; for Berdyaev, it is the courageous struggle to maintain one's independence vis-à-vis universal being, which is the congealment of freedom. Temple's view of freedom is developed from the premise of a "friendly universe" in which he is characteristically "at home"; Berdyaev starts from the premise of an alien world in which he is the Exile, the Rebel, the Stranger. These radically different approaches to the question of freedom demonstrate once again the capacity of philosophy for what William E. Hocking called "appalling multiplicity."¹

Two questions present themselves: (1) Are these two views of freedom purely idiosyncratic, or are they somehow typical; can they, in virtue of their outward- and inward-turning dynamic respectively, serve as poles around which doctrines of freedom can be clustered, loosely or tightly? (2) Would a psychodynamically oriented principle of classification provide the basis for a modus operandi in comparative interpretation that would obviate the total displacement of one philosophy by another when they confront each other as systems, and at

¹William Ernest Hocking, Types of Philosophy (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1939), p. xii.

the same time preserve the integrity of each?

Proceeding with the discussion of these questions, let the following proposition serve as the starting point: When my philosophical position is confronted by an opposing position whose exponent manifests conviction, there is little chance of adjustment unless I approach him with the assumption that his position is authentic, i.e., that it accords with and reflects his deeply held point of view. I can, of course, attempt to refute him, thus eliminating the necessity for adjustment. The history of philosophy affords little hope that this would be successful. Individual philosophers do, of course, change their position, just as religionists change churches, but philosophical systems or distinct philosophical approaches go on. "Appalling multiplicity" seems to be inherent in the philosophical enterprise. The elimination of philosophical differences would have to come through reconciliation in one final, universal system, which is the ideal of philosophy. But this would be the end of the philosophical enterprise, so the solution to diversity could only come simultaneously with the achievement by philosophy of its complete self-fulfillment. Meantime, no matter how hopefully a system may be offered as the final word in its area of concern, it adds one more voice to a discordant chorus. Since

philosophy aims at the final system, the clash of discrepant formulations is simply the noise made by philosophy as the inevitable product of its going about its own business. Voltaire is supposed to have said that there is no such thing as orthodox history; neither is there orthodox philosophy, and for much the same reason, viz., that philosophy, like history, is written from a point of view. Temple and Berdyaev could not have written each the other's philosophy of freedom; each philosophy is too deeply rooted in, and too greatly an extension of, its author's personality.

According to an ancient tradition, philosophy is "love of wisdom." This excludes mere calculation of means to ends. It also excludes any equation with gnosis, which is inwardly held knowledge. Philosophy is something to live by; it is the way in which reality comes to focus in the understanding of a personality. It includes the apprehension of ultimate ends and calculation of the means of realizing them. It preceded and produced science. It desires to penetrate to the secret of the world. Nicolas Berdyaev is in harmony with this ancient understanding of the nature of philosophy when he writes:

. . . Philosophy is a general orientation to the whole of being and not a partial orientation in partial conditions of being. Philosophy seeks

the truth, not truths. Philosophy loves wisdom . . . By its essence and by its purpose philosophy has never adapted to necessity . . . Even if the given world were exclusively material, philosophy would not have to be materialistic . . . Philosophy is art . . . because it is creation . . . because it predicates a calling and a special gift from above . . . because the personality of its creator is impressed upon it.²

It can be deduced from this that, for purposes of understanding and rapprochement, the proper question to ask about a particular philosophy is the question concerning its authenticity, i.e., Why does the philosopher take this position; why does his personality focus reality in just this way? In the field of psychology, Jung revealed a keen sensitivity to the matter of authenticity in the case of the painful discrepancies between his, Freud's, and Adler's views of the nature of the neuroses. Instead of assailing the others with logic, statistics, etc., he asked the question, Why do we see things so differently and are yet able, all of us, to produce genuine therapeutic results? The result was, as we have seen, his prolonged investigation of the "problem of types." But Jung saw also that the problem exists in the area of philosophy, and in the following passage he is directly in line with the ancient understanding of philosophy as love of wisdom as an art, in which every

²Nicolas Berdyaev, Dream and Reality (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 210.

formulation is the creative personal product of its author:

It is, for instance, an immediately intelligible fact to an ordinary human intelligence that every philosophy, that is not just a mere history of philosophy, depends upon a personal psychological pre-condition. This pre-condition may be of a purely individual nature, and moreover would ordinarily be so regarded, if a true psychological criticism existed at all. Because it has always been taken for granted, we have thereby overlooked the fact that what we regarded as individual prejudice was certainly not so under all circumstances; since the standpoint of the philosopher in question often boasted a very imposing following. His standpoint was acceptable to these men not because they echoed him without thinking, but because it was something they could fully understand and appreciate. Such an understanding would be quite impossible if the standpoint of the philosopher were merely individually determined, for it is quite certain in that case that he would neither be fully understood nor even tolerated. The peculiar character of the standpoint which is understood and appreciated by his following must, therefore, correspond with a typical personal attitude, which in the same or similar form finds many representatives in human society. As a rule, the partisans of either side attack each other merely externally, always seeking out the joints in their opponent's individual armour. Such a dispute, as a rule, bears little fruit. It would be of considerably greater value if the contest were transferred to the psychological realm, whence it actually originates. Such a transposition would soon reveal the fact that many different kinds of psychological attitudes exist, each of which has a right to existence, although necessarily leading to the setting up of incompatible theories. As long as one tries to settle the dispute by forms of external compromise, one merely satisfies the modest claims of shallow minds that have never yet glowed with the passion of a principle.³

³C. G. Jung, Psychological Types (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1946), p. 619. (*Italics*)

There is, then, an ineluctably subjective factor in philosophizing, which is not merely a prejudice to be overcome but which is the conditio sine qua non of the pursuit of wisdom. This passage emphasizes in a most pointed way the necessity of recognizing a man's philosophy as the record of his psychic encounter with the world. From this point of view every passionately held philosophy is existential (not Existentialist). Its authenticity is precisely what matters most, both to the philosopher and to his following, and this explains why it is so difficult for philosopher A to refute philosopher B, except to A's own satisfaction. For a philosopher to consider his system refuted, or for him to admit radical changes in it, is tantamount to conversion.

Henry Nelson Wieman and Bernard Meland once attempted a classification of some American philosophies of religion which is deserving of greater appreciation than it has apparently received, because of its effort to go beneath mere external similarities and differences and seek out the "dynamic determinants" of philosophical formulations.⁴ Their effort is summarized here not

added.) (Cited hereafter as Psychological.)

⁴Henry N. Wieman and Bernard Meland, American Philosophies of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark, 1936), pp. 3-14.

merely by way of illustration, but in order to argue that they should have plunged deeper than they did in their search for the real "dynamic determinants," clear down to the psychic level.

Repudiating rigid schemes of classification as being unable to deal justly with the organic content and flexibility of method of most philosophies of religion, these men sought a classification based on the "determining and shaping elements" in a philosophy. Some predilection or bias has gripped the philosopher and determined the "curvature" of his thought. The philosopher's logic is in the service of his bias. The bias constitutes the "dynamic determinant" of his philosophy, and with his philosophy is to be identified.

Wieman and Meland are concerned with the reason why a philosopher adopts a particular metaphysic, why he upholds a particular method of inquiry, why he deals with a particular set of problems. They find their answer in an appeal to history: the dynamic determinants of philosophies of religion come into view as the philosophies are studied in relation to the historic intellectual traditions of which they are representatives. Every major American philosophy of religion is rooted in one of four great traditions: supernaturalism, idealism, romanticism, and naturalism. "The most potent

influence in shaping any philosophy is the tradition of thought which provides the method, the materials, the objective, and the problem for the system that is constructed by the individual."⁵ It is in the "broader perspective" of these historic traditions that the "motivating factors" come to light. And ". . . to sense the more subtle, motivating influences that determine the slant of vision, and which give rise to the inhibitory as well as the outreaching impulses, one must see the reactive tendencies that lay back of that way of thinking."⁶

This approach is a step away from those rigid classifications which permit the escape of the vital quality, the wholeness, the passionate character of a man's thought, these being precisely the elements which, for many, constitute its persuasiveness and power. The approach would seem to hold promise of minimizing the situation acknowledged by Hocking in a prefatory remark made in his Types of Philosophy: "Put it this way: all the types are one-sided; nobody's philosophy is one-sided; ergo, nobody's philosophy is a type; ergo, nobody's philosophy is here expounded (except my own)!"⁷

⁵Ibid., p. 8.

⁶Ibid., p. 12.

⁷Hocking, op. cit., p. ix.

Awareness of these dynamic determinants sharpens and, to some extent, implements one's sensitivity to "the total nature of [a man's] thought: its spirit as well as its literal characteristics; its negations as well as its affirmations . . ."⁸

But Wieman and Meland need to ask at least one more Why. They need to ask why a philosopher is captured by one rather than the other of the great traditions; what affinities drew him to it? They need even to ask why the traditions arose and why they persist; after all, the fact that a formulation exhibits features that can be fitted into a tradition does not necessarily prove that the philosopher was influenced by the historical manifestations of the tradition. Perhaps the tradition itself is the manifestation of some deep, widespread psychic response to the world which can spring up here and there independently of other manifestations of it. Neither do Wieman and Meland answer the question as to why some historical eras are dominated by one tradition, and some by another. To be fair to Wieman and Meland, they do raise the question about the persistence of the traditions, and even suggest that the answer lies in the realm of psychology, but in their preoccupation

⁸Wieman and Meland, op. cit., p. 14.

with the historical bias, they do not pursue it:

Why do these biases persist? Because the historical episodes of reaction in the history of thought are the expressions of a more deeply persistent phenomenon: namely, the temperamental differences in human nature, arising out of socio-physical conditions affecting the human organism. Much as we may seek to make thinking objective and purely logical, we never succeed fully in escaping the human equation. For thinking involves responding to stimuli. It is here that the human equation asserts itself. The variations in men's sensitivity on the one hand, and the diversity of stimuli to which they become sensitive on the other, are the root conditions that determine both the line of their reasoning and the degree to which this or that idea takes hold of them, or may appeal to their reason as acceptable.⁹

This open appeal to psychic factors is matched more than once in their main discussion, as for example when they come to an impasse between two systems of thought which no logic or reasoning can get over. Besides these, there are references to "temperament," "sentimentality," "emotive" forces, "moral optimism," etc.

However, it is implied in the quotation given above that Wieman and Meland regard temperamental biases as sources of regrettable prejudices or 'subjectivisms' in the derogatory sense of the term, and not as conditions sine qua non of philosophical thought. Their own Naturalistic empiricistic bias comes through everywhere. But this is only one possible mode of apprehending reality, as Jung has shown. The psyche contains the

⁹Ibid., p. 13.

possibility of other approaches, each of which has its own right to exist. It is highly probable that both Wieman and Meland are Extraverts in attitude and Sensationalists in function, but with some degree of skewing toward the Thinking function. Thus they would belong to Jung's extraverted-empirical-thought type. At any rate, they reveal at times that inability to be entirely fair to their opponents which characteristically comes into play when one type confronts a different type. For example, in discussing some objections to Wieman's "impersonal God," they say that the "conventional theist" is moved by an "exaggerated sentimentalism" to recoil from "the naturalistic doctrine of God." The Naturalists, on the other hand, are "motivated by the deeper desire to commit themselves in full devotion to that reality, not through sentiment alone, but through submission to it, allowing themselves to be shaped by it and fulfilled through it, and giving themselves devotedly to promoting its wider fulfillment in the world."¹⁰ Surely here is as "prejudiced" an evaluation of one's opponent as one could hope to find! Can it be imagined that a "conventional theist" like Edward John Carnell, for instance, cannot also lay claim to being motivated

¹⁰Ibid., p. 303.

by "the deeper desire to commit [himself] in full devotion to that reality," etc? Temple was a "theist"; was he moved by an "exaggerated sentimentalism" in rejecting Whitehead's too-immanent and impersonal God? Wieman and Meland are a bit too quick in claiming a commendable motive for themselves and denying it to their opponents.

Temple's own extraverted bias comes through clearly in some of his polemics. His philosophical bête noir is René Descartes.¹¹ In attacking the "Cartesian Faux-Pas" he betrays an emotional tone that scarcely stops short of bitterness. Somewhat surprisingly, he brands that day when Descartes remained "shut up alone in a stove" as a candidate for "the most disastrous moment in the history of Europe."¹² Not only in philosophy but in politics as well, Descartes had been responsible for "many of our worst troubles." Temple rejected the Cartesian emphasis on the subject and the consequent sundering of the subject-object relationship.¹³ He was emphatically explicit concerning his own basic assumption of the interconnection of the subject and the object. He reluctantly admitted for the sake of argument that Descartes' methodological doubt might be valid, but

¹¹William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London: The Macmillan Company, 1953), Lecture III.

¹²Ibid., p. 57.

¹³Ibid., p. 66.

contended that Descartes "found the wrong residuum": "What he ought to have reached as the irreducible basis of all thought, including doubt, was the subject-object relationship."¹⁴ It is not possible to doubt the reality of the object-world, and Descartes "was really as sure of the stove as of himself."¹⁵ His doubting was therefore "artificial," "purely academic," a "nursery make-believe," and an "intellectual pastime."¹⁶ As such, its significance lay not in itself, but in what it represented, namely, the search for a secure foundation in face of "the total collapse of the authority of medieval tradition." Hence it was a necessary movement in the history of philosophy, but one which deserved only a short life, and which had served its purpose when it had paved the way for a more intelligent reassertion of man's confidence in his awareness that he has knowledge of real objects. It's the Hundred Year's War over again, and English common-sense wishes to sweep away the major part of modern French philosophical tradition.

Temple simply could not entertain the notion of less reality in the object than in the subject "without intellectual perturbation of the profoundest kind."¹⁷

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 65.

This taking refuge in the individual consciousness was anathema to him. He said, "But it seems to me that in fact I cannot really doubt all else except myself; I cannot really doubt the earth, or the stars, or (above all) my friends; so that I cannot find in fact any greater psychological assurance about the existence of myself than about the existence of a great deal else."¹⁸

And for Temple this sort of doubt was, apparently, a psychological impossibility. One who knew him intimately said of him, "I should say that by temperament he was the very opposite of a sceptic . . . I believe it to be simply true that he had never had to face as a problem the ultimate doubts. His was both a hospitable and a believing mind . . ."¹⁹ And in connection with Temple's rejection of Descartes, Dean Matthews said of him, that his argument against the Cartesian method was "not very successful," but that as we read it "we feel . . . that Temple simply could not understand a state of mind for which everything was doubtful."²⁰

Was Descartes one who could seriously doubt?

¹⁸Ibid., p. 64.

¹⁹W. R. Matthews, "William Temple as Thinker," William Temple: An Estimate and an Appreciation, edited by A. E. Baker (London: Jas. Clarke & Co., Ltd., 1946).

²⁰Ibid.

First there is the fact that he did use methodological doubt, with no indication of "let's pretend." Then, one could speculate about the effect upon a man's outlook of having lived during the period when the traditional authorities had broken down and new ones were being sought. Two historians of philosophy testify to the existence in Descartes' day of a "tradition of scepticism into which many enlightened thinkers retreated," disgusted and bewildered by the religious controversies of the day.²¹ This strongly suggests that Descartes was introverted. It is essential to Jung's theory of types that psychic energy follows the line of least resistance. When this line leads outward, there is extraversion, but when the outward flow is blocked (as when familiar institutions are disintegrating and one remains there amidst their ruins, with no stable cultural synthesis for support), there is a damming up of energy which forces a backward flow, activating the introvertedness which stands always as the suppressed opposite of extraversion. Objective certainty being wanting, he found a subjective certainty in the "cogito ergo sum." The subject supplied what the object could

²¹Newton P. Stallknecht and Robert S. Brumbaugh, The Spirit of Western Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1950), p. 256.

not, and this is the difference between extraversion and introversion.

Michel de Montaigne was one who had the real spirit of doubt. Stallknecht and Brumbaugh say of him, "Thus for Montaigne, doubt had almost taken the place of faith. It was from doubt or the suspension of judgement that he derived his peace of mind, and his sense of security rested upon a despair of reasoning."²² So there are those whose psychology can sustain an attitude of doubt, and methodical doubt works best in their hands; it is least effective for those who feel uncomfortable when they are forced to deny common-sense propositions. Temple the Affirmer and Integrated Participant in the World was of the latter. For him, doubt was psychologically impossible, but he had no right to speak for Descartes in affirming that the latter was "really as sure of the stove as of himself."

Now it is at this point--where appreciation of another point of view becomes psychologically impossible and we are unable to concede the authenticity of the philosophy which expresses it--that we have the line of demarcation between the dynamic determinant of one type of philosophy and that of another. The point can be illustrated by the adaptation of an illustration used

²²Ibid., p. 257.

by Professor Addison H. Leitch in an entirely different connection.²³ Imagine yourself at the end of a long straight line. You are walking this line in the direction of rapprochement with diverging philosophies. Let us suppose that you have a pronounced extraverted attitude which your philosophy reflects by revealing at every crucial point the authority which the objective world holds for you. As you move farther along this line you encounter other philosophies which are also extravertedly oriented. You do not think about this, however, for it is taken for granted in that you are not aware that you are extraverted but only that you and the others apprehend the world in a generally similar way. You notice sharply, however, that the others expound various metaphysics by methods and for the solution of problems which disagree with, and even contradict, your own. You enter into dialogue with them. This is possible because there is a prepared condition of communication, that is, a similar slant of vision. The disputes become violent, perhaps, but still there is communication. Ergo, we saw Temple rejecting the traditional formulation of the

²³Addison H. Leitch, "The National Council and the World Council," Christianity Today, IX (January, 1965), p. 6. Professor Leitch uses the illustration to show that a Christian bent upon Ecumenical union with Christians of different communions will eventually reach

problem of "free will," giving his own formulation, and moving on toward his solution, but he never moved out of the general attitudinal orbit of his antagonists, and they could agree or disagree with him on logical or factual grounds. Eventually, however, you encounter a pronounced Introvert, as Descartes probably was. Now you are conscious not only of disagreement, but chiefly of bewilderment; you say, "I do not understand this mentality and cannot appreciate the point of view of this thinker, if thinker he is." Then you decide that what he offers is sheer disaster, and you experience "intellectual perturbation of the profoundest kind." Two dynamic determinants have encountered each other and are repelled by each other. Yet both are authentic, for both have an equal right to existence. By no logic or reasoning can they adjust to each other; their problem must be grasped at the psychic level.

In Jungian terms, this encounter brought a halt to "the daily advance of the process of psychological adaptation," which Jung terms "Progression."²⁴ As we have seen already, the function of directed attitudes such as intro- and extraversion is to enable the

a point at which he must say of doctrinal accommodations, "I can go no further."

²⁴C. G. Jung, Contributions to Analytical Psychology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1928), p. 34.

individual to make an adaptation to the demands of the environment. These attitudes are permanent, but their "effective accomplishment in the sphere of adaptation is always impermanent."²⁵ It is the changing demands of the environment that cause fluctuations in the process of adaptation. Jung says that the satisfaction of environmental conditions is possible "only by means of an attitude, which as such is necessarily directed and, therefore, tainted with a certain one-sidedness. Thus it can easily happen that the attitude ceases to be adequate because outer changes have occurred that demand a different attitude."²⁶ In our illustration this outer change consisted in the encounter with a philosophical orientation to which adjustment could not be made through logic or reasoning. The respective attitudes of the philosophers blocked each other. The point at which the blocking occurred is the boundary between two types of philosophy. This is because it is the boundary between two human psychic types, who happen to be philosophers.

Our conclusion is, then, that philosophies can be typed according to the psychological differences of their authors, and that such typing can serve the useful purpose of aiding in the adjustment of conflicting views.

²⁵Ibid., p. 35.

²⁶Ibid.

These could be not only conflicting views held by different persons, but conflicting views held by the same person and which may have baffled his every attempt at reconciliation, yet neither of which he was willing to surrender. Jung writes:

It is a fact which is constantly and overwhelmingly apparent in one's practical work, that a man is well-nigh incapable of comprehending and giving full sanction to any other standpoint than his own. . . . It is my conviction that a basis for the adjustment of conflicting views could be found in the recognition of types of attitude, not however of the mere existence of such types but also of the fact that every man is so imprisoned in his type that he is simply incapable of a complete understanding of another standpoint. Without a recognition of this far-reaching demand a violation of the other's standpoint is practically inevitable.²⁷

Turning specifically now to the question of freedom, there are few, if any, philosophical problems which are more sensitive to the dynamic determining power of extraversion and introversion than this one. Whatever else a thinker's doctrine of freedom may be, it is primarily his conception of the relation of 'self' to the 'not-self.' The question of freedom is the question concerning the individual's sense of personal responsibility and possibility vis-à-vis the facticities of the world. It seems reasonable to suppose--indeed, it even seems obvious--that where the object is made

²⁷Jung, Psychological, pp. 620-21.

superordinate to the subject, the freedom of the latter will be viewed as limited or even non-existent. Conversely, the superordination of the subject favors a heavy emphasis on freedom. Determinism, for example, is the doctrine of the absolute supremacy of the environment, which is the 'cause' of which the subject is the 'effect.' E. L. Thorndike's statement of the ideal aim of psychological science expresses this in extreme form:

A complete science of psychology would tell every fact about everyone's intellect and character and behavior, would tell the cause of every change in human nature, would tell the result which every educational force--every act of every person that changed any other or himself--would have. It would aid us to use human beings for the world's welfare with the same surety of result that we now have when we use falling bodies or chemical elements.²⁸

This states precisely the basic assumption of the cybernetic approach to social theory, that human behavior is totally determinable from without, therefore totally predictable, therefore as manipulable as physical phenomena.

This extreme doctrine of determinism is counterbalanced in the philosophical marketplace by an equally extreme view of freedom. Jean Paul Sartre holds that human freedom is unlimited by anything except itself.

²⁸Quoted in Proceedings of Association of Disciples for Theological Discussion (1962). Privately circulated.

He declares, ". . . No limits to my freedom can be found except freedom itself."²⁹ Freedom is all-or-nothing: "Man cannot be sometimes slave and sometimes free; he is wholly and forever free or he is not free at all."³⁰ Again: ". . . Either man is wholly determined . . . or else man is wholly free."³¹ Freedom is no mere mode-among-other-modes of human existence but "is identical with my existence."³² Therefore it has its locus throughout the entirety of man's psychic being: ". . . It cannot be limited to voluntary acts" but includes the passions as well.³³

How can the existence of these extreme, mutually exclusive views be explained except on the basis of that "personal psychological pre-disposition" of which Jung speaks? Neither determinism nor libertarianism is a simple and straightforward reading of the facts. If this were the case, as many exponents of each view would like us to believe, then the centuries-old controversy over determinism versus free-will could have been settled long ago. But, as Charles H. Patterson says,

²⁹Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 515.

³⁰Ibid., p. 441.

³¹Ibid., p. 442.

³²Ibid., p. 444.

³³Ibid.

. . . the issue between human freedom and determinism is one that cannot be settled by any of the scientific information we possess concerning the causes of human behavior. The facts can be interpreted in accordance with the principles of determinism, or they can with the same degree of consistency be interpreted in a manner that allows for freedom. There is nothing in any of the physical or social sciences to indicate which of these two opposing explanations is the true one.³⁴

This neutrality of the facts does not prevent Patterson from making a decision, however. He commits himself to the libertarian position on what he claims are primarily logical grounds.³⁵ Taking as his premise the individual's sense of obligation and freedom, he argues that since no known facts forbid it, it is unreasonable not to accept freedom as real. His logic is every whit as sound as that which lies behind Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, or behind William James' "The Dilemma of Determinism." But his logic is not a whit sounder than that of the scientific determinism whose argument has been summarized by J. D. Mabbott in the Encyclopaedia Britannica:

Could it be possible . . . that the behaviour of a single species on a minor planet in one of the countless solar systems should escape a type of determination which had been found to apply to the smallest particle of matter and the largest and most distant heavenly bodies? Everywhere nature showed itself to be the playground of

³⁴ Charles H. Patterson, Moral Standards (New York: The Ronald Press, 1957), p. 342.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 340.

irresistible forces and subject to complete and exact scientific prediction. To explain an event was to give the causes whose conjunction rendered it inevitable. It was true that until 1850 these had been justified only in the world of inanimate matter. But Charles Darwin in biology, Karl Marx in sociology, and Ivan Pavlov and Sigmund Freud in psychology were now to advance causal explanation across the frontiers of life and mind.³⁶

Even if the Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy has forced scientists to speak no longer of "irresistible forces" and to abandon the idea of absolute predictability in favor of statistical probabilities, the subsequent history of the determinist-freedom controversy fails to reveal an appreciable advantage accruing to the libertarian side. Bertrand Russell, at least at one stage of his development, could still counsel "unyielding despair" as the only sure foundation upon which to build the habitation of the soul in a world in which "man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving" and which would inexorably roll over him and all his works like a juggernaut.³⁷ The only freedom in such a world is to acquiesce in the inevitable. Donald C. Williams writes, ". . . For every moralist who, like Kant, has believed morality impossible

³⁶John David Mabbott, "Free Will," Encyclopaedia Britannica (1963), IX, 746-50.

³⁷Quoted, John Herman Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modern Mind (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1940), p. 582.

without free will we can name another who, like Baruch Spinoza, has thought the uses of moral instruction and the difference between right and wrong are no more affected by determinism than are the validity of geometry and the difference between round and square."³⁸

In impasses of this sort it is well to look for the 'hidden agenda,' the psychic dynamis, that keeps the dispute alive. William James recognized that "the potentest of all our premises" in philosophical disputes are psychologically derived. He wrote:

"Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament . . . Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe, just as this principle or that fact would. He trusts his temperament."³⁹

On this insight he based his famous distinction between "tender-minded" and "tough-minded" types of philosophy. Although Jung is critical of this typology he nevertheless accepts it as an approximation to his introversion and extraversion types. A glance at the opposing characteristics of James' types, as compiled by Jung,

³⁸Donald C. Williams, "Free Will," Encyclopedia Americana (1965), XII, 46-47.

³⁹Quoted, Jung, Psychological, p. 372.

will suffice to show that the tender-minded philosopher is subject-orientated, while the tough-minded thinker is turned toward the object:⁴⁰

<u>Tender-minded</u>	<u>Tough-minded</u>
Rationalistic (going by principles)	Empiricistic (going by principles)
Intellectualistic	Sensationalistic
Idealistic	Materialistic
Optimistic	Pessimistic
Religious	Irreligious
Free-willist	Fatalistic
Monistic	Pluralistic
Dogmatical	Sceptical

Not by any means can all these pairs of opposites be predicated of introversion and extraversion. Free-will and determinism, however, are characteristic of the Jungian types.

Jung finds this antithesis to be of great psychological interest. He writes:

It is obvious that empiricism thinks causally, whereby the necessary connection between cause and effect is axiomatically assumed. The empiricistic attitude is orientated by the felt-into object; it is, as it were, "impressed" by the external fact with a sense of the inevitability of effect following cause. It is quite natural that the impression of the unalterableness of the causal connection should, psychologically, obtrude itself upon such an attitude. The identification of the inner psychic processes with the course of external facts is already granted by the fact that a considerable sum of one's own activity and life is unconsciously bestowed upon the object in the act of feeling-into. . . . The psyche, accordingly, labours under an

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 374.

impression of the unique validity of the causal principle . . . Of what consequence is that frail, indefinite feeling in face of the overwhelming mass of objective proofs to the contrary?⁴¹

Just as strongly, the psychology of the Introvert inclines him toward freedom. Concerning the Introvert's preoccupation with the "idea," which we have previously discussed, Jung writes:

As a paramount, inner, though unrepresentable fact, it [the "idea"] is super-ordinated to "objective" external facts, and yields, at least, a sense of its independence and freedom to the subject, who, as a result of this inner assimilation to the idea, feels himself independent and free vis-à-vis the object.⁴²

Determinism and libertarianism, then, as these positions have manifested themselves in the history of their controversy, represent one-sided points of view, each of which finds it well-nigh impossible to appreciate the other. They are founded upon attitudes which, in order to possess adaptation-value by being "directed," exclude the "irrelevant," and each is irrelevant for the other. Each point of view apprehends the world as furnishing convincing evidence only for its own position. The opposing position appears arbitrary and wrong-headed.

In the case of Nicolas Berdyaev and William

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 393-94.

⁴²Ibid., pp. 394-95.

Temple, however, we have to do, not with determinism versus freedom, but with a limited versus an unlimited freedom. This difference, too, yields to the extra-version-introversion analysis. For Temple understands freedom as belonging to man as an integral part of the world-whole, while Berdyaev understands it as the independence of personality in relation to the world. For Temple the world is the matrix of freedom; for Berdyaev it is the enemy of freedom. The dependence of the subject upon its objective environment is the very source of these "free ideas" of the mind upon which Temple based his solution for the problem of freedom. For Berdyaev personality represents an interruption of the world-process and is not explicable in terms of continuity with that process. For Temple freedom is "control of the parts by the whole which they constitute." For Berdyaev the world is the realm of "objectivization" which signifies "the enslavement of the spirit." Temple and Berdyaev in their understanding of freedom are opposites, not in the sense that one holds for freedom and the other does not, but in the sense that the conditions of freedom for one signify slavery for the other. This contrast is adequately explained only when we discover the "dynamic determinant" behind each philosophy in the psychology of the philosophers,

for they are dealing with the same human beings in the same world. Each personality focussed the reality of the world in a manner commensurate with his own psychic constitution. Each practiced his philosophical art in accordance with his own genius. Each man's philosophy is an intellectual reflection of himself as he stands revealed in his biography or autobiography.

It is psychologically and perhaps epistemologically naive to ask which philosophy is "right" and which is "wrong." To ask the question as intending anything more than ascertaining a personal preference is to assume what John Dewey calls "the ubiquity of knowledge as a measure of reality."⁴³ For Dewey this is the "intellectualistic fallacy" which assumed that mind is "a spectator beholding the world from without and finding its satisfaction in the joy of self-sufficing contemplation."⁴⁴ By revealing that an individual is not qualified to observe the world sub specie aeternitatis but only from that angle of vision which is permitted by the directedness of his basic attitude of consciousness, and that his conscious is differentiated out of the collective unconscious, Jung has provided an insight that

⁴³John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (New York: Minton, Balch & Co., 1929), p. 291.

⁴⁴Ibid.

is reinforced by the fundamental epistemological assumption of Pragmatism, viz., that the mind is within the world as an integral part of the world's continuous process. We can, of course, subject a philosophy to our 'tests of truth' and perhaps provide valid criticisms in regard to logical consistency, correspondence to fact, etc., but it remains true that the ensemble of a man's thought constitutes, as Alfred Kazin said of the fictionalist, his "quintessential commentary on the nature of things."⁴⁵ The crucial question in regard to it is best directed to ourselves: "Can I participate in his vision; can I appreciate his thought, finding it a viable system for the daily progression of my own psychic thrust?" We have the right to ask of the philosopher only that as an 'instrument' already prepared for some definite apprehension of reality, his philosophy shall accurately reflect his own point of view and not falsify the orientation of his own consciousness, not belie his own psychic encounter with the world.

At this point Jung's insistence that every viewpoint is "necessarily relative" becomes highly relevant. If a philosopher's formulation is an authentic reflection of his psychic encounter with reality, and cannot be

⁴⁵ Alfred Kazin, "J. D. Salinger: 'Everybody's Favorite'," The Atlantic, CCIIX (August, 1961), p. 29.

otherwise, his system will inevitably omit some aspect which can only be apprehended in some different orientation. As we have seen, this insight lies at the heart of Jung's solution to the puzzle of antagonistic psychological theories, and it is, of course, divergences in psychological theories that Jung is primarily concerned with. He realizes clearly, however, that differences in human psychology affect relations in other fields as well. For example, in the concluding chapter of his book on Psychological Types he criticizes social legislators who, on the basis of an assumed one-psychology-for-all, seek to establish general and uniform conditions that will make for the happiness of all.

No general external form could be devised, however equitable and just it might appear, that would not involve injustice for one or other human type. That, in spite of this fact, every kind of enthusiast--political, social, philosophical and religious--is at work endeavouring to find those general and uniform external conditions which shall signify a more general opportunity for happiness, seems to me to be linked up with a general attitude to life too exclusively orientated by external facts.⁴⁶

Arnold Toynbee raises the same issue, specifically in relation to religion. "Is uniformity or diversity more blessed in the practice and presentation

⁴⁶Jung, Psychological, p. 619.

of Religion?" he asks.⁴⁷ In answer to his own question, Toynbee says,

Uniformity is not possible in Man's approach to the One True God because Human Nature is stamped with the fruitful diversity that is a hallmark of God's creative work, and psychologically diverse human souls need different lenses for seeing, through a glass, a Beatific vision . . . If each of these religions did not genuinely satisfy some widely experienced human need, it is indeed hardly conceivable that each of them should have succeeded, as each had done, in securing the allegiance of so large a portion of the Human Race.⁴⁸

Toynbee then offers a tentative interpretation of the living higher religions in terms of Jung's functional types, discussed in Chapter I above. The exclusive identification of each religion with one of these functions, and the claim to exclusive validity which went along with it, provides the dynamis by which Toynbee explains in part the "ebb and flow in which, in the history of the higher religions, antithetical features of the religious life had asserted and reasserted themselves against one another in divers fields, without any one of them ever succeeding in permanently suppressing their opposites or succumbing to being permanently suppressed for their own part . . ."⁴⁹

⁴⁷Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), VII, 442.

⁴⁸Ibid.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 721.

But if every philosophy is necessarily relative because it reflects the way in which reality comes to focus in the consciousness of the particular philosopher, by the same token there is in it the element of authenticity which is the source of its persuasive power, especially over those who share the philosopher's typical attitude. From the depths of his Existentialist, Personalistic conception of the nature of philosophy, Berdyaev writes, "Philosophy cannot help being personal even when it aspires to be objective. Every true philosophy bears the stamp of its author's personality."⁵⁰ Again, ". . . Hegel's philosophy is no less subjective than Nietzsche's."⁵¹ And we can say that Temple's philosophy is no less subjective than Berdyaev's, except that he would not use the personal pronoun as often. What authentic insights can Temple the Extravert and Berdyaev the Introvert give us, and at what points does it become apparent that each philosophy needs the complementation provided by its opposite?

The appeal of each of these powerful philosophies lies precisely in its subjectivity. A classical

⁵⁰Nicolas Berdyaev, Solitude and Society (London: The Centenary Press, 1938), p. 26.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 28.

Extravert has, from the depths of his positive identification with the object, revealed grounds for confidence in the friendliness of the universe toward human values, vigor in tradition and institutions that often seem too rigid or senile to serve longer in furtherance of man's aspirations, and possibilities of change for the better in the oppressive power structures of human society. Temple induces a feeling of 'at-home-ness' in a "Sacramental Universe." Christians, especially churchmen, who have grown tired, discouraged, or indifferent are challenged to discover new potency in the Church. Temple, in the words of a London reporter, "put the Church on the map," an accomplishment not likely for an Introvert.

In November 1942, and April 1943, cartoons by Low appeared in the London Evening Standard. In one of them William Temple, dressed in prelatical garb, stands with a compassionate hand resting on the bowed back of an emaciated and sorrowful figure who represents the underprivileged. He is confronted by a group of black-clad, dour-faced figures, one of whom extends to the Primate a tract entitled "The wickedness of introducing the Christian spirit into public affairs." Another gestures admonishingly with one hand and with the other points upward toward a haloed and winged cow bearing

the label "Sacred Traditions of Economics." The caption reads, "Be warned Sinner! Turn to Higher things." In the second cartoon Temple is holding a book titled "The Christian Aims," while standing in a meadow bearing the label "Economic Fields." He is faced by the figure of a fat man who is clad only in a towel which is wrapped around his waist, and who wears a fierce walrus mustache. He holds on a leash a straining bulldog which sports a similar mustache. With his left hand this figure points to a sign post which reads "Trespassers will be prosecuted," and is signed "Vested Interests." The caption reads, "Here, Sir, don't you know you're on private property?"

These cartoons, appearing in a great daily newspaper of mass circulation, have expressed the significance of William Temple's life. He became the man "whose words were heard and heeded in five continents."⁵² It was not the author of philosophical and theological treatises whose death was lamented by Franklin D. Roosevelt, but the promoter of Christian principles applied to international relations. The Hearst press of this country attacked, not the Gifford

⁵²F. A. Iremonger, William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury, His Life and Letters (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), p. 73.

lecturer, but the chairman of COPEC, the critic of capitalistic finance, the assailant of the profits-before-men attitude of corporate business. Common people in widely separated quarters of the globe mourned his passing, not as the death of a revealer of the mysteries of theology, but as their fearless champion against underprivilege and exploitation. Churchmen of many denominations loved and trusted him as a sincere and understanding leader in the movement toward Christian unity. He was "The People's Archbishop" because he was the people's friend. Temple's philosophy was but the intellectual canopy under which he wrought, the reflection in thought of the world into which he was concernedly integrated.

Yet in this age of the collectivized society, the "organization man," "other-directedness," suburban homogeneity, and the function-focussed evaluation of the individual in our Western societies, it was Berdyaev the Introvert, who thought external action a failure, who appealed to many as the apostle of freedom. Jung has shown that extraversion and introversion are randomly distributed. This suggests that our society contains many covert Introverts who are forced by the conditions of 'success' to falsify their own nature. American civic and fraternal clubs, and even churches, seem to be

committed, more or less consciously, to the cult of extraversion. We have elevated the persona to a position of near-absolute power.

In this situation there must be many who hear Sartre's "Existence precedes essence" and Berdyaev's "Being is congealed freedom" as a word addressed to their condition. In the Existentialist perspective the subject stands over against being, the generic, the object-world, and is not to be defined by reference to them. To be a subject is to be free. Sartre says, ". . . man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world and defines himself afterward." The "prime dimension of all concrete reality" is "total human existence in its movement in time," says John Brown.⁵³ To exist as a subject is to be always on the move, on the make. Man is a "possibility poised between two nothingnesses."⁵⁴ Man's task is to create his own essence out of his lonely freedom. Man is only what he makes of himself. For Berdyaev man is a "pilgrim" sojourning in an alien world. For Sartre man is "a project which possesses a subjective life, instead of being a kind of moss, or a fungus, or a cauliflower." In this outlook value is summed up in a

⁵³ John Brown, Subject and Object in Modern Theology (London: SCM Press, 1955), p. 84.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

single phrase: Authentic Selfhood.

Evidence that this philosophy has sounded a note of authenticity is found in the coincidence of its emphases with the emphases of that "Third Force" psychology which is developing in America under the leadership of men like Abraham Maslow. This "Third Force" is an alternative to the Freudian approach and the "experimental-positivistic-behavioristic" psychologies which between them have dominated psychology until recently.⁵⁵ Maslow includes in the group the Adlerians, Rankians, and Jungians, "as well as all the neo-Freudians (or neo-Adlerians) and the post-Freudians (psychoanalytic ego-psychologists as well as writers like Marcuse, Wheelis, Marmor, Szasz, N. Brown, H. Lynd, and Schactel who are taking over from the Talmudic psychoanalysts) . . . Kurt Goldstein . . . G. Allport, G. Murphy, J. Moreno, and H. A. Murray."⁵⁶ Maslow, for his part, seeks more accurate concepts than those of "psychological health" and "psychological illness." The direction of his search is suggested by his use of such terms as "self-actualization," which stresses "full-humanness," terms which he considers "less culturally relative."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Abraham Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1962), p. vi.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. iii.

Maslow concludes a chapter titled "What Psychology Can Learn From the Existentialists" with these words:

It is possible that existentialism will not only enrich psychology. It may also be an additional push toward the establishment of another branch of psychology, the psychology of the fully evolved and authentic Self and its ways of being. Sutich has suggested calling this onto-psychology.⁵⁸

In commenting on the need for such a psychology of full-humanness Maslow says, "Certainly it seems more and more clear that what we call 'normal' in psychology is really a psychopathology of the average, so undramatic and so widely spread that we don't even notice it ordinarily."⁵⁹ This is the psychology of "adjustment" and it is not difficult to perceive in it that conformity to the collective norm which Jung sees as being a major pre-occupation of the Extravert, and which to an Introvert like Berdyaev is equivalent to the "plebian" mentality which is sheer slavery. Maslow's proposal of a psychology of full-humanness is one in which the Introvert as well as the Extravert will be acknowledged as having his part in "psychological health." "The existentialist's study of the authentic person and of authentic living helps to throw this general phoniness, this living by illusions and by fear into a harsh, clear light which reveals it clearly as sickness, even tho widely shared."

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

On this point, call to mind Berdyaev's analysis of "collectivization," and his application of Dostoievsky's Legend of the Grand Inquisitor.

Maslow interprets the Existentialists as "responding to something real outside themselves," and that "something real" is "the total collapse of all sources of value outside the individual."⁶⁰ Even the Americans have learned that "political democracy and economic prosperity don't in themselves solve any of the basic value problems." This is precisely the reason why Berdyaev was equally severe with Communistic totalitarianism and Western culture, "Too Russian for the West and too European for the East, but nevertheless a messenger of a new age, in which some sort of synthesis between the Spirit of Western Europe and Russia is bound to be attempted."⁶¹ This synthesis will require something more, or other, than the Russian Pavlovian and the Western Freudian psychologies; perhaps the onto-psychology to which men like Berdyaev are seen as contributing.

"In face of what privileged situation have you made the experience of your freedom?" Sartre asks.⁶²

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 10.

⁶¹F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 163.

⁶²Quoted by Heinemann, Ibid., p. 112.

A privileged situation is one in which no demands can be made upon the individual, as nothing except passivity could be expected of a man dying of cancer. It corresponds to that "total collapse of all sources of value outside the individual" of which Maslow speaks. Amidst the collapse of the whole social and cultural synthesis which supported the values by which it was supposed that men ought to live, who could blame them if they no longer regarded those values? Who could blame the French resistance fighters had they lost their integrity as persons during the German occupation? This is the "privileged situation" to which Sartre referred. All their rights were lost, including the right to talk, they were insulted and humiliated daily, they were hunted down and tortured --yet, says Sartre, "We were never more free" than during this experience.⁶³ The attention of each man was forced, not to the objective situation, but to his part in the relation to the objective situation: "If they torture me . . .?" "Thus the basic question of liberty was posed," says Sartre, "and we were brought to the verge of the deepest knowledge that man can have of himself. For the secret of man is not his Oedipus complex or his inferiority complex: it is the limit of his own liberty,

⁶³Quoted by Heinemann, Ibid., p. 112.

his capacity for resisting torture and death."⁶⁴ This is a form of the preoccupation of the Introvert: the integrity of his Self in face of the object.

Berdyaev, twice imprisoned, twice exiled, the second time permanently, also lived in a privileged situation, strikingly similar to Tillich's "boundary situation." This, coupled with his strong introversion, led him to elaborate the individual in his aloneness, his responsibility for himself, his self-making, his freedom. Along with the same emphasis made by others of his type, this is contributing to the developing synthesis in psychology with which Abraham Maslow is identified. Maslow writes,

American psychologists have listened to Allport's call for an idiographic psychology but haven't done much about it. Not even the clinical psychologists have. We now have an added push from the phenomenologists and existentialists in this direction, one that will be very hard to resist, indeed I think theoretically impossible to resist. If the study of the uniqueness of the individual does not fit into what we know of science, then so much the worse for that conception of science. It, too, will have to endure re-creation.⁶⁵

Relevant to the problem of freedom as one which psychology can no longer afford to ignore, Gordon Allport writes:

⁶⁴Quoted by Heinemann, Ibid., p. 114.

⁶⁵Maslow, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

It is customary for the psychologist, as for other scientists, to proceed within the framework of strict determinism, and to build barriers between himself and common sense lest common sense infect psychology with its belief in freedom. But to our discomfort recent events have raised the issue all over again. Existentialism insists on freedom; much of the psychotherapy now in vogue presupposes it; psychology's new concern with values is at bottom a concern with choices . . . The scientist's frame of reference is like the frame of an omniscient being: to him all things have time, place, and determined orbits. But this frame is definitely not the frame of the acting person . . . As psychologists we ought to know, and do know, that the way a man defines his situation constitutes for him its reality . . . It is because existentialism takes always the acting person's point of view that it insists so strongly upon the attribute of freedom in man's nature.⁶⁶

Psychologists like Maslow and Allport, deeply concerned with the individual and his growth and open to evidence and insights from any quarter, thus afford evidence of the relevance of a philosophy which is formulated from the point of view of a strongly introverted personality.

But the philosophy of William Temple requires the opposite point of view. Temple, the disciplined servant of great causes, must find his source of values in the objective world. He was a man of loyalty in the Roycean sense, the loyalty which says, "I am the servant of this cause, its reasonable, its willing, its devoted instrument, and being such, I have neither eyes to see

⁶⁶G. W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), pp. 83-84.

nor tongue to speak save as this cause shall command."⁶⁷
 It would be difficult to find a formula more fully expressive of the potency which the object possesses for the Extravert. It would be equally difficult to find a formula which better expresses Temple's understanding of freedom--willing submission to a cause for whose sake every impulse that is purely individual (segmental) is resolutely subordinated, so that eyes and tongue are totally at the disposal of the cause. Indeed, Temple is a good example of Royce's concept of "loyalty to loyalty," for the former is accurately reflected in the following passage from the writings of the latter:

My cause cannot be merely forced upon me. It is I who make it my own . . . Since this is the case, . . . I can of course determine my loyalty . . . by the consideration of the actual good and ill which my proposed cause does to mankind . . . I can define a principle of choice which may so guide me that my loyalty shall become a good, not merely to myself, but to mankind.⁶⁸

Temple the world figure was simply the Temple whose conscious devotion to his beloved England was expanded to include the whole world in his "Beloved Community" (Royce). Furthermore, Temple both taught and exemplified Royce's judgment that:

⁶⁷Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908), p. 106.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 120.

Loyalty without self-control is impossible. The loyal man serves. That is, he does not merely follow his own impulses. He looks to his cause [Temple: "purpose"] for guidance. His cause tells him what to do, and he does it. His devotion, furthermore, is entire. He is ready to live or die as the cause directs . . . Your cause, you take, then, to be something objective--something that is not your private self. It does not get its value merely from your being pleased with it . . . You love it just because of its own value, which it has by itself, even if you die.⁶⁹

It would be useless to expect Temple to appreciate that introverted point of view which sees "this world" as having the "nature of Ariman," to understand why Ivan Karamazov wanted to return his ticket of admission to "world harmony"; he could not be expected to take seriously Camus' insistence in the Myth of Sisyphus that suicide is the central problem of philosophy, viz., the issue of whether or not man should commit the ultimate godlike act of changing the basic conditions of life by the only means open to him.⁷⁰ How could Temple, "at home and happy" in his "friendly universe," appreciate attitudes which are rooted in an overpowering sense of the world's instability and unreality?

It was because Temple trusted the educational and

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

⁷⁰ I owe this suggestion as to the meaning of the central problem of the Myth of Sisyphus to Dr. Donald Rhoades of The Southern California School of Theology.

training institutions of society that he could assign to them the task of providing that discipline by which the individual is "brought . . . to freedom." In view of his own fortunate background of institutional relations, how could Temple be expected to appreciate the Sartrean and Berdyaevan negation of social institutions and refusal to be institutionally bound? Yet Temple was blind to what the psychotherapists know well, and that is that even with good intentions and even when conducted with intelligence, our social institutions can make havoc of sound individual personality development. Andras Angyal, for example, recognizes as a healthy personality one which has actualized two major tendencies, namely, the tendency toward self-mastery and that toward self-surrender (autonomy and homonomy). Socialization through institutional discipline is hazardous for the individual and for society itself, for homonomy is impossible if the individual is unable to "organize the relevant items of his world out of the autonomous center of government that is his self."⁷¹ But it is precisely our institutions which threaten this development.

"In the neurotic development," writes Angyal,

⁷¹Andras Angyal, "A Theoretical Model for Personality Studies," The Self: Explorations in Personal Growth, ed. Clark Moustakas (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956).

"there are always a number of unfortunate circumstances which instil in the child a self-derogatory feeling."⁷²

Prominent among these are the following:

1. The over-protective attitude of an insecure, anxious parent which tends to convey to the child a feeling that he lives in a world that is full of dangers, and with which he is unable to cope;
2. The over-eagerness of the parent for the child's success, leading the parent to be overly critical, thus instilling in the child the feeling that "something must be very wrong with me; I can't do anything right";
3. Exaggerated praise of the child's accomplishments, which leads him to feel that great things are expected, though he knows that the expectation is unrealistic, thus engendering a feeling of unworthiness;
4. The constant "don'ts" of parents, which lead the child to feel that his desires are forbidden and evil;

⁷²Ibid.

5. The myriad of ways in which an adult-dominated society treats the child with disrespect.

Yet all of these are mistakes which can be, and are, committed by 'good' and intelligent parents and institutional leaders. Institutional discipline can hardly avoid victimizing the child by one or another of these errors. Maslow writes,

Clearly, what will be called personality problems depends upon who is doing the calling. The slave owner? The dictator? The patriarchal father? The husband who wants his wife to remain a child? It seems quite clear that personality problems may sometimes be loud protests against the crushing of one's psychological bones, of one's true inner nature.⁷³

Further evidence is found in Betty Friedan's recent critique of "the feminine mystique," which she defines as the post-World War II idea that woman can find total fulfillment in her role as wife and mother.⁷⁴ Friedan contends that woman must find creative work of her own, and place her housework and marriage in a hierarchy of values. Yet society conspires to keep her 'in the home.' Friedan writes:

Women of orthodox Catholic or Jewish origin do not easily break through the housewife image; it is

⁷³Maslow, op. cit., p. 7.

⁷⁴Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1963).

enshrined in the canons of their religion, in the assumption of their own and their husband's childhoods, and in their churches' dogmatic definition of marriage and motherhood.⁷⁵

Temple needs a corrective at the point of his over-confidence in society, and it is best provided by some such introverted philosophy as Berdyaev's in which freedom depends upon man's sense of inner authenticity.

Without too much exaggeration one can say that Temple's vision of the "Sacramental Universe" is the universalizing of his own happy experience in the world. It is a philosophy the strongest appeal of which is to the highly differentiated, well-integrated Extravert, to whom this world is highly rational. But to one whose disillusionment and tragic sense of reality coincides with an introverted nature which seeks its reality-value within, it will seem unwarrantedly optimistic, and even oppressive in its view of freedom as the control of the part by the whole to which it integrally belongs. Or, if the reader is not philosophically sophisticated, Temple's philosophy may, contrary to Temple's intentions, engender a feeling of guilt in the reader whose temperament simply does not permit him to apprehend those aspects of the world which can be combined into a

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 351.

philosophy that implies the imperative to serve great social causes. The very persuasiveness of Temple's style, the systematic inclusiveness of his thought, and the personality of the man himself, combine to produce in the psychologically unaware reader a reinforcement of Karen Horney's "tyranny of the should." Yet some teachers of philosophy, themselves psychologically naive, being favorably impressed with Temple's system, will hold this system before the student in a way to imply that it is final, or the model for finality, not realizing the damage they may be doing to the student. For the particular student, some other type of philosophy might be the more "natural gradient" for his "psychic energy."

On the credit side of the ledger for Temple, the absence of discipline may also be a breeding ground for neurosis. One of the very remarkable things about William Temple was the ease with which he performed prodigious amounts of work with relish. For example, writing in the intervals of an extremely busy and responsible ecclesiastical career, he turned out a corpus of writing that would seem a lifetime of work to most men. He even sat up the night before his wedding to finish Mens Creatrix! Only discipline can produce such a personality. Maslow has a cogent word about such people. Speaking of the "easy self-discipline which is

customarily found in self-actualizing, authentic, genuine people and which is not found in average people," he writes:

In these healthy people we find duty and pleasure to be the same thing, as is also work and play, self-interest and altruism, individualism and selflessness . . . We know already that the main prerequisite of healthy growth is gratification of the basic needs . . . But we have also learned that unbridled indulgence and gratification has its own dangerous consequences, e.g., psychopathic personality, "orality," irresponsibility, inability to bear stress, spoiling, immaturity, certain character disorders . . . a large store of clinical and educational experience . . . allows us to make a reasonable guess that the young child needs not only gratification; he needs also to learn the limitations that the physical world puts upon his gratification, and he has to learn that other human beings seek for gratifications, too, even his mother and father, i.e., they are not only means to his ends. This means control, delay, limits, frustration-tolerance and discipline. Only to the self-disciplined and responsible person can we say, "Do as you will, and it will probably be all right."⁷⁶

But there is no alternative to Temple's insistence that self-discipline begins with externally imposed discipline, and this can only be applied by an agent whose authority is recognized, e.g., a social institution.

The definition of discipline that is implied in Maslow's statement above is, subjectively considered, respect for the 'given.' The world is not "my oyster." This is the import of Buber's "I and Thou." The

⁷⁶Maslow, op. cit., pp. 153-54.

subjectiveness of the Thou which I encounter is a 'given'; I am not 'free' to treat him as an object, and do so only at my peril.

It is at this point that Berdyaev's blind spots come into view. It is simply a fact that my freedom is limited by that in this world which is not-self. This is true by any meaningful definition of freedom. On the assumption that science is indispensable for contemporary man, to deny the foregoing statement is nonsense. It makes sense to ask whether man is free at all, but it makes no sense in a world committed to science to affirm that his freedom is unlimited. If it exists, it is limited. The existence of limiting givens is both a presupposition and a discovery of science. To deny the givens is to negate the science. Perhaps science can be negated some day, but now this is unthinkable. The scientific mode of intellectual functioning is a process of ascertaining and interpreting facts, and to this point in the development of the human mind no better method has been found for obtaining reliable knowledge. It is reliable knowledge that man lives in an environment upon which he is dependent and which to some extent shapes him. This reliable knowledge is expressed in the proposition that man is determined. To ask whether man is free is to ask, "Is there also reliable knowledge

which can be expressed by the proposition that 'Man is free'?" We are bound to submit the question to the method which has become indispensable. But to submit it to scientific inquiry is already to determine that freedom, if it exists, shall be limited. For if it were unlimited, science would be invalidated, for science presupposes as a condition of its own existence the reality of the distinction between knowing subject and object which is to be known but which resists our knowing. Science is a method for the investigation of the object. That is why it is difficult for sociology and psychology to establish themselves as being sciences in the sense in which physics and chemistry are sciences, for the former require that man become an object to himself. And that is why some psychologists are calling for an idiographic psychology, and that is why Maslow says, in the passage earlier quoted on page 311, "If the study of the uniqueness of the individual does not fit into what we know of science, then so much the worse for that conception of science. It, too, will have to endure re-creation." William A. Luijpen writes, "The self occurs only as involved in the facticity of body and world, with which it is not identical." This quality of being-subject-only-because-there-is-object means that man's ontological freedom is "very limited," that his

freedom "is at the same time immediately a bond," and he is caught in a kind of "powerlessness."⁷⁷ Apropos of the Existentialist claim of absolute freedom, Luijpen says that it would have to be granted if the subject were an "isolated subjectivity."⁷⁸ But if the subject were thus removed from the world, then it could not investigate the world; the subject would, for all practical purposes, be its own All; science as we know it could not exist.

If freedom were the All, it would be meaningless. Thus Jaspers argues against the claim of absolute freedom, since freedom is empty and meaningless except as it "unfold[s] itself continually and in struggle."⁷⁹ Only a "totality" to which all opposition is internal instead of any of it being external, could be absolute. That is, freedom absolute can exist only in a world that is all subject and no object. That would also be a world of no science.

As a people committed to "knowing" through "science," we have no real alternative approach to the question of freedom than that of which Charles H.

⁷⁷William A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1963), p. 269.

⁷⁸Ibid.

⁷⁹Quoted, Wilfrid Desan, The Tragic Finale (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 169.

Patterson's will serve as an example. He begins his discussion with an acknowledgement of the "Factors Which Influence Human Conduct."⁸⁰ Climate, geographical location, heredity, endocrine glands, psychic history and conditioning, the social environment, and educational factors--all have been shown "beyond doubt" to exercise a determining influence on human conduct. "As human beings our actions are without exception determined to some degree by forces over which we have no control."⁸¹ Patterson then formulates the problem of freedom in a way that takes these conditioning factors into account, a formulation that calls for the affirmation or denial only of a limited freedom:

However, the question still remains whether our natures are completely determined by these factors. Is it possible that their effects upon us are, to some extent, determined by ourselves, so that we are free to react to these conditions in one way or another? This is the real crux of the problem concerning human freedom.⁸²

The dispute over this issue has been inconclusive, and this is, of course, unsatisfactory. But it is no solution to cut the Gordian knot as Berdyaev, and also Sartre, have done. Each has in effect isolated the subject from the world. Therefore the philosophy of each

⁸⁰ Charles H. Patterson, Moral Standards (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1957), Chap. XII.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 340.

⁸² Ibid.

comes down, despite all claims or appearances to the contrary, against science. This study has already agreed with Berdyaev that philosophy is an art, the love of wisdom. This does not mean, however, that philosophy must not take as part of its data the findings of science. There is much to be said for Heinemann's criticism: "Berdyaev falls a victim to the very chaos of the West which he attempted to overcome. It is all very well to cry for liberty. But freedom in this extreme anarchical form is no liberty at all, in spite of the metaphysical aura by which it is here surrounded; on the contrary, it is just one of the causes of the present chaos."⁸³ Berdyaev teaches us to "guard the image of man" because it is "the image of God," but his philosophy needs a corrective which is best supplied by some such extraverted point of view as that represented by Temple's philosophy, which defines its doctrine of freedom within the limits of "The World as Apprehended" with the aid of man's most reliable method of obtaining knowledge.

Berdyaev's emphasis on freedom enables him to speak perhaps more movingly and profoundly on creativity than any other philosopher of our time. But if the

⁸³Heinemann, op. cit., p. 163.

history of human genius is any criterion, Berdyaev himself may fail to be ranked among the geniuses, precisely because of his lack of the discipline that freedom gains in its struggle against opposition. Again Heinemann speaks a telling word against him:

. . . He did not understand that creation calls for industry and work. He did not bother to reduce the vast material to its simplest and most perfect form. He did not see that creation implies the production of form, of structure, and therefore of the Repeatable. He did not grasp the function of repetition and the possibility of perfection within the realm of the Finite. Even the Infinite needs the finite for its realization.⁸⁴

Creativity was for Berdyaev the thrust toward the eternal. But he tried to take the eternal by storm, to realize the perfect freedom of God. He rejected "this world," he was impatient of restriction, refused to be institutionally bound, had no confidence in tentative melioristic action (by which real improvements have been effected), and longed in lonely exile for the apocalyptic revolution that would destroy the realm of necessity and "objectivization."

Berdyaev is subject to the same kind of criticism which we have directed to Temple. He, too, universalizes his personal experience, that is, his "alienation" from the world, and this he could not help. But it

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 162.

relativizes his philosophy, and there is the same indication that Berdyaev does not want his philosophy relativized as is present in other philosophers. His work will appeal strongly to those who are as introverted as he, but his view of freedom as a quality which marks man as the native of another world than this, and an alien in this one, will seem overly pessimistic to one whose "at-home-ness" and "happiness" in a "friendly universe" coincides with a deeply extraverted nature which has a tendency to find its reality-value in the objective realm. Berdyaev's philosophy, taken in the full rigor of its extreme emphasis on freedom and of its "aristocratic" view of creativity, is not a philosophy for men and women who are dependent for much of their security on a highly structured and specialized social order. Nor is it a philosophy for those who live in a democracy and must achieve improvement of the human condition by cooperative action. For many modern men and women, therefore, Berdyaev's philosophy is not viable, not wisdom.

Here, then, are two diverging types of philosophy, each persuasive and powerful. The undeniable note of authenticity in each is limited and relativized by the authenticity of the other. What shall the person do who is attracted to both? To repeat the second of

the two questions asked near the beginning of this chapter, must one philosophy rule out acceptance of the other, or can we find a basis in the "dynamic determinant" of the two on which to "serve two masters"?

CHAPTER VII

THE RECONCILIATION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL TYPES

Two results of the foregoing study are of vital significance to the problem of reconciling the divergent philosophies delineated. First, their reconciliation is primarily a psychological, rather than primarily an intellectual, problem; the determinants of the philosophies are psychic. Second, the divergence of these psychically determined philosophies reflects the bipolarity of the psyche; the differentiated, conscious attitude of the Introvert is opposed by undifferentiated extraversion in the unconscious, and vice versa. Every individual psyche contains both attitudes, and the very energy which renders the directed attitude of consciousness an effective instrument for the individual's adaptation to the world has its source in the tension of the opposites. This is in accordance with Jung's analogical description of the psyche as a relatively closed energetic system. Jung writes:

For every piece of conscious life that loses its importance and value--so runs the law [of the psyche]--there arises a compensation in the unconscious. We may see in this an analogy to the conservation of energy in the physical world, for our psychic processes have a quantitative aspect also. No psychic value can disappear without being replaced by another equivalent intensity.¹

¹C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of A Soul (New

I. ACCEPTING THE UNCONSCIOUS

Since it reflects the division of the individual psyche into opposites, the problem of having a whole philosophy is at bottom a problem of healing the inner split in man. It is a therapeutic problem.

An intellectual synthesis is produced by some conscious mind which will be characterized by its own one-sided attitude which it cannot help imposing upon the synthesis. This means that the third term of the Hegelian trinity--thesis, antithesis, synthesis--is actually just another thesis. The so-called intellectual synthesis merely extends the psychic split. If the dynamic determinants of philosophies are psychological, the only genuine synthesis takes place in the psyche. Apropos of religious disputes, Stephen Neill says, "A man can speak only of those things which he knows; for this reason all discussion of religious questions must be of the nature of witness; it cannot be frigid disquisition about merely intellectual terms."² The same can be said of the discussion of philosophical questions, with one correction, viz., to change the phrase "which

York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1933), p. 209. (Cited hereafter as Modern Man.)

²Stephen Neill, Creative Tension (London: Edinburgh House Press, 1959), p. 24.

he knows" to "which he encounters," since any philosophy is the record of the philosopher's psychic encounter with reality. Between witnesses there can be what Neill calls "creative tension" but not an intellectual 'synthesis' which only destroys the cutting edge of both witnesses. A philosophical system must be left alone in its particularity, for it is precisely in its particularity that its value lies as a suitable gradient for the daily advance of the individual's psychic energy in his adaptation efforts. The value of a philosophy as wisdom-for-living, consists in its efficacy as an activating symbol and a guide for what Jung has called the daily "progression" of psychic energy.

Since the problem of reconciliation is that of joining the opposites in man himself, it involves the necessity of the acceptance of the unconscious. Two considerations are highly relevant to this necessity:

- (1) Non-acceptance of the unconscious, because of an unnecessary fear of it, lies at the root of the antagonisms of the world, including philosophical antagonisms.
- (2) In the unconscious lies the neglected, even unsuspected, affinity for the very opposite of that philosophy which consciousness mistakenly claims to be the whole truth.

Jung has much to say concerning the wide-spread

fear of and prejudice toward the unconscious which depth psychology encounters. For example, "The unconscious, if not regarded outright as a sort of refuse bin underneath the conscious mind, is at any rate supposed to be of 'merely animal nature'."³ Much of this distrust is apparently due to Freud's discovery of the unconscious as the repository of unacceptable sexual and criminal tendencies which our social upbringing forced us to repress. Most men prefer to turn away from the threatening unconscious and to live their lives entirely in terms of their conscious orientation. It is essential at this point to be reminded that Jung revealed levels of unconscious content which cannot possibly be accounted for in terms of repression. This content is not something which "might as well be conscious," for much of it can never become conscious. On the contrary, the unconscious contains, at its deepest levels, the psychological deposit of the common experiences of the entire race since the beginning of time; it is the bond of oneness between individuals of every time and place who, on the conscious level, diverge sharply in their orientations. The unconscious is, as we have seen in Chapter I above, the vast, undifferentiated, supporting ocean on which the conscious floats

³Jung, Modern Man, p. 103.

like an island. It is the individual's measureless "undiscovered self," from which he is estranged by his inordinate attachment to his feeble consciousness.

Not only is there no warrantable reason for fear and prejudice against the unconscious, but there is imperative reason for gaining the self-knowledge that comes of heeding its presence and its demands. For, "There is an unconscious psychic reality which demonstrably influences consciousness and its contents. All this is known, but no practical conclusions have been drawn from it. We still go on thinking and acting as before, as if we were simplex and not duplex. Accordingly, we imagine ourselves innocuous, reasonable and humane" [and, we might add, possessed of the only 'true' philosophy].⁴ In the strength of this illusion we sit in judgment on others, attack them, even try to exterminate them.

We have seen, too, that the unconscious plays a compensatory role in relation to the conscious. All possible psychic attitudes and modes of functioning are contained in potentia in the unconscious. In this connection stands the significance of Jung's interpretation of regression. When the differentiated attitude is met by environmental demands for which it is not fitted, there is a damming up of energy, which then flows

⁴Ibid., p. 96.

backward into the unconscious, activating attitudes which, because of neglect, were hitherto possessed of too little psychic value to become conscious. The accrual of energy from the thwarted conscious attitude lifts the neglected attitude to the status of consciousness, and a new orientation is formed, progression is resumed. Many people have had this experience. It is in this capacity of the unconscious for giving birth to a new orientation that we find the affinity of the individual for a philosophy which is determined by the opposite psychic dynamic to the philosophy of his consciousness. Regression is the outraged judgment of the unconscious, penalizing the seizure of sole power by the upstart consciousness. The rise of introverted Existentialism is no accident. It is a warning of the near-bankruptcy of Western man's extraverted conscious attitude and philosophies. Some have tried to brush it off as a mere reaction to the horrors of World War II, but this criticism overlooks the fact that it is precisely when the status quo of conscious values breaks down that man turns his attention inward to heed the demands of the inner man. This, and all other language of the unconscious, should be heeded.

Progression is the balance of introversion and extraversion, of conscious and unconscious attitudes,

working together in harmony. It is the source of that vital feeling, zest, interest, which makes life seem worth the living. It is the psychological equivalent of the concept of freedom. As Gilbert Ryle says,

Despite the fact that theorists have, since the Stoics and St. Augustine, recommended us to describe our conduct in this way [i.e., as "results of counterpart hidden operations of willing"], no one, save to endorse the theory, ever describes his conduct, or that of his acquaintances, in the recommended idioms. No one ever says such things as that at 10 a.m. he was occupied in willing this or that, or that he performed five quick and easy volitions and two slow and difficult volitions between midday and lunch-time.⁵

Operations of willing are not experienced as such. But men do experience the vitality and zest of life that comes of adaptation efforts successfully concluded. There is no better name to give to this than freedom. And when it is not experienced in a way that can be reflected in an extraverted philosophy, then it is time . . . for introversion to have its word, and vice versa.

II. NOT ANTAGONISM, BUT POLARITY

This situation means that the divergent views of freedom which have been discussed, in as much as they are dynamically determined by extraversion and introversion,

⁵Gilbert Ryle, "The Myth of Volitions," Philosophic Problems: An Introductory Book of Readings, eds. Maurice Mandelbaum and others (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 315.

and as each has a right to existence, are related to each other as polarity and not as rival absolute monarchs, one of whom must be assassinated if the other is to reign. Polarity is like the positive and negative terminals of the storage battery, each of which is essential to the generation of electrical energy.

The wise man, instead of holding to the one and despising the other, will strive for the self-knowledge by which he shall recognize the authenticity of the philosophy that represents his unconscious attitude and which will enable him to "serve two masters." He may adopt the spirit of Pragmatism, and draw freely upon whichever philosophy best serves to effect the rapprochement of past experience and the demands of present circumstances. He may adopt the spirit of that dialectic which Stephen Neill recommends between the Christian and the religious non-Christian, and no sooner adopt a conscious position than he turns to his unconscious and says, "This is the kind of thing that I have experienced. Do you know what I am talking about? Have you experiences that seem to you to be in some way parallel to these?" [Or which my experience requires in some way as complementation?]⁶ If it seems silly to address one's

⁶Neill, loc. cit.

unconscious, recall that Jung has revealed the autonomy of the unconscious, that it is not under the control of the conscious and that it has its own demands and its own language for expressing them, e.g., dreams, etc. The unconscious addresses us, why should we not reply?

If a psychological attitude is to become effective in our experience through the instrumentality of a philosophy, then it must, of course, be conscious. Some will be able to admit to consciousness only one attitude at a time. These must utilize the principle of alternation. Others will be able to enlarge the conscious so that they can serve their two masters simultaneously, as the porter carries water on both shoulders. The problem of the reconciliation of the philosophical types can be attacked at the psychological level without necessarily being completely solvable at the rational level.

III. SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR PHILOSOPHERS AND TEACHERS OF PHILOSOPHY

The results of the foregoing study seem to this writer to support the wisdom of the following suggestions: (1) Appreciation of the solidarity of the generations: ". . . that apart from us they should not be made perfect."⁷ This involves tentative conclusions

⁷Hebrews 11:40.

consciously submitted to knowledge-yet-to-come for confirmation; willingness to live by tentativeness, being content to further rather than finish the task. (2) Appreciation of the solidarity of races, cultures, and traditions. This involves carrying on a dialogue with those outside our tradition, putting conclusions as proposals subject to criticism. (3) 'Role playing,' or exchange of identification, a mode of understanding through empathy. (4) Term commitment to one's philosophy, involving anticipation of the compensatory phase, or reversal of libidinal flow. This is a form of the principle of alternation. (5) Recognition of passionate conviction as a clue to the authenticity of another's philosophy.

The hypothesis elaborated herein requires testing by further study based on a more adequate sample. It is highly probable that the application of the concept of extraversion would reveal a high degree of correlation between the temperament and the philosophy of a thinker such as Josiah Royce. The factor of introversion would probably afford the basis for a correlation of the thought of Sartre and the psychic structure and dynamics of the man.

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